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‘Warrior: it’s a made-up thing; it sounds funny; you get called it by 
putting a uniform on; it’s like being called a legend…’ 
Junior Non-Commissioned Officer 
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In recent years, the British Army has begun to refer to its soldiers as ‘warriors’. This 
thesis asks as its central research question whether the term is appropriate. It explores 
the types of warrior represented in academia and examines the idea of ‘Warrior Ethos’; 
draws on concepts from evolutionary and social psychology; considers the warrior 
archetype; and discusses how these inform recent thinking about modern day 
warriorship. To see how the notion informs and reflects contemporary British Army 
martial identity, the views of soldiers, primary research collected through discussion 
groups, are documented; the opinions of a cohort of infantry Commanding Officers, 
offered by questionnaire, are recorded; and, finally, the thoughts of a number of senior 
officers, obtained through interview, are collated. In total over one hundred serving 
personnel were canvassed for their perception of martial identity and their sense of the 
word warrior. This is the first time that this issue has been examined in depth. The thesis 
makes an original contribution through extensive primary research with serving British 
soldiers in the immediate aftermath of recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
My argument is that the term warrior whilst superficially attractive, has a complex and 
multifaceted character which makes its adoption problematic. Other conclusions are that 
there is no agreed definition of a warrior in academia, in mythology, across armies, within 
the British Army or amongst British soldiers, and that the term can be simultaneously 
meaningful and inspiring but also banal or misleading. Further, it lacks authenticity, and 
in its current guise is an imposition rather than an organic reflection of British army 
culture. Accordingly it doesn’t resonate with British soldiers, and so is unlikely to gain 
purchase. This would not be the worst outcome: a more worrying consequence is a 
selective reading of the word that creates momentum toward behaviour in small groups 
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Glossary of Military Terms 
 
‘Ally’ British Army slang term for anything desirable or fashionable 
Banner Campaign name for operations in Northern Ireland 
BAOR  British Army of the Rhine 
BAR  British Army Review 
BCS  Battlecraft Syllabus: training instruction for the British Army 
Bde  Brigade: an army formation usually of 3 or more battalions or units 
‘CDRILS’ Mnemonic for British Army Values and Standards (V&S) 
CDS  Chief of the Defence Staff: the head of the British armed forces 
CFA Commander Field Army: responsible for the army’s deployable forces 
CGS  Chief of the General Staff: the head of the British Army 
CGC  Conspicuous Gallantry Cross 
‘Chippie’ Slang term for anything undesirable or common: the opposite of ‘ally’ 
CO Commanding Officer: usually responsible for 600 or more soldiers 
COIN  Counterinsurgency 
Comds Commanders 
Coy  Company: the collective term for a body of c100 soldiers 
Coy Comd Company Commander aka ‘OC’ 
DIPR  Defence Intellectual Property Rights 
DSO  Distinguished Service Order 
FG  Focus Group 
GS General Staff: describes British Army officers ranked Colonel and above 
G1 Staff Branch designation: administration, personnel and discipline.  
G2 Staff Branch designation: intelligence 
G3 Staff Branch designation: operations 
G4 Staff Branch designation: logistics 
Herrick Campaign name for operations in Afghanistan 
IFV Infantry Fighting Vehicle 
JNCO Junior Non-Commissioned Officer: Lance Corporal or Corporal 
MACA Military Aid to the Civil Authorities 
MOD Ministry of Defence 
MODREC MOD Research and Ethics Committee 
MC Military Cross 
MCO Major Combat Operations (aka ‘warfighting’) 
OC Officer Commanding: usually responsible for a company of soldiers 
OED  Oxford English Dictionary 
Op  Operation 
Para  Paratrooper: soldier of the Parachute Regiment 
PARA  Abbreviated regimental title for The Parachute Regiment 
P Coy ‘Pegasus Company’: selects soldiers for service as paratroopers 
RAF  Royal Air Force 
RAC  Royal Armoured Corps 
RHQ  Regimental Headquarters 
RIRISH Abbreviated regimental title for The Royal Irish Regiment 
RMAS  Royal Military Academy Sandhurst 
RN  Royal Navy 
RRT  Regimental Recruiting Team 
‘Scoff’  British Army slang term for food 
Sgt Sergeant 
SNCO Senior Non-Commissioned Officer: Sgts & Colour Sgts (or equivalent) 
SO  Staff Officer 
Telic  Campaign name for operations in Iraq 
UDR   Ulster Defence Regiment 
VC  Victoria Cross 
V&S  Values and Standards 






In recent years, the British Army has begun to refer to its soldiers as ‘warriors’: it treats 
warriorship the same as soldiering and recommends warrior ethos as a guiding 
philosophy. This thesis asks if the terminology is appropriate, establishes soldiers’ self-
conception, their role as group members1 and their relationship with society.2 It asks if 
warrior is a welcome descriptor, and whether the employment of the term is ‘accidental, 
coincidental or an intentional result of purposeful human decision-making.’3 The role of 
cognitive dissonance, where people try to make things that they know to be 
psychologically inconsistent, more consistent, is examined. 4  Warriors that generate 
strange and timeless fascination,5 who are subject to ‘a dazzling halo of poetry and of 
glory’6 but also echo ‘the cult of the kill’7 present this challenge. My argument is that the 
term whilst superficially attractive, has a complex, multifaceted character that makes 
easy adoption problematic. Simultaneously meaningful and inspiring, it is also banal and 
misleading. To understand its contemporary relevance, I scrutinise the literature and 
identify several warrior types. I then analyse British Army culture, and the myths and 
stories told around ‘guttering fires, to wring order and meaning out of the chaotic clash 
or arms.’8 The role of nature and nurture in the creation of martial identity is investigated 
and I give voice to soldiers on their perception of the word warrior9 uncovering through 
primary research and archival material ‘the different criteria by which soldiers appraise 
themselves and their service.’ 10  The thesis concludes with some thoughts on the 
 
1 Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg (eds), Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances, 
(Harvester-Wheatsheaf, London, 1990), 2, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226768706 
2 John W. Hackett, The Profession of Arms (London: Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd, 1983); Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, (Cambridge: 
Belknapp Press, 2008); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, (NY: 
Free Press, 2017); Hew Strachan, The British Army, Manpower, and Society into the Twenty-First Century, 
(London: Frank Cass, 2000). 
3 Matthew Ford, “Learning the Right Lessons: Military Transformation in Crisis and the Future of Britain’s 
Armed Forces,” in A Military Transformed?: Adaptation and Innovation in the British Military, 1792-1945, 
eds. Michael LoCicero, Ross Mahoney and Stuart Mitchell (Solihull: Helion & Co. Ltd, 2016), 246. 
4 Leon Festinger, "Cognitive Dissonance." Scientific American, 207:4 (Oct 1962): 93, www.jstor.org/stable/ 
24936719. 
5 John Keegan, Richard Holmes and John Gau, Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle, (New York: Konecky 
& Konecky, 1997), foreword by Frederick Forsyth, 5. 
6 E.T. Moneta, “What Is War?” The Advocate of Peace, 56:2 (Feb 1894): 29, https://www.jstor.org/stable/ 
20665070. 
7 Robert L. Ivie & Oscar Giner, “Waging Peace: Transformations of the Warrior Myth by US Military 
Veterans.” Journal of Multicultural Discourses, 11:2 (2016): 199, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
17447143.2016.1182174 
8 Philip Caputo, Rumor Of War, (London: Bodley Head, 2017), 355. 
9 The view of serving military personnel is often absent in the literature due mostly to organisational 
constraint on public engagement. The number of anonymous contributors to The Wavell Room is 
remarkable. Registering the voice of British soldiers is important though it should not silence others. Aimee 
Fox & David Morgan-Owen, “Whose Voice Matters? The British Army in 2018,” The Wavell Room, 21 Jun 
2018, https://wavellroom.com/2018/06/21/whose-voice-matters-the-british-army-in-2018/. 
10 Eyal Ben-Ari, Mastering Soldiers, Conflict, Emotions, and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit, (NY: 
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implications of promoting ‘warrior’ as an identifying term for British soldiers. 
 
Identity is ‘the human capacity – rooted in language – to know ‘who’s who’ (and hence 
‘what’s what’).’11 Yet sociocultural categorisations can be ‘utilized without much thought 
being given to how and when definitions of the term have changed,’ or alternative 
meanings. 12  Where warrior is the premise of soldier identity it should be clear, 
conceptually and practically. Simple or contradictory definitions fail to ‘live up to the 
realities of modern combat’ 13  and present instead ‘philosophical quandary’ and 
dilemma.14 Whilst some armies ‘have a strong tradition of precision in their military 
language, the British Army does not’15 so new terms require explanation. Sophisticated 
understanding, borne of explanation, over superficial attraction is more useful. Words 
carry hidden baggage that can determine perception. 16  Language ‘shapes thought 
patterns on which actions are based’17 and action is taken to resolve social problems.18 
Getting the language right is therefore critical for its implications. 
 
Warriors, according to the ‘accepted authority on the English language’19 make war: the 
warrior is ‘a fighting man’, and a soldier,  sailor, or airman, and a valiant or experienced 
man of war. This, though contestable for gender specificity and its broad service 
application, is relatively comprehensible. Defining warriors as ‘the fighting men of the 
ages celebrated in epic and romance and of pre-industrial peoples, for whom the 
designation soldier would be inappropriate’ is where the term becomes more 
complicated and intriguing. This historic allusion suggests exclusivity and invokes 
memory, myth and symbols that ‘represent a compact’ between individuals who assert 
primacy over other groups.20 Contemporary relevance is debatable not least for the 
aggressive suggestiveness of the term. Derived from the French word guerre meaning 
war, warrior (guerrier) in German is Kämpfer, meaning fighter and is a word that has a 
positive and not necessarily military connotation; more traditionally it is read as Kreiger 
 
Berghahn Books, 1998), 18. 
11 Richard Jenkins, Social Identity, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 5. 
12 Kevin Linch & Matthew McCormack, “Defining Soldiers: Britain’s Military, c.1740–1815,” War in History 
20:2 (Apr 2013): 146, https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344512471004. 
13 Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare, (UK: 
Basic Books, 2010), 52. 
14 Gilbert Ryle, “The Theory of Meaning,” in The Importance of Language ed. Max Black, (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962), 168-9. 
15 John Kiszely, “The British Army and Approaches to Warfare Since 1945,” Journal of Strategic Studies 
19:4 (1996): 197, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402399608437657. 
16 Adam Alter, “The Power of Names,” The New Yorker, 29 May 2013, https://www.newyorker.com/tech/ 
annals-of-technology/the-power-of-names. 
17 Albert Bandura, “Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency.” Journal of Moral 
Education, 31:2 (2002): 104, https://doi.org/10.1080/0305724022014322 
18 Hackett, Profession of Arms, 9. 
19 The Oxford English Dictionary (OED). 
20 Edward Burke, An Army of Tribes: British Army Cohesion, Deviancy and Murder in Northern Ireland, 
(Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2018), 27. 
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from the German word for war. To German soldiers, the anglicised version sounds ‘fierce 
and gladiatorial’.21 The OED would allow this and permits the warrior as a ‘persecutor’. 





My interest came from a declaration from General Sir Peter Wall, then Chief of the UK 
General Staff, who said in 2014 that the British Army had an ‘imbued warrior mentality’: 
I believe the warrior spirit and experience the British Army has acquired 
during its long decade of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan means it is ready 
for the challenges it is likely to face in the years ahead. We can be confident 
we have a ‘warrior generation’ who have the skill and fighting ability to play 
their role in the nation’s defence and its security interests.22 
He authoritatively heralds those who ‘made war’ and encourages soldiers through ‘a 
common social construction’ similar to that which tells armies that some supreme being 
is on their side in times of war.23 I initially thought the title attractive but on reflection 
decided the issue deserved deeper thought, not only for its defining martial utility on a 
narrow ‘warfighting’ front, but more so for the introduction of an unfamiliar term of identity 
for British soldiers. It is also unclear whether his message is linguistic or expressive: the 
former sees sender and subject with ‘no necessary connection’ but is intended; the latter 
allows the sender to ‘deny he meant quite what others claim he meant’.24 
 
Anthony King tells us that Britain’s armed forces ‘have changed profoundly over the last 
two decades’.25 With the UK contemplating its relations with Europe, security concerns 
over a resurgent Russia, an emergent China and a volatile Gulf region, further change 
is inevitable. These provide critical junctures, ‘relatively short periods of time during 
which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the 
outcome of interest.’26 Such junctures challenge existing norms.27 In 2017 the British 
infantry, produced seminal doctrine focussed on warrior ethos, that ‘characteristic spirit’: 
...that that separates the Infantryman from other soldiers and the attitude 
 
21 Sarah Katharina Kayß, “War, Combat and Peacekeeping,” The Wavell Room, 20 Sep 2018, 
https://wavellroom.com/2018/09/20/war-combat-peacekeeping/ 
22 Christopher Hope & Con Coughlin, ‘UK Troops: a New 'Warrior Generation,” The Daily Telegraph, 4 Aug 
2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/defence/11009347/Afghanistan-has-left-
Britain-with-a-warrior-generation-of-soldiers-says-top-general.html. 
23 David L. Hull, “In Search of Epistemological Warrant,” in Selection Theory and Social Construction: The 
Evolutionary Epistemology of Donald T. Campbell, eds., Cecilia Heyes & David L. Hull (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2001), 162. 
24 Erving Goffman, Behavior in Public Places, (NY: Free Press, 1963), 13-14. 
25 Anthony King, The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics And Cohesion In The Twentieth And Twenty-First 
Centuries, (Oxford: OUP, 2019), 418. 
26 Giovanni Capoccia & R. Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures,” World Politics 59:3 (Apr 
2007), 348, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40060162.  
27 Adrian Hyde-Price & Charlie Jeffery, “Germany in the European Union: Constructing Normality,” Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 39:4 (Nov 2001): 693, https://doi/pdf/10.1111/1468-5965.00327. 
12 
that marks him out as extraordinary in the profession of arms. The Warrior 
Ethos is rooted in our Values and Standards but it is also more than this. It 
is the state of mind which inspires Infantrymen to go that bit further and 
work that bit harder than they believe is possible.28 
Operating beyond the Army’s norms29 distinguishes the infantry from other soldiers. 
Warriorship is its measure: ‘If we want our soldiers to behave like Warriors then we must 
treat them like Warriors.30 Soldier as an identity isn’t ‘thick enough’:31 warrior is preferred. 
 
Regiments have adopted the term:32 Army programmes use ‘warrior’ as a descriptor.33 
The Achilles Project 34  and the Warrior 
Programme promote well-being in 
soldiers;35 the Warrior Games have been 
established.36 The head of the Field Army 
has declared his desire for an organisation  
‘bold, innovative, with a warrior spirit and 
an unrelenting will to win’.37  Recruitment 
strategy incorporates ‘warriors’, alongside 
the iconic bayonet38 (opposite) as a device 
to attract trainees. 39  It was suggested 
during the research that the term 
originated ‘bottom up’ from regiments not 
‘top down’ from the Army.40 In fact it has 
sprung omni-directionally and is popular 
even with veterans. 41  The concept is increasingly discussed 42  but the speed of its 
 
28 UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), “The Infantry Battle Craft Syllabus,” (BCS), restricted circulation, (2017), 
3. Permission to quote granted by MOD (DIPR) email to author 10 Jul 2018. 
29 UK MOD, “A Soldier's Values and Standards,” https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/our-people/a-
soldiers-values-and-standards/. 
30 BCS, 5. 
31 Cheyney Ryan, “The Dilemma of Cosmopolitan Soldiering,” in Heroism and the Changing Character of 
War: Toward Post-Heroic Warfare? ed. Sybille Scheipers, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 135. 
32 “Yorkshire’s Warriors” were at Waterloo and D-Day; Royal Welsh Regiment soldiers are to “perfect the 
ways of the modern warrior” and ‘#RIRISHWARRIOR’ identifies the Royal Irish Regiment. UK MOD “Who 
We Are: The Infantry,” https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/corps-regiments-and-units/infantry/. Infantry 
soldiers are: ‘Skilled warriors, naturally. Adaptable military professionals, definitely’ (@ArmyInfantryHQ, 28 
Mar 2019) and infantry regiments in the round are described on Twitter by ‘#CLOSECOMBATWARRIOR’. 
33 Exercises often have the ‘warrior’ suffix, for example Agile Warrior and Autonomous Warrior. 
34 To strengthen the mind, body and soul of soldiers in training (@CO_AFC, 22 Jan 2019). 
35 Marco Giannangeli, “British Soldiers Forego ‘Warrior Fried Breakfast’ For Avocado On Toast ‘To Tackle 
Obesity’,” The Daily Express, 7 Jul 2019, https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1150219/british-army-fitness-
diet-health-regime. 
36 To instil competitive spirit and teamwork (@ArmyInfantryHQ 24 Jul 2019).  
37 Commander Field Army tweet (@field_army) 10 Sep 2019  
38 For a history see Tim Ripley, Bayonet Battle: Bayonet Warfare in the 20th Century, (London: Sidgwick & 
Jackson, 1999). 
39 General Staff Officer #2 (hereafter ‘GS2’) interview with the author, 14 Feb 2019. “Infantry Branding” 
design dated Jul 2018. Permission for use granted by UK MOD by email to the author on 03 Apr 2019. 
40 GS6,15 Mar 19, timestamp 40:10. 
41 ‘Warrior RV’ is for ‘serving and ex serving warriors,’ https://warriorsrvopsroom.com. 
42 “Securing Competitive Advantage,” RUSI Conference, 05 June 2019. A soldier presented: “I’m a Soldier, 
 
Fig. 1.1: Infantry Branding Flashcard 
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appearance and opacity of origin gives concern: the ‘faster a theory grows in terms of its 
effect and reach, the greater the capacity for confusion and misinterpretation.’43 
 
Warriorship is often associated with US forces where warrior ethos is promoted,44 even 
chanted, as part of daily routine.45 Incidents in the Iraq campaign in 2003 indicated that 
fighting skills had been relegated to secondary importance.46 ‘They'll tell you, 'I'm a 
mechanic,' not 'I'm a soldier,' and we've got to change that…’.47 The terms warrior and 
soldier so became synonymous and Warrior Ethos supplanted the Soldier’s Creed.48 
American soldiers are now ‘Warriors, Leaders, Professionals, Servants’.49 The concept 
remains popular with the Army urged ten years later to ‘renew Project Warrior.’50 Recent 
wars ignited the concept in others as well. In 2006 the ‘return of the Canadian warrior’51 
was marked (though the term was not explained)52 and Australia has been deploying a 
‘special class of warrior’ to combat zones.53 This may be military isomorphism, where 
‘weapons and military strategies begin to look the same across the world’54 or the seizing 
 
Not a Warrior - the Problem with ’Warrior Ethos'.” At the RUSI launch of the UK Strategic Command a BBC 
journalist, tweeted: ‘I’ve just heard a British RM [Royal Marine] General talk about the need for UK armed 
forces to employ “information warriors”. He was being serious.’  @bealejonathan, 18 Feb 2020 
43 Matthew J Hornsey, "Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory: A Historical Review." Social 
& Personality Psychology Compass, 2:1 (2008): 205, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ 
j.1751-9004.2007.00066.x 
44 US Army Values state: ‘I am an American Soldier. I am a Warrior.’ “US Department of Defense (DOD), 
“The Warrior Ethos,” https://www.army.mil/values/warrior.html. 
45 Steven L. Gardiner, “The Warrior Ethos: Discourse and Gender in the United Army Since 9/11,” Journal 
of War & Culture Studies, 5:3 (2012), 371, https://doi.org/10.1386/jwcs.5.3.371_1. Soldiers in training 
scream ‘kill’ hundreds of times each day. D. Dixon, “The LAWS Virtues: Rebuilding Our Scholarly Culture,” 
Marine Corps Gazette 98:7 (Jul 2014): 74. 
46 Vernon Loeb, “Army Plans Steps to Heighten Warrior Ethos,” The Washington Post, 08 Sept 2003, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/09/08/army-plans-steps-to-heighten-warrior-
ethos/aafb2625-a33d-48ca-8fcf-3ef2747f1243/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.87357ce8520a. The unit was 
the 507th Maintenance Company. See Rick Bragg, I Am A Soldier Too: The Jessica Lynch Story, (NY: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).  
47 Attributed to General Byrnes. Argiris Malapanis, “Each Soldier a Rifleman: Radical Shift in U.S. Army,” 
The Militant, 67:32, (22 Sep 2003), http://www.themilitant.com/2003/6732/673204.html. 
48 US DOD, FM 3-21.75 “The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills,” (Washington, DC: Dept of the 
Army, 2008), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-21-75.pdf. The original Creed introduced in the aftermath 
of the Vietnam War, had greater emphasis on ethical behaviour. “The old Soldier’s Creed came down to 
‘doing the right thing’. I like that.” Sarah Baxter, “US Army's Kill-Kill Ethos Under Fire,” The Sunday Times, 
24 Sep 2006, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/us-armys-kill-kill-ethos-under-fire-676x0q0w9zj 
49 Don M. Snider & Gayle L. Watkins, The Future of the Army Profession (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002), 11. 
50 US DOD, “Chief of Staff of the Army's Leader Development Task Force Final Report,” (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2013): 34, 53, https://docplayer.net18885929-2013-chief-of-staff-of-the-army-
leader-development-task-force-final-report.html on 29 Jan 2020. 
51 Tina Managhan, "Highways, Heroes, and Secular Martyrs: The Symbolics of Power and Sacrifice." 
Review of International Studies 38:1 (Jan 2012): 98, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210511000271  
52 Colin Magee, “The Way of the Warrior: A Warrior Ethos for the 21st Century,” in Dimensions of Military 
Leadership, ed. Allister MacIntyre & Karen Davis, (Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 21. 
53 Andrew Greene, “Defence Inquiry Into Alleged Unlawful Killings by Special Forces Demands Thorough 
Response,” ABC News, 22 Jun 2018, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-23/analysis-australian-war-
crime-allegations-demand-examination/9869738. Armies not known for warfighting are also declaring as 
warriors. Peter Murtagh, “Targets, Bullets and Soldiers: Deep in the Wicklow Mountains,” The Irish Times, 
01 Jul 17, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/targets-bullets-and-soldiers-deep-in-the-
wicklow-mountains-1.3139502. 
54 Joelien Pretorius, “The Security Imaginary: Explaining Military Isomorphism,” Security Dialogue, 39:1 
(Feb 2008): 99, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010607086825. The notion of mimicry is not immutable. Gat 
prefers military culture as circumstantial. Azar Gat, Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political 
Ethnicity and Nationalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012), 328. Equipment standardisation has been 
examined to show national choice has bearing alongside the influence of ‘evolving relational structures.’ 
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of a ‘common template’.55 Armies model on ‘organizations they perceive to be more 
professional and hence legitimate.’56 Perhaps warrior distinguishes western forces from 
less soldierly adversaries, or creates shared identity with less constrained proxy forces.57 
 
For the British Army this may be an attempt to emulate allies, to capture and instil in the 
British soldier some of the essence of their military power and martial strength. The 
introduction of the term warrior may be to persuade an external audience or adversary 
that the army has a level of aggression beyond that of ‘ordinary’ soldiers; or by presenting 
the nation’s soldiers as warriors it recommends to the British public that their security is 
guaranteed – who better to defend them than an army of warriors? There could be a 
political angle: an army in transition requires political attention, and investment. More 
cynically it is a symptom of the ‘Militarisation Offensive’, launched in 2006 ‘by a loose 
and diverse group of politicians, military chiefs, newspapers and pressure groups to 
generate support for the ‘good war’ in Afghanistan and repair the damage caused to the 
military’s reputation by the ‘bad war’ in Iraq.’58  It is certainly an adjustment and an 
example of change that is ‘rapid in wartime’.59 
 
Manipulating identity impacts social and political history, and culture: the army cannot 
divorce60 itself from this in pursuit of something more narrow or local. Identity, imagined61 
or otherwise reverberates. Whether an army is known as a Defence Force or 
‘warfighters’, where soldiers are ‘stormtroopers,’ the collective a horde not a battalion, 
the observer assumes behaviours and supposes association. ‘Words and the meanings 
of words are not matters merely for the academic amusement of linguists and 
logisticians, or for the aesthetic delight of powers; they are matters of the profoundest 
ethical significance to every human being.’62 Declaring soldiers as warriors where it is 
unwarranted and unappreciated could impact the Clausewitzian Trinity of Government, 
 
Matthew Ford & Alex Gould, “Military Identities, Conventional Capability and the Politics of NATO 
Standardisation at the Beginning of the Second Cold War, 1970–1980,” The International History Review, 
41:4 (2018): 788, https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2018.1452776 
55 Theo Farrell, The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict. Boulder, (CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2005), 25. 
56 Theo Farrell, “Review Article. Culture and Military Power,” Review of International Studies, 24:3, (Jul 
1998): 412, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210598004070. 
57 Charles Dunlap, ‘Lawfare Today: A Perspective’, Yale Journal of International Affairs (Winter 2008): 
146-154, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3154/. 
58 Paul Dixon, Warrior Nation: War, Militarisation and British Democracy, (London: ForcesWatch, 2018), 
accessed at https://www.forceswatch.net/sites/default/files/Warrior_Nation_web.pdf on 07 Nov 18. 
59 Andrew J. Knight, "Retaining the Warrior Spirit," Military Review 94:5 (Sep/Oct 2014): 88-9. 
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_ 
20141031_art015.pdf  
60 Kevin Linch, Britain and Wellington’s Army: Recruitment, Society and Tradition, 1807-15, (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 3. 
61 A phrase made popular by Benedict Anderson – it refers to communities that are socially constructed by 
its members. Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, (London: Verso, 2006). 
62 Aldous Huxley, "Words and Their Meanings,” in Black, The Importance of Language, 12. 
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People and Army63 and damage the social contract64 where citizens ‘tolerate sacrifices 
in return for popular sovereignty; and the first among these sacrifices was the death of 
their sons on the battlefield.’65  Words have meaning and ‘ought to be a little wild, for they 
are the assault of thoughts upon the unthinking’66 but not so wild to be incomprehensible. 
 
Kiszely warns that the ‘enormity’ of change in army culture should not be underestimated. 
‘It strikes at the heart of its attitude to discipline and hierarchy, its perception of martial 
qualities, its recruiting and training policy, the expectations it has of its soldiers and their 
ability to think independently….’ The Army holds ‘strong and fixed views’ on such issues 
so change must be understood for its implications.67 Jenkins says ‘we can’t live routine 
lives as humans without identification, without knowing – and sometimes puzzling about 
– who we are and who others are’. He suggests we require ‘repertoires of identification’ 
without which ‘we would not be able to relate to each other meaningfully and 
consistently’;68 Burr focusses on language allowing the achievement of ‘particular social 
goals’69 vice the purpose of description. Poorly formed, limited repertoires and incoherent 
language, inconsistent with reality, imposed and worse, misunderstood, is dangerous. 
Change that introduces new terms may alter the essential workings70 of an organisation 
in unanticipated ways, and should be guarded against. Sir Peter’s presentation of the 
British soldier in a new light following a ‘long decade of combat’ acknowledges that the 
organisation is defining ‘its boundaries, identity, and role in a time of change’71 but the 




The ‘infantry is at the heart of the army and everything else coalesces around it.’72 They 
self-declare as warriors, promote warrior ethos as their characteristic spirit and ‘make 
war’: infantry soldiers are ‘fighting men’ 73  the infantry the bedrock of ‘warfighting’ 
 
63 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. & trans. by Michael Howard, Peter Paret & Bernard Brodie, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1984). 
64 Where the people have influence and even sovereignty. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract: 
Or, Principles of Political Right, trans. Henry J. Tozer, (Ware, UK: Wordsworth Editions, 1998). 
65 Scheipers, Heroism, 1. 
66 John Maynard Keynes, "National Self-Sufficiency." Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 22:86 (Jun 
1933): 191, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30094997 
67 Kiszely, “Approaches,” 186. 
68 Jenkins, Social Identity, 27. 
69 Vivien Burr, An Introduction to Social Constructionism, (London: Routledge, 2006), 6. 
70 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), 8. 
71 Pauline Shanks-Kaurin, “Questioning Military Professionalism,” in Redefining the Modern Military: The 
Intersection of Profession and Ethics, eds. Nathan K Finney & Tyrell O. Mayfield, (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2018), 9 
72 General Sir Nicholas Carter, UK Chief of the Defence Staff quoted in “Who We Are: The Infantry”. 
73 The term is used generically and as offered by the OED. It is noted that the first female British Army 
infantry soldiers and officers were in training at the time of writing (2019), and prior to submission the first 
female officer passed paratrooper training. Jonathan Beale, “British Army Officer Becomes First Woman to 
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capability.74 Their activity takes place in the ‘most demanding environment that you can 
possibly get’ according to one senior officer who further declared that this is ‘not science 
it’s fact’.75 This makes the infantry separable from other soldiers, as it wishes, and the 
infantry the most likely part of the army to collectively associate with warriorship. 
 
Other soldiers make war too but it is the infantry who close with and kill the enemy in the 
most intimate of circumstances, hand-to-hand where warranted, in a ‘direct struggle of 
sinew, muscle and spirit.’76 The ‘primary function’ of soldiers of other branches ‘is to 
support the fighting’.77 Fighting is the trade and primary purpose of the infantry and this 
distinguishes them from those whose first duty is as drivers, clerks and logisticians. 
Separating the infantry from soldiers designated ‘combat arms’ is more difficult.78 They 
would assert that they too are ‘front-line’ troops but the qualification offered by a 
respondent to the research conducted for this thesis is preferred: front-line troops as a 
descriptor is reserved for those ‘engaging the enemy directly.’ He denied it to anyone 
‘dropping bombs from many thousand feet, or drone pilots, or artillery…’. 79 The infantry 
have a mandate to take and hold ground, often in appalling environmental 
circumstances, in all weathers, round the clock, on foot, with what they can carry. Their 
focus is on dismounted close combat: a ‘terrifying and unnatural setting. Fighting for 
ground and killing people in the process’ is an intense and very human experience.80 
Here infantry soldiers are unique, the ‘maids of all work on the battlefield’81 who go ‘where 
vehicles cannot travel, shells and missiles cannot reach, and electronic sensors cannot 
sense.’82 The infantry bear the brunt of battle83 and the ‘unit of account’ that matters in 
war is the infantry battalion.84 It is with the infantry that we find the ‘undeniable certainty 
of responsibility on the part of the killer.’85 The British infantry, a fitting object of analysis 
for the phenomenon of warriorship, is therefore focus of this thesis.  
 
 
Pass Brutal Para Course,” BBC News, 18 Feb 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-51553815. 
74 “Who We Are: The Infantry”. 
75 GS7: 29 Mar 19, 13:15 
76 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, (NY: Back 
Bay Books, 2009), 99. 
77 Patrick Mileham, “Military Virtues 2: The British Army Ethos,” Defense Analysis, 14:3, (1998): 234, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/07430179808405767 
78 ‘Some folks might have the view that an actual combat veteran is one that was directly involved in active 
combat while others might extend this definition a bit more.’ Kevin Landrigan, “Female Vets Running for 
Congress Find Service Records Under Attack,” Military.Com, 26 Aug 2018, https://www.military.com/daily-
news/2018/08/26/female-vets-running-congress-find-service-records-under-attack.html 
79 Focus Group 5 (hereafter FG5) JNCOs discussion with the author 29 Nov 18, 08:40. 
80 Dave, “The British Regimental System: Essential or Outdated?” The Wavell Room, 16 August 2018 
https://wavellroom.com/2018/08/16/the-british-regimental-system-essential-or-outdated/. 
81 George Forty, Companion to the British Army, 1939-1945, (Stroud: History Press, 2009), 95. 
82 John A. English & Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Infantry, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 177. 
83 In 1944 the infantry was 'less than 25 per cent of 21st Army Group’ but suffered 71% of its casualties. 
David French “’Tommy Is No Soldier’: The Morale of the Second British Army in Normandy, June-August 
1944,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 19:4, (1996): 159, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399608437656 
84 English & Gudmundsson, On Infantry, introduction. 
85 Grossman, On Killing, 114. 
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Some issues that I expected to draw comment didn’t appear in the primary research and 
are therefore only lightly touched upon in the thesis. It is ‘the rule, rather than the 
exception that genetic variation is between individuals’86 so discredited ‘martial race’ 
theories are not considered in any depth.87 The debate surrounding women in combat is 
relevant and expansive88 but it was minimally commented upon during the research and 
is therefore not examined in detail. My focus was driven by the data I collected. Similarly, 
class, a supposed mainstay British society, did not figure in consultations. Rank was 
discussed in oblique terms with regard to expectation and disagreement on the meaning 
of warrior was as evident between peers as it was across ranks. The criterion of warrior 
membership89 ‘is no longer race, ethnicity, or nationality or in some case, even gender’:90 
it is more nuanced. 
 
 
86 Richard Lewontin, "The Apportionment of Human Diversity," in Evolutionary Biology eds. Theodosius 
Dobzhansky, Max K. Hecht & William C. Steere, (NY: Springer, 1972), 382, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-
4684-9063-3_14  
87 Indian soldiers were historically designated warriors by ‘tradition and descent’(or caste); others ‘would 
be without physical courage and unfit for any military service’. John Walter Beresford Merewether, The 
Indian Corps In France (Location Unstated: Pickle Partners Publishing, 2014), location 6865-6870, Kindle 
(original published in 1917). The notion of martial races wasn’t confined to the British. According to 
Theodore Roosevelt ‘all the great masterful races were fighting races’ (Address of Hon. Theodore 
Roosevelt before the Naval War College, Sagamore Hill National Historic Site, 02 Jun 1897). The issue of 
cause and effect is though worth consideration. Whilst race is no determinant, culture may influence 
martial preference and vice versa. ‘Military service’ for example shaped Sikhism as a martial culture 
through ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’, according to Tarak Barkawi “Subaltern Soldiers: Eurocentrism and the 
Nation-State in the Combat Motivation Debates,” in Frontline: Combat and Cohesion in the 21st Century, 
ed. Anthony King, (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 30. With regard to the British Army, Highlanders, Gurkhas and the 
Irish are considered ‘martial races’. Burke, Army of Tribes, 35. The pugnacious Irish, the religious fervour 
and eagerness for battle of the Highlander, the ‘calmness in anger’ of the English is highlighted in R. 
Money Barnes, The British Army of 1914, (London: Seeley Service & Co. 1968) 14. Streets discusses 
Highlanders, Sikhs and Gurkhas and declares the martial race theory an issue of gender as much as 
genetics. Heather Streets, Martial Races: the Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture 
1857-1914, (Manchester, Manchester UP, 2004). The issue of race is explored with reference to the 
German Wehrmacht, the US Army and Marine Corps, the British and French Armies in King, Combat 
Soldier, 90-97. Race was commented on during the research but not as a major area of enquiry. 
88 Gardiner, “Warrior Ethos,” 371–383, details the US Army’s travails with the issue of gender and warrior 
ethos; Allsep deals with the gender divide in Michael L. Allsep, “The Myth of the Warrior: Martial 
Masculinity and the End of Don't Ask, Don't Tell,” Journal of Homosexuality, 60:2-3, (2013), 381-400, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2013.744928. Eve MacDonald provides an historical view of ‘Warrior 
Women’ at https://theconversation.com/amp/warriors, published 04 Oct 2018; Kate Germano and Franklin 
C Annis debate gender and warriorship in The Wavell Room: Germano published “Hyper-Masculinity and 
Ground Close Combat,” https://wavellroom.com/2018/10/09/hyper-masculinity-ground-close-combat/; 
Annis’ counter-argument that “Ground Close Combat is Masculine”, is at https://wavellroom.com/2018/10/ 
30/ground-close-combat-is-masculine/ (published on-line 0 Oct 2018). Anthony King explains the ‘concept 
of equivalency rather than equality as a way of understanding’ the role of women in the armed forces. 
Anthony C King, “Women Warriors: Female Accession to Ground Combat,” Armed Forces & Society, 41:2 
(Apr 2015): 380, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X14532913 and addresses the issue further in Combat 
Soldier, 376-418. The role of women serving in Special Forces is examined in Nicole Alexander & Lyla 
Kohistany, “Dispelling the Myth of Women in Special Operations,” Center for a New American Security 
(CNAS), 19 Mar 2019, at https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/dispelling-the-myth-of-women-in-
special-operations. Further analysis is available at Adrienne Mayor, The Amazons: Lives and Legends of 
Warrior Women across the Ancient World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2016) and Jean Bethke Elshtain, 
Women and War, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) but it is early days in cultural and policy 
terms to make firm declarations on how the issue of warriorship will evolve with regard to women in 
combat. It represents an opportunity for future research. 
89 Special Forces would be an interesting case study but access to the community is difficult and for this 
reason it is not probed in this thesis in detail; other service persons such as submariners or fighter pilots 
could also be usefully examined for their views on warriorship but these also fall outside of scope where 
the infantry is the declared focus. 
90 King, Combat Soldier, 421. 
 
18 




This study considers the individual soldier, and the military unit or group. In my 
examination of individuals I am guided by Hofstede’s model of human programming1 
(Fig. 2.1) that shows the relationship between human nature or that which is universal; 
the culture in which we exist; and our individual personalities. 
 
 
Wright calls this ‘new Darwinism’ where behaviour evolves from three sources: our 
biological roots (‘human nature’); culture or the influence of others; and the malleable 
human mind or personality that allows choice.2 The models are grounded in evolutionary 
psychology, that ‘long-forestalled scientific attempt to assemble out of the disjointed, 
fragmentary, and mutually contradictory human disciplines a single, logically integrated 
research framework for the psychological, social, and behavioral sciences.’3 Where the 
group is concerned I draw too on social identity theory and ‘those aspects of an 
individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives 
 
1 Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, (London: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 6, 
accessed on-line at https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5b53/90078b153ff9d9f805f09c570fb82f90c9a5.pdf. 
Model from Sven Uebelacker, “Security-Aware Organisational Cultures as a Starting Point for Mitigating 
Socio-Technical Risks,” Conference Paper (Sep 2013), https://doi.org/10.13140/2.1.1389.6000. 
2 Robert Wright, The Moral Animal: Why We Are the Way We Are. The New Science of Evolutionary 
Psychology (London: Abacus, 1996), 5-7. 
3 John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, “Conceptual Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology,” in The Handbook 
of Evolutionary Psychology, ed. David. M. Buss, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 3. 
Fig. 2.1: Hofstede’s Three Levels of Mental Human Programming 
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himself as belonging’, and different from distinct ‘out-groups.’4 Cultural evolution, the 
‘knowledge, values, and other factors’ that influence behaviour through teaching and 
imitation,5 where meaning develops alongside others,6 and the individual’s sense of self 
are reconciled and provide balance to contemplations on evolutionary psychology. Social 
constructionism, socially negotiated, collective and collegiate and social constructivism, 
the identity more actively given by others, have relevance. This interdisciplinary study7 
examines warriorship as a ‘biological adaptation’ and cultural invention with more 




Chapter One outlined the rationale for the study. This chapter explains the structure and 
methodology of the thesis: it is followed by the literature review, where the meaning of 
war11 is considered, and two schools of thought regarding the term warrior are identified. 
Chapter 4 considers myth and story, documented history, suspect metaphor and the 
dubious analogies 12  that preserve ‘the underlying substance’ of culture. 13  Academic 
 
4 Henri Tajfel & John Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in Organizational Identity: A 
Reader, eds. Mary Jo Hatch & Majken Schutlz, (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 59. 
5 Robert Boyd & Peter Richerson, Culture and the Evolutionary Process, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1985), 2. 
6 Jonathan D. Raskin, “Constructivism in Psychology: Personal Construct Psychology, Radical 
Constructivism, and Social Constructionism,” American Communication Journal, 5:3, (Spring 2002), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e059/911cff568f4d4c05837252c787f052523fb5.pdf. 
7 ‘One can draw on varied disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, and anthropology to define and 
interpret identity.’ Kay Deaux, “Reconstructing Social Identity,” Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 
19:1 (Feb 1993): 4, https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167293191001. This study also considers organisational 
theory, psychology and the impact of history on warriorship. 
8 Luke Glowacki et al., “The Evolutionary Anthropology of War,” Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, (2017): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.014. 
9 Sir Francis Galton first established. the nature/nurture distinction in "On Men of Science, Their Nature 
and Their Nurture,” Proceedings of the Royal Institution of Great Britain, (Feb 1874): 227, http://galton.org/ 
essays/1870-1879/galton-1874-men-of-science.pdf. Steven Pinker dates the phrase earlier to 1581. “Why 
Nature & Nurture Won't Go Away,” Daedalus 133:4 (2004): 5, https://doi.org/10.1162/0011526042365591  
10 Kenneth Payne, The Psychology of Modern Conflict: Evolutionary Theory, Human Nature and a Liberal 
Approach to War, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 6. 
11 Maurice R. Davie, The Evolution of War: A Study of Its Role in Early Societies, (NY: Dover Publications, 
2003); Jared Diamond, The World Until Yesterday: What Can We Learn from Traditional Societies? 
(London: Penguin, 2013), Kindle; Aaron Edwards, War: A Beginner's Guide, (London: Oneworld, 2017); 
Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War: A History, (London: Allen Lane, 2017); Azar Gat, A History of 
Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War, (Oxford: OUP, 2001), War in Human 
Civilization, (Oxford, OUP, 2006); Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 
(London: Routledge, 2001); Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical 
Greece (CA: University of California Press, 1989), The Father of Us All: War and History, Ancient and 
Modern, (NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2010); Michael Howard, War in European History, (London: OUP, 1976); 
Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press,1999); John 
Keegan, A History of Warfare, (NY, Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1993); Lawrence H. Keeley, War Before 
Civilization, (Oxford: OUP, 1996), Kindle; Julian Lindley-French & Yves Boyer, The Oxford Handbook of 
War, (Oxford: OUP, 2012); Scheipers, Heroism; Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the 
Modern World. (London: Allen Lane, 2005); Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy 
in Historical Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013); Hew Strachan & Sybille Scheipers. The 
Changing Character of War, (Oxford: OUP, 2014). 
12 Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, (London: Routledge, 2006): 22-3.  
13 Christopher Coker, Waging War Without Warriors? The Changing Culture of Military Conflict (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 39. 
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opinion on the British Army14 is deliberated in light of ‘socially established structures of 
meaning’15 and authoritative works on culture.16 Chapters 5, 6 and 7 comprise the bulk 
of the primary research. Here, soldiers explain how they understand ‘warrior’ as a 
prescriptive, proscriptive and descriptive term. They consider how it applies, the complex 
dynamic of self and social identity, and how they relate to each other and internalise 
group membership.17 
 
Amongst a raft of findings, the main conclusion is that the term warrior is poorly 
understood and soldiers are uncomfortable with it. They recognise tension between the 
archetype warrior and army norms; and it was suggested that the introduction of the term 
amounts to an imposition. It is not an organic reflection of army culture, nor regimental 
identify which is vigorously defended. The vast majority of those consulted (87%) 
disagreed that British soldiers were warriors. About half thought they personally qualified 
(though a third had no opinion of the matter) and over two thirds expressed the view that 
where warrior is a term of identity in the British Army then it is for infantry soldiers. They 
were ill-disposed to extending the title to all soldiers, and inclined to those whose primary 
duty is combat. The views expressed were as remarkable for their inconsistency and 
contradiction as they were for consensus. 
 
14 Antony Beevor, Inside the British Army, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1990); Burke, Army of Tribes; 
Patrick Bury, Callsign Hades, (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011); David Chandler & Ian Frederick William 
Beckett (eds.) The Oxford History of the British Army, (Oxford: OUP, 2003); Adrian Carton de Wiart, Happy 
Odyssey, (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Books, 2007), Kindle; Spencer Fitz-Gibbon, Not Mentioned in 
Despatches: The History and Mythology of the Battle of Goose Green, (Cambridge: Lutterworth Press, 
2002); J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol. 1 (London: MacMillan & Co, 1910); David 
French, Military Identities : The Regimental System, the British Army, and the British People c.1870-2000, 
(Oxford: OUP, 2005), The British Way in Warfare 1688-2000, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990); Aimée Fox, 
Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914-1918, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 2018); Dominick Graham, Against Odds: Reflections on the Experiences of the British Army, 1914-45, 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); A. C. Grayling, War - an Enquiry, (London: Yale University Press, 2017); 
Gerald Hanley, Warriors: Life and Death among the Somalis, (London: Eland, 2004); Richard Holmes, 
Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket (London: HarperCollins, 2001), Tommy: The 
British Soldier on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (London: HarperCollins, 2004), Sahib: The British Soldier 
in India, 1750-1914 (London: HarperCollins, 2005), Dusty Warriors: Modern Soldiers at War (London: 
HarperPress, 2006)a; Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the 
Wars (Princeton N.J.: Princeton UP, 1999); Basil Henry Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (London: 
Faber & Faber Limited, 1932); Linch, Wellington’s Army; Alan Macmillan, “Strategic Culture and National 
Ways in Warfare: The British Case,” RUSI Journal, 140:5, (1995): 33-38; Lewis Page, Lions, Donkeys and 
Dinosaurs: Waste and Blundering in the Military, (London: Arrow Books, 2007); Helen Parr, Our Boys: The 
Story of a Paratrooper, (UK: Allen Lane, 2018); Mark Urban, Generals: Ten British Commanders Who 
Shaped the World (London: Faber & Faber, 2006); Noel T Williams, Redcoats and Courtesans: The Birth 
of the British Army 1660-1690 (London: Brassey's, 1994). 
15 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, (London: Fontana Press, 1993), 12. 
16 Anderson, Imagined Communities; Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected 
Texts on Sociology and Its Method, trans. W. D. Halls, ed. Steven Lukes, (NY: The Free Press, 1982), 
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, London: Allen & Unwin (first edition 1912), trans. Joseph Ward 
Swain, (NY: Dover Publications, 2008); Geertz, Interpretation; Victor Davis Hanson, Why the West Has 
Won: Carnage and Culture from Salamis to Vietnam, (London: Faber, 2001); Patrick Porter, Military 
Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes. (London: Hurst & Co., 2009); Edward W Said, Culture 
and Imperialism, (London: Vintage, 1994); Martin van Creveld, Pussycats: Why The Rest Keeps Beating 
The West, And What Can Be Done About It, (Mevasseret Zion, Israel: DLVC Enterprises, 2016), Kindle. 
17 Tajfel & Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.” Also S. Alexander Haslam, Stephen D. 
Reicher, & Michael J. Platow, The New Psychology of Leadership: Identity, Influence, and Power, (Hove, 





Following the literature review four key areas of inquiry were identified: the meaning of 
warrior, warriorship and warrior ethos; the reasons for the promotion of these terms; 
‘soldier/society’ dynamics; and whether warriors are ‘born or made’. Communities of 
interest, or ‘cohorts’ were identified ‘to provide information on issues and decisions that 
I could not directly observe and where respondents could provide insight’.18 Means of 
research (questionnaire, focus group and semi structured interview) were selected for 
their potential to generate quantitative data and qualitative responses. 19  This multi-
sample approach allowed triangulation of findings and the exploration of the problem 
from different angles. Some of those consulted set ethos, others enforce it, cohort three 
promote it and live its consequences. The approach is exploratory: I employed both 
ethnomethodological (where the focus is on widely accepted and taken-for-granted 
practices) and deconstructionist frameworks, where the aim is to reveal the instability of 




Fig. 2.2: Research Model 
 
Interviews. Semi-structured interview was employed to obtain constructions of the 
phenomenon of warriorship and the events (historical and contextual) that have brought 
‘warrior’ as a term of reference to the fore in recent decades; to provide projections for 
the future; and gain opinion on comment made by others.21 Individuals were selected on 
 
18 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods: Applied Social Research Methods 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994), 85. 
19 Ian Brace, Questionnaire Design: How to Plan, Structure, and Write Survey Material for Effective Market 
Research, (London: Kogan Page, 2006); M. Patton, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, 
(Beverley Hills, CA: Sage, 1990). 
20 Martha S. Feldman, Strategies for Interpreting Qualitative Data, (London: Sage, 1994), 4-5. 





























the basis of their expertise and insight and the detailed information they possess 
regarding corporate culture, policy and direction. They could clarify issues that had 
arisen during the process and afforded insight into army level thinking. Interviews were 
conducted through open-ended questioning with inductive probing in response to 
prompts from the participant. All interviews followed a similar basic format: 
• Do you agree that the term ‘warrior’ has become more prevalent in the British Army? 
• What do you think of the term and why is it being using for British soldiers? 
• Does the British Army need warriors? 
• What are the implications in identifying British soldiers as warriors? 
• Will ‘warrior’ endure as a term of reference? 
Detailed questions were not provided in advance as I sought instinctive answers from 
those consulted and wanted to avoid pre-planned responses. Interviewees added to the 
conversation as they wished. 
 
Questionnaires. Background reading, personal knowledge and experience allowed the 
creation of meaningful questions for an attitudinal questionnaire. A pilot resolved issues 
with an initial version and allowed confidence that the issue required examination.22 The 
dispersed nature of the primary audience, infantry COs, meant questionnaire suited the 
research aim and also respondents.23 An added benefit is that answers ‘to a question on 
a paper and pencil questionnaire – ranging from highly favorable to highly unfavorable 
responses – may contribute to greater freedom on the part of the subject to express 
asocial or antisocial feelings’.24 Self-completion questionnaire25 best allows opinion to be 
expressed that may not be in keeping with corporate narrative. 
 
Quantitative data from collected answers to questions 1-6 (the questionnaire is 
reproduced below at Fig. 2.3), based on the Likert Scale was processed into bar charts; 
qualitative responses, to open-ended questions, delivered evidence of patterns of 
thought. These permitted narrative analysis: a ‘common approach to interpreting textual 
responses to open questions is to work through question-by-question looking for key 
themes that recur across different respondents’.26 Written responses to questions 7 to 
12 were collated and key words extracted. Infrequent mentions were deleted: the 
remainder were grouped and processed for analysis through ‘Word Cloud’ software,27 or 
 
22 Paul N. Hague, Questionnaire Design, (London: Kogan Page, 1998), 95-6. 
23 Jenny Rowley, “Designing and Using Research Questionnaires,” Management Research Review, 37:3 
(2014), 5, https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/MRR-02-2013-0027/full/html. 
24 Helen Metzner & Floyd Mann, “A Limited Comparison of Two Methods of Data Collection: The Fixed 
Alternative Questionnaire and the Open-Ended Interview,” American Sociological Review, 17:4 (Aug 
1952), 491. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2088007 
25 Distributed with a Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form. 
26 Rowley, “Research Questionnaires,” 29. 
27 https://www.wordclouds.com  
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quoted as evidence of pertinent opinion within the thesis. 
 
This questionnaire is based on the Likert Scale. For the first 6 questions place an ‘X’ in the box that 
best reflects your view. For questions 7-12 please offer your thoughts in free text. 
7. How do you understand the term ‘warrior’? What does it mean to you? 
8. Please describe British Army culture. What are its constituent parts? 
9. What do you consider to be the most iconic actions/events in British Army history? Please * or 
highlight those that are particular to your Regiment. 
10. What is warrior ethos? 
11. Do you have family ties (parent, aunt/uncle, cousin, sibling, grandparent) to the military? 
12. Can anyone be a warrior? Please elaborate. 
Please feel free to make any further comment below.  
Would you agree to a follow up interview? If so please include contact details. 
 
Focus Group. An ‘adjunct to other research methods’ focus groups allowed me to 
pursue findings28  from background reading and returned questionnaires. Held in an 
informal setting in the participant’s work place, soldiers were encouraged to discuss the 
issues anticipated as common to all participants.29 Group sessions provided a spread of 
opinion and permitted observation of how views are advanced, elaborated and 
negotiated in a social context. 30  Comprising 3-9 participants (groups varied due to 
attendee availability) these ‘performances in which the participants jointly produce 
accounts about proposed topics in a socially organized situation’31 advanced the analysis 
by providing ‘grass-roots’ opinion that could be compared to that expressed by COs.  
 
Attendees were assembled by rank and so were amongst peers in a homogeneous 
grouping where prestige or status had less impact, making for a more open discussion.32 
Prior to the focus group soldiers completed the questionnaire to allow focus on the issues 
 
28 Sue Wilkinson, “Focus Group Methodology: A Review,” International Journal of Social Research 
Methodology, 1:3, (1998): 184, https://doi.org/10.1080/13645579.1998.10846874 
29 Andrew Parker & Jonathan Tritter, “Focus Group Method and Methodology: Current Practice and 
Recent Debate,” International Journal of Research & Method in Education, 29:1, (Apr 2006): 24, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01406720500537304. 
30 Wilkinson, “Focus Group Methodology” 187. 
31 Janet Smithson, “Using and Analysing Focus Groups: Limitations and Possibilities,” International Journal 
of Social Research Methodology, 3:2, (2000): 105, https://doi.org/10.1080/136455700405172. 







1. The British Army has a warrior ethos      
2. The British Army trains warriors.      
3. I am a warrior.      
4. Infantry soldiers are warriors.      
5. All British soldiers are warriors      
6. All soldiers are warriors.      




that I wished to discuss: this also allowed additional quantitive and qualitative data to 
complement the original questionnaires distributed to COs. Focus group discussion was 
recorded, then transcribed with an emphasis on the words and phrases most commonly 
used, and the most interesting comments in the context of the study; data from 
questionnaires was processed in the same manner and subject to similar content and 
thematic analysis. Direct quotations in keeping with the 'spirit' of the group were 
extracted.33 Groups provided an ‘interpretative account of the everyday social processes 
of communication, talk and action occurring within the focus group’.34 They give a true 
representation of attendees’ thoughts at that time. Conducted using a basic question set, 
conversations involved spontaneously worded questions in response to prompts. 
Discussion typically lasted one hour. 
 
Communities of Interest 
 
Senior Army Officers. This cohort (Colonels, Brigadiers and Generals) set army policy 
and procedure. Their status and authority is such that for them ‘it may be possible simply 
to impose change without waiting for 
compliance.’ 35  Where ethos, recruitment, 
training and leadership require attention for 
example (interviewees have expertise in all 
these areas) they issue orders and military 
discipline provides for their enactment. Officers 
of this cohort and their peers led the army in the 
programme announced in 2017 to switch from 
a counterinsurgency focus36 toward soldiering 
in more austere conditions that initiated the 
infantry’s focus on warriorship. One of those 
interviewed championed the establishment of warrior ethos in the infantry that defined 
infantry soldiers as warriors; another launched the ‘Pegasus Ethos’ and (re)adopted 
Bellerophon (known as ‘Pegasus’ and shown at fig. 2.4), the mythical airborne Warrior, 
as a totem for the airborne brigade.37 This was for historical reasons but also to give the 
brigade renewed impetus. ‘I felt there was something missing in our collective ethos. 




35 Ford, “Learning the Right Lessons,” 258. 
36 “Troops Get Back to Basics on Salisbury Plain,” UK MOD, Press Release, 06 Dec 13, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/troops-get-back-to-basics-on-salisbury-plain on 08 Oct 18. 
37 Bellerophon was the symbol of airborne forces of the 1st UK and 44th Indian Airborne Divisions in WW2. 
Accessed at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/16_Air_Assault_Brigade on 29 Jan 20 available under Creative 
Commons licence (SA). 
Fig. 2.4: Pegasus’ – Formation Badge 
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our roots, and harness what was good in the Brigade.’38 This cohort, of General Staff 
Officers (referenced as ‘GS’ in the footnotes, contributors are unnamed) provided insight 
into the rationale for the increased use of the term ‘warrior’ in the army. They are 
advocates and agents who shape, 39  and are considered alongside those who they 
influence. Interviewees were selected for breadth of perspective and knowledge of topics 
which needed explanation and refinement:  
 
Infantry Commanding Officers. Respondents were Regular Army and Reserve Unit 
COs,40 who were commanding battalions in 2018 or had commanded in the preceding 
year. This cohort, the frontline stewards41 and ‘gatekeepers’ of organisational culture42 
enforce ethos and set the character of the battalions. In total 77 COs were invited to take 
part: not everyone could. Some had only recently assumed command and had little time 
to know their units well enough to offer a view; others were on exercise or operations 
and couldn’t participate. The response by 31 officers is nearly 50% of the available and 
judged qualified cohort. They know the soldiers referred to as warriors, and proved to 
have a view on ‘warriorship’: they are a vital cohort – ‘the primary agents by which an 
organization’s culture and role norms are modelled, transmitted, and maintained’.43 Data 
collected through questionnaire corroborated the sense that the term ‘warrior’ is 
problematic. Contributors are anonymised (CO1, CO2 etc) and units are unidentified 
except where unavoidable for context or to maintain the integrity of comment. 
 
Soldiers and Officers. Cohorts 1 and 2 are ‘horizontal’ slices of personnel of similar 
rank; the third cohort is a vertical sample across ranks. This cohort, ten times larger than 
cohort one and over double the size of cohort two, comprises 74 respondents from 
private soldier to major. Soldiers of the Royal Irish Regiment provide the majority of the 
 
38 GS3, 12 Feb 19, 38:30. 
39 The role of agents is evident through the negative effects of experiments conducted in the 1960s and 
1970s: Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, (NY: Perennial Classic,1974); 
Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Evil, (London: Random House, 2007). I 
believe the conclusions of these studies are defensible though I recognise that Zimbardo’s conclusions 
and in particular his methodology are not universally appreciated and are contested: see S. Alexander 
Haslam & Stephen D. Reicher, “Contesting the ‘Nature’ Of Conformity: What Milgram and Zimbardo's 
Studies Really Show.” PLoS Biology, 10 (Nov 2012). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001426; Haslam 
& Reicher, “50 Years of ‘Obedience to Authority’: From Blind Conformity to Engaged Followership,” Annual 
Review of Law & Social Science, 13 (Oct 2017), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110316-
113710; See also the interaction between agents and subjects in Haslam et al, New Psychology, 64, and 
Stephen Reicher, Alex Haslam, & Jay Van Bavel. “How the Stanford Prison Experiment Gave us the 
Wrong Idea About Evil.” Prospect, 06 Mar 2019. https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/how-the-
stanford-prison-experiment-gave-us-the-wrong-ideal-about-evil 
40 One Royal Marine and one cavalry officer took part. These where the only ‘non-infantry’ officers 
surveyed but both had service and experience comparable to their infantry peers. 
41 Casey Landru, “Evolution of Defining the Army Profession,” in Finney & Mayfield, Redefining, 49 
42 Rod Thornton, “The British Army and the Origins of its Minimum Force Philosophy,” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, 15:1, (Spring 2004): 93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310410001677005. 
43 Donna Winslow, “Misplaced Loyalties: Military Culture and the Breakdown of Discipline in Two Peace 
Operations,” in The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience, eds. Carol McCann & 
Ross Pigeau, (NY: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2000), 307. 
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sample for their specific ability to allow investigation of the reception of the marketing 
device ‘#WARRIOR’ used for recruiting, and more generally due to the unit’s strong 
regimental identity. 44  The historical, organisational and functional structure, and the 
societal, political and national influences on the Royal Irish are distinct and make the 
regiment a fascinating study. The regiment has comprised in serving soldier memory 
regular full-time soldiers, both home-based and abroad, part-time soldiers on operations 
overseas and in Northern Ireland, and Territorial Army (now Army Reserve). It recruits 
from both main communities in NI, from the Republic of Ireland, and in Great Britain, and 
also has a number of Commonwealth soldiers within its ranks. The CO of the 1st Battalion 
highlighted that even within his unit of regular soldiers he identified discrete identities: 
‘home birds’ and ‘wild geese’. The former feel the draw of Ireland and are socio-economic 
recruits; the latter had broken ties to Ireland and were motivated by duty, conviction, 
adventure and expeditionary zeal.45 The impact of the introduction of another term of 
reference, #RIRISHWARRIOR, makes this regiment an engaging case study. 
 
Research was conducted through questionnaire and focus group discussion with 1st 
Battalion soldiers in Great Britain; in NI, with the 2nd Battalion, at the Regimental 
Headquarters (where branding work was undertaken) and with the Regimental 
Recruiting Team (RRT). The research cannot be generalised across the British Army but 
insight into this unit that has adopted the title ‘warrior’ is likely transferable. Answers to 
the questionnaire are anonymised as RIRISH1, RIRISH2 etc. Cohort 3 also included 
instructors at the Infantry Training Centre where Royal Irish recruits are trained. Training 
staff there – modern day high priests to military orders46 – are role models and have 
custody of basic training. I wanted to find out how the instructors (from corporal to 
captain) perceived the title warrior, its applicability to recruits and their views on whether 
they were producing warriors. Recruits were excluded due to sensitivity regarding their 
age and lack of experience. Respondents were from infantry regiments47 other than the 
Royal Irish allowing a useful triangulation and comparison of views. Contributors are 
 
44 This dates to the raising of the regiment in Ireland by Zacharia Tiffin in 1689 and is a consequence of 
many regimental mergers since. In 1992, the Royal Irish Rangers and the Ulster Defence Regiment 
merged to form the Royal Irish Regiment. Gerry Murphy, Where Did That Regiment Go?: A Lineage of 
British Infantry and Cavalry Regiments at a Glance. (Stroud: Spellmount, 2009), 106-7, 112-3. Prior to that 
the Irish Rangers were formed in 1968 through the amalgamation of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 
Royal Ulster Rifles and the Royal Irish Fusiliers – a consequence of a decision taken by the War Office 
more than 10 years previously to ‘maintain regimental esprit de corps’ by a re-organisation of line infantry 
regiments ‘into nineteen large regiments, each of three battalions and a depot.’ French, Military 
Identities, 295. The time taken to effect mergers provides a cautionary note where organisational and 
cultural change is planned. New identity rarely resonates immediately. Riflemen and Fusiliers pride 
themselves on unique approaches to soldiering; so too bringing for example soldiers from cities together 
those from rural communities requires careful handling. The Royal Irish had to contend with functional and 
geographical identity alignment in the 20th Century. 
45 ‘The Future Basing of 1 R IRISH: A Strawman,’ Commanding Officer’s paper, dated summer 2018. 
Limited ‘Regimental Only’ circulation. Permission to quote granted by CO 1 R IRISH (author), Nov. 2018. 
46 Caputo, Rumor, 8. 
47 Including the Parachute Regiment who provided insight and contrast with ‘line infantry’ personnel. 
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anonymised as Instr (Instructor) 1, Instr2 etc. 
 
• Main Case Study: The Royal Irish Regiment. 9 Focus Groups: 52 participants; 
o FG1: Regimental Headquarters staff – 3 participants; 
o FG2: Regimental Recruiting Team all ranks – 9 participants; 
o FG3: Senior Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs)48 – 9 participants; 
o FG4: Officers – 3 participants; 
o FG5: Junior Non-Commissioned Officers (JNCOs)49 – 3 participants; 
o FG6: Corporals – 5 participants; 
o FG7: SNCOs – 7 participants; 
o FG8: Officers – 8 participants; 
o FG9: Majors – 5 participants. 
• Secondary Case Study: Infantry Training Centre. 4 Focus Groups: 22 participants; 
o FG10: JNCOs – 4 participants; 
o FG11: SNCOs – 4 participants; 
o FG12: Officers – 9 participants; 
o FG13: Parachute Regiment (‘P Company’) instructors – 5 participants. 
 
Archival Research. The army has an archive of interviews of soldiers who deployed to 
Iraq and Afghanistan.50 It exists to facilitate the lessons that inform the development of 
doctrine and has broad utility for the insight into the thoughts of those involved in recent 
conflicts. I examined 150 interviews from Operation Herrick51 between 2005 and 2010 
and more than 300 interviews from operations in Iraq52 deployments from 2004-08 for a 
sense of how common the term warrior was in the British Army and how soldiers then 
identified. I also scrutinised the regimental journals of the Royal Irish Regiment. These 
highlighted the regiment’s many recent functional purposes from service in Germany, to 
internal security duties in Northern Ireland, through to operations in the Balkans and 
Sierra Leone in the ‘90s. They document the regiment’s role in the invasion of Iraq in 
2003, later as an air assault unit in Afghanistan, on deployment to Mali, and most recently 
in 2019, duty in Kabul. The journals provided a flavour of the lived experience of soldiers 
and are representative of the practise of British infantry regiments. They were most 
useful for citations of awards made to soldiers in recent years and document the 
behaviours that are admired and honoured. 
 
 
48 FG3 and FG7 included Warrant Officers. 
49 FG5 included one private soldier. 
50 Mostly ranging in rank from Major to Major-General. 
51 The UK codename for operations in Afghanistan. 





All research has limitations. I couldn’t always access the opinions I wanted, nor people 
who I thought could contribute. In a study involving service personnel, political, 
procedural and security sensitivities impact freedoms. The interviews involving senior 
army officers were recorded and on occasion caution was evident in responses: those 
consulted for example wouldn’t draw a line between combat and non-combat soldiers as 
clearly as did more junior soldiers. At other times they were remarkably candid. By 
focussing on specific areas of expertise maximum benefit was had from the engagement. 
 
With the questionnaires (aside from Likert scale limitation where there is no measure 
between categories),53 random answer choices where respondents hadn’t fully read or 
understood the question, and a failure to engage the qualitative questions were 
expected. 54  Limited opportunity was available to respondents to express additional 
thoughts beyond the offer to ‘feel free to make any further comment below’ (which some 
did exploit) but my focus was on making the survey simple to elicit as many responses 
as I could. There are more questions that could be asked but balance was necessary 
and compromise required to gain as rich response as possible. 
 
Surveys were mostly distributed and returned electronically, and though I am acquainted 
with some of those who responded no personal contact was had; those completed by 
focus groups attendees were distributed 24 hours in advance and out of my sight. I am 
therefore satisfied that I brought no direct pressure to bear on respondents either to 
respond or to comply with a perceived requirement. Creating distance between 
questionnaire delivery and completion, and collation of results did result in some lack of 
clarity. For example, whether ‘Palestine’ was an iconic event related to Allenby’s entry 
to Jerusalem in 1917 or the British campaign there in 1948 was unclear and limited 
opportunity existed for follow-up. More broadly, the risk in using a survey as a means of 
data collection is that what is omitted can be as important as that which is offered and 
respondents ‘may miss what culture is all about: that which is taken for granted’.55 No 
two respondents either have the same experience so perceptions differ and those who 
responded were volunteers and so demonstrate self-selection bias. 
 
Focus groups bring different concerns. Attendees were selected by their parent 
organisation on the basis of availability so one can never be certain of levels of expertise 
 
53 Further limitations are detailed at Susan Jamieson, "Likert Scales: How To (Ab)Use Them," Medical 
Education, 38:12 (2004): 1217-1218. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2929.2004.02012.x 
54 A lack of comprehension was declared in one focus group, but obvious in few cases. 
55 Kier, Imagining War, 36. 
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or indeed, though the Participant Information Sheet and verbal briefing beforehand made 
it explicit, that soldiers were willing volunteers. There were some identifiable instances 
of non-participation due to a lack of confidence, inarticulate communication skills or the 
dominant influence of one or two individuals. I encouraged participation and invited 
quieter group members to speak but I recognise that there are often unknown ‘social 
variables’ that impacted upon levels of participation.56 I cannot qualify if or how this 
manifested. I also cannot be certain that their perception of my position of seniority over 
them had no impact on shaping their answers. This said, focus groups were marked by 
‘vivid and compelling views’57  and the opportunity to contribute was afforded to all. 
Incomplete or interrupted speech did occur and I both intervened to allow the contributor 
to finish and accepted the interruption. 
 
Focus groups could morph into Group Interviews. 
In group interviews the researcher adopts an ‘investigative’ role: asking 
questions, controlling the dynamics of group discussion, often engaging in 
dialogue with specific participants…the researcher asks questions, the 
respondents relay their ‘answers’ back to the researcher. In focus groups 
the dynamics are different. Here, the researcher plays the role of ‘facilitator’ 
or ‘moderator’; that is, facilitator/moderator of group discussion between 
participants, not between her/himself and the participants. 58 
I was ‘driving’ the conversation on occasion. This meant that non-verbal communication 
was difficult to ascertain, and management of the meeting took precedence over listening 
for cues: it was easy to become fixed by lively discussion. Recording the conversation 
mitigates against missing information though follow up after the focus group disbands is 
difficult. It is also true that participant’s positions shift so the opinions expressed on the 
day may not endure. ‘A quote from an individual may be typical of their initial view but 
radically different from the one they hold when they leave the focus group.’59 
 
A failure to over-recruit60 meant some groups were lighter than I would have liked (3 
people only in two groups): reliance on others to select personnel, the availability of 
soldiers not otherwise engaged and the stipulation that participation should be voluntary 
reduced my influence. Procedural problems are ‘an integral part of focus group use, and 
even if mitigated by moderator techniques, will still exist.’61 Environmental factors (design 
of the room and temperature, time of the day, future activity, duties prior to the 
discussion) had uncertain impact and my status as a serving military officer was known 
to attendees: this may have influenced some interactions. Where I could I applied 
 
56 Parker & Tritter, “Focus Group Method,” 32. 
57 Wilkinson, “Focus Group Methodology,” 187. 
58 Parker & Tritter, “Focus Group Method,” 25-6. Others though do merge the terms. 
59 Ibid.,32. 
60 Wilkinson, “Focus Group Methodology,” 188. 
61 Smithson, “Using and Analysing Focus Groups,” 106. 
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mitigating measures to minimise any effect: I didn’t conduct engagements in uniform for 
example. The disadvantages inherent in engaging with a hierarchical community, as a 
member of that community, are though offset by the benefit of ‘familiarity with the 
language habitually used by research participants’ 62  and comfort in a military 
environment. ‘Socio-cultural and interviewer-style differences are two important 
uncontrolled variables’ that can account for observed differences 63  but my affinity 
minimised difference. Where the researcher can ‘remain aware of how respondents see’ 




In preparing a research proposal, ‘the candidate must reflect on who they are in the world 
and what their world-view is.’65 The thesis involved a journey of self-examination and a 
change in my stance on the issue of warriorship and I recognise that some conflict of 
interest and unconscious bias is possible. The study reflects my perception of what is 
important in the opinions of those who contributed: thought ‘bears the stamp of our age 
and our geography’66 and my knowledge too is historically and culturally derived. Those 
consulted are also influenced by their experience but it is ‘unlikely that members of the 
armed forces in different ranks, regiments and regimes have over a long period 
consistently held to a single strategy or view of themselves’67 so snapshots are valuable 
as representative of the time. I incorporated multiple sampling techniques and several 
different audiences to create a broad research base but recognise limitations here too. 
Questionnaires reflect the designer’s view of the world, no matter how 
objective a researcher tries to be. This is true not only for the design of 
individual questions, but often about the very choice of research subject. 
Furthermore, what we choose not to ask about may just as easily reflect 
our world view as what we include in the questionnaire’.68 
 
The thesis bears the stamp of my experiences. On submitting it I had been in the Army 
for over 30 years as a soldier and officer; an infantryman for the first 16 of those (though 
never in any of the units that comprise the case studies). I have been a CO of a non-
 
62 Wilkinson, “Focus Group Methodology,” 188 
63 Greg Guest et al., “Comparing Focus Groups and Individual Interviews: Findings from a Randomized 
Study,” International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 20:6, (2017): 705, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
13645579.2017.1281601 
64 Parker & Tritter, “Focus Group Method,” 32. 
65 Adele Baldwin, ‘Putting the Philosophy Into PhD,’ Working Papers in the Health Sciences, 1:10 (Winter 
2014), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273694286 
66 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, (NY: Vintage Books, 
1994), xv, https://monoskop.org/images/a/a2/Foucault_Michel_The_Order_of_Things_1994.pdf  
67 Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, “The Concept of Military Professionalism,” Defense Analysis, 6:2, (1990): 119, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/07430179008405441 
68 Rowley, “Research Questionnaires,” 32, citing D. E. Gray, Doing Research in the Real World, 2nd ed., 
(London: Sage, 2009), 339. 
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infantry unit and understand the ‘fundamental codes’ of military culture; I have followed 
the empirical orders69 and I consider myself a master of the vernacular. This gives me 
insight but also association and proximity to my subject. My military experience and 
training extends throughout the ‘spectrum of operations’ 70  from support to the civil 
authority through to operations on the staff of an armoured brigade on combat 
operations. I identify with many of those who contributed to the primary research, and 
with some of their opinions. None of those consulted, to my knowledge, have ever fallen 
under my command in the past and will unlikely do so in the future. I am therefore 
satisfied that I am distant enough from the soldiers who contributed that I cannot impact 
on any of their career prospects for the future though I cannot be certain that they 
recognised this. I am confident that I have not amplified my opinion or beliefs, nor 
indulged in advocacy, but recognise the value in reflexivity and in writing myself, as the 




The research conducted for this thesis was cleared to King’s College, national and 
internationally accepted ethical standards through the UK Ministry of Defence. The MOD 
Research Ethics Committee (MODREC) process,72 for the assessment and approval of 
research protocols, provides authority to collect data on identifiable individuals directly 
(by focus groups or interviews) or indirectly (such as by questionnaire). Both methods 
were employed and though the individuals would be unidentified, approval was 
nevertheless sought. The process involved appraisal by the Army Scientific Assessment 
Committee, then review by MODREC. The research protocol was given favourable 
opinion on 3rd April 201873 and negated the requirement for renewal of other approvals.74 
Requests for interview with officers of Brigadier rank and above also required MOD 
approval75 and the finished thesis was authorised for publication in the public domain. 
 
69 Foucault, The Order of Things, xx. 
70 The army presents the different operations it expects to conduct as existing along a ‘spectrum’. It shows 
each separate from another. On the left had side of the model it shows Major Combat Operations (MCO) 
that morph into Stabilisation then Counter-insurgency (or ‘COIN’) through to Peace Support and Conflict 
Prevention to the right hand side where Military Aid to the Civilian Authorities (MACA) is situated. MCO is 
assumed the ‘most demanding’ of operations; MACA the least demanding. UK MOD, ADP Ops 8-9 (2010), 
Figure 8.1 ‘Summary of Military Activities,’ accessed at http://www.defencesynergia.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/Army-Doctirne-Operations-Dec-2010.pdf. The model is frequently updated but 
the phrase is well enough recognised to be employed here. 
71 Paul Higate and Ailsa Cameron, “Reflexivity and Researching the Military,” Armed Forces & Society 
32:2 (Jan 2006): 220, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X05278171 
72 UK MOD Research Ethics Committee, https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/ministry-of-defence-
research-ethics-committees and Joint Service Publication 536, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/553276/JSP536_Part1.pdf on 31 August 2017. 
73 Letter MODREC-Marks ref 840/MODREC/17 dated 03 April 2018.  
74 KCL ethical approval, was previously granted and was allowed to lapse once superseded by MODREC. 
Guidance available at https://internal.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/ethics/do-i-require/external-approval  
75 Approval granted 16 Jan 2019 by UK MOD Directorate of Defence Communications. 
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3. Literature Review 
 
Heroes and Killers 
 
The literature presents the warrior from one of two broad perspectives: as hero or killer. 
The first suggests culture, and often ethics as overriding factors in the warriors construct; 
the second emphasises the physical and neurological aspects of warriorship. Each is 
analysed in this chapter and, where useful, primary research is introduced to validate or 
contest the academic views, and expose the gaps in thinking. First, and before 
scrutinising the types of warrior determined through my analysis of the literature, the 
curious attraction of the word warrior is examined in overview. Suggestive of status, 
strength and valour; associated with images of chivalric contest and skilled champions, 
warriorship can ‘expand beyond the literal interpretation of war and destruction to include 
every moment of our lives’.1 It is a blend of ‘personal morals, institutional culture, training 
and experience, personal biases, societal expectation, and legal obligation.’ 2  But it 
involves less tangible, psychological aspects too. Warriors choose to fight: they are 
savages who operate in a ‘coldly efficient’ manner and revel in the reality of war that 
‘doesn’t allow for polite company, private hygiene and weakness’.3 They arouse fear: 
their presence is disturbing and mention can suppose atrocity and dishonour. War is 
brutal yet ‘intoxicating and exciting.’4 So are warriors. The warrior is hero and killer; 
warriorship a demonstration of nobility and animality.5 The concept involves depth and 
is both disturbing and appealing.6 
 
The warrior represents ‘only the small portion of the force that is called upon to do the 
actual fighting…we cheapen both words [the other word is soldier] when either one or 
the other or both are used out of context.’7 Gilchrist thinks it is the act of battle that 
bifurcates the two: ‘By necessity, war will barbarise its participants’8 and even those with 
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3 Annis, “Combat is Masculine.” 
4 George Kassimeris, “The Warrior’s Dishonour,” in Warrior’s Dishonour : Barbarity, Morality and Torture in 
Modern Warfare, ed. G. Kassimeris, (Aldershot: Routledge, 2006), 11, https://doi.org/10.4324/ 
9781315547640. 
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honourable intent can become ‘other worldly’ with accepted norms suspended and 
conflict creating a ‘physical separation of the military from the population it represents.’9 
Ankersen says warriors fight as ‘a personal quest, often railing against legitimate 
authority’ – an uneasy fit with soldiering and an issue wrapped up in ethics.10 Those ‘who 
identify as warriors (and who may espouse a set of values contrary to those of the 
contemporary military) prior to formal socialization/training’ may in fact be dangerous.11 
Warriorship as a functional, circumstantial or psychological phenomenon prompts its 
examination beyond limited descriptive terminology. 
 
Loaded with ‘philosophical and behavioural connotations’,12 warrior extends to ‘bullies, 
terrorists, religious extremists, tribal warriors, narco-guerrillas, and the all-others 
category that interests adventurers and special operations soldiers’, 13  warlords, 14 
mercenaries and private security companies.15 It is thought ‘citizen soldiers or insurgents 
can buy into it too’;16 soldiers think warrior can apply outside the military to those with a 
disability,17 sportsmen, nurses and even politicians ‘because of their tenacity, outlook or 
how they engage’.18 It is ‘a familiar concept and catchphrase in the fields of psychology, 
philosophy, literature, business, and in the movies’: amongst 13 variants (such as warrior 
athletes, earth warriors and executive warriors) Strozzi-Heckler highlights market value. 
It gets ‘great press, precisely because it suggests kicking ass in a moral and socially 
conscious way, though most people don’t have a sense of what it entails.’19 At a recent 
army conference it was less kindly regarded. A serving soldier ridiculed the broad 
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context. ‘The Basics of Philosophy’, http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_moral_absolutism.html. 
11 @ProfAnkersen, 19 October 2018. 
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application of the word: ‘cross-fit Spartans and glam rock Vikings.’20 A word that comes 
in and out of vogue, ‘Ngram’ software21 allows broad trend analysis22 and suggests the 
word was most popular prior to 1900.23 It dipped away considerably from 1900 with a 
nadir around 1920 and again in the mid ‘40s, assumedly in the aftermaths of the World 
Wars. As a term of reference it has been on the rise through the critical junctures of the 
wars of the early 2000s. 
 
 
Fig. 3.1:Warrior: Occurrence in Literature Since 1800 
 
We can be confident that warrior mostly applies to a ‘person who makes war upon’, not 
least for the trends shown in Fig. 3.1. However this specificity makes it no less clumsy. 
It fits awkwardly to Luttwak’s ‘post-Napoleonic and post-Clausewitzian’24 conflict and 
Kaldor’s wars, more social than bloody.25 How Fourth,26 Fifth,27 and 6th Generation28 
 
20 “Securing Competitive Advantage: I’m a Soldier, Not a Warrior - the Problem with Warrior Ethos,” RUSI 
Conference, 05 June 2019. 
21 This presents the words and phrases that occur in a corpus of books (here ‘predominantly in the English 
language published in any country’). Google Books Ngram Viewer, http://books.google.com/ngrams. 
22 Over 5 million digitized books or c4% of all books ever published. The designers intent was to allow the 
observation of ‘cultural trends and subject them to quantitative investigation’. Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., 
“Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books,” Science 331: 6014, (Jan 2011), 176. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1199644 
23 The trends are illustrative and the ‘beguiling power’ of the software is acknowledged. For criticism of this 
methodology see Eitan Adam Pechenick, Christopher M. Danforth & Peter Sheridan Dodds, 
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Evolution,” PLoS ONE 10:10 (Oct 2015), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0137041  
24 Edward N. Luttwak, “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 74:3, (May-Jun 1995): 122. 
25 Kaldor, New Wars, 4. 
26 ‘Decentralised war’ reliant on technology; the successor to war conducted through mass, industry and 
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warfare are serviced by warriors is uncertain. Ambiguous,29 hybrid,30 ‘Non-Obvious,’31 
and Unrestricted Warfare 32  have few templates against which the warrior can be 
considered. Employing ‘military analogies to discuss things that aren’t quite military’33 
like cyber-war a ‘medium with its own rules’34 is then imprudent. Warrior is as ill-fitting to 
individuals who indulge in war as a ‘remote spectator sport’35 as it is to the sportsmen, 
earth warriors or executives mentioned previously. The term requires an excursion into 
a definition of war to establish a baseline for understanding. 
 
War, the ‘central institution in human civilisation’ 36  suffers from a lack of linguistic 
precision.37 Coker advises that it is possible to ‘experience war without understanding 
it’38 so a singular representation is elusive. Defining it is not helped by what Turchin calls 
the ‘war over war’ in academia39  and some complicated approaches to what might 
appear simple – like defining ‘combat’.40 War is also constantly evolving: Bobbitt provides 
a useful, though he admits an ‘oversimplified’ graphic of constitutional conventions (the 
princely, kingly, territorial, state-nation, nation-state and market states) compared to the 
significant events of the time (wars, treatises, innovation). 41  Fascinating, repulsive, 
exhilarating, sad, tender and cruel,42 war stirs primordial emotion. It can be rational 
according to Sun Tzu, Machiavelli and Clausewitz: Gat says it is ‘a continuation of human 
desires by violent means’;43 it provides the opportunity for status; for sex44 (it is ‘a strategy 
by which coalitions of males cooperate to acquire and defend resources for 
 
29 Mark Galeotti, “I’m Sorry For Creating The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’,” Foreign Policy, 05 Mar 2018, 
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reproduction’45); and to commit murder, steal or trespass.46 Definitions are contestable: 
as Strachan explains ‘we do not really know what is a war and what is not’.47 The inability 
‘to agree on the meaning of key terms’48 does not though negate a working definition. 
 
This study focuses on British Army soldiers and the act of war, not the reasons for it: the 
frame of reference is combat. ‘At its most basic level,’ says Edwards, ‘war is something 
that individuals engage in collectively’. It is both an individual and group endeavour.  
War is a complex social process, if you will, which animates human beings 
into committing violent acts, ranging from killing and maiming, to inciting 
great fear, stress and hatred in their fellow man and woman…war has, of 
course, deeply human consequences that are often overlooked, including 
the degeneration of fighting into genocide and ethnic cleansing.’49 
War is social, involving organised groups of humans, ‘each attempting to exercise 
tyranny over the other through violence, terror, and threat’.50 Functions are exclusive: 
non-martial or sporting allusions are dismissed: ‘Warriors kill people, that’s it, it’s a laugh 
when people say war is like a boxing match – it’s not, someone’s going to die’.51 In war 
‘placing second is to pay an unthinkable price’.52 The warrior engages in ‘direct fighting, 
face-to-face’ at personal risk53 with a ‘willingness to put their body on the line’.54 Combat, 
the ‘inherently lethal environment in which competing organizations seek to use their skill 
and strength of arms to impose their will’55 involves the application of purposeful violence. 
War is that ‘quintessentially human institution of organized, leader-mandated, group-on-
group killing’;56 the warrior is ‘someone who takes part’57 in applying lethal force and 
engages in the rare activity where ‘one can kill without crime’.58 
 
I determined that there are two schools of thought evident in the academic literature 
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regarding the warrior or homo furens, meaning ‘fighting man’.59 This Latin phrase is 
employed to permit analysis through a less declaratory, distracted approach whilst 
meaning is investigated. The first school thinks the phenomenon sociological, where 
individuals ‘have enormous flexibility in what they can become, in contrast to the 
inflexibility and determinism attributed to evolutionary approaches to human behaviour.’60 
Individuals respond to direction: fighting is controlled – ‘armed surgery to deliver us 
painlessly from evil’61 – but homo furens is also automaton-like, operating to institutional 
norms.62 Considered mostly through an ethical lens this homo furens fights in the service 
of others, within a collective, recognisable, institutional and hierarchical group.63 Known 
here as ‘Type 1’ (T1) these are products of formal military training, and nurturing, who 
perform to qualified standards. They exist as easily in peace as they do in combat – and 
calibrate to either. The terms soldier and warrior may be synonymous, but ‘soldiering’, a 
social construct, is the dominant authority. T1 homo furens are soldiers, servants, 
occasionally automatons: ‘loyalty and obedience are the highest virtues.’64  
 
The second school looks to the deeper motivations behind fighting.65 It considers the 
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physiological, neurological and psychological influences and promotes evolutionary 
psychology. This is Hobbesian man66 inclined, or born, to fight: warriors who ‘go their 
own way’,67 who like Berserkers embody the spirit of reckless attack.68 They are ‘free 
riders without moral scruple’ an idea that ‘seems to have become controversial only in 
the postmodern era, when it has become fashionable to deny that any of us have a 
“nature” at all.’ 69  This individual comprehends an ‘internal reality and cannot know 
whether an outside world exists’.70 They stand for themselves, against others. 
There are no treaties of trust between lions and men: wolves and lambs 
share no unity of heart, but are fixed in hatred of each other for all time – 
so there can be no friendship for you and me, there will be no oaths 
between us, before one or the other falls…’ 71 
Autonomy and emotion, not policy, law or institution72 dominate behaviour: warriors’ 
actions are anathema where ‘moral perfectionism’73 is nirvana, incomprehensible to any 
‘tidy, rational western mind.’74 Type 2 (T2) homo furens are fighters, maybe savages, 
with animalistic tendencies who go ‘into battle naked, or at least without armour, in a 
godlike or god-possessed – but also beastlike – fury.’75 They act according to impulse 
and desire, and fight ‘depending on whether it might be profitable’.76 A product of nature, 
it is individual character that dominates. A love of combat and a dedication, fixation or 
even obsession with fighting are motivations. This individual operates in an 
unconstrained, dissident manner, according to internally determined reference. 
 
Warriorship permeates ‘synapses to social networks’.77 Darwin and Galton’s78 views on 
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the innateness of personality provides some explanation; inheritance and heritability is 
important. Freud and Lorenz’s work on shaping the psyche has meaning; the thoughts 
of Pavlov and B. F. Skinner on the power of learning, and ‘the autonomous power of 
culture’79 that operates outside of our awareness, and ‘makes some things possible, 
some things desirable, and some things unimaginable’ 80  provide useful if partial 
explanation. Strachan summarises: 
Achilles may have been in need of in-depth psychotherapy, but he and the 
other leading figures in the Iliad, Hector, Patroclus and even Odysseus, are 
indubitably the West’s archetypal heroes. However, three problems arise if 
we relate the Iliad to modern conceptions of war…First, we don’t know 
whether we are talking about historical figures or mythical ones. Second, 
these heroes, although certainly warriors, were not soldiers – in that they 
were not regularly paid, even though they did make war pay. Third, they 
became heroes through the medium of single combat rather than the 
collective use of force, through individual and intermittent courage rather 
than consistent campaigning.81 
These problems are now explored. The types evolve from ancient, localised beginnings, 
and a trade ‘as old as human society itself’.82 They are not exclusive and the truth of one 
idea ‘is not proof of the falsehood of another.’83  Understanding is enhanced where 
identity, a concept ‘ubiquitous in contemporary social science, cutting across 
psychoanalysis, psychology, political science, sociology, and history’ 84  is fully 
considered. The observer mustn’t be seduced by trends.85 The connectionist adds ‘a 
useful brick to the wall. They are wrong only when they try to pull somebody else’s bricks 
out, or to claim that the wall is held up only by empiricist bricks.’86 Gat warns against the 
historian and social scientist who disregard the biological element of human culture.87 
The construction of T1 homo furens is first examined with a close eye to culture and 




Soldiers and warriors are compared to each other in the literature. Keeley says soldiers 
are the poorer and will lose ‘to warriors in combat despite superior weaponry, unit 
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discipline, and military science’.88 Edwards highlights the effectiveness of insurgents: 
soldiers ‘organized along conventional lines’ struggle against their ‘speed, aggression 
and intimate knowledge of the human and physical terrain.’89 
A giant, heavy and unresponsive machinery, that deliberately transforms 
its living members into unthinking robots performing standard operational 
procedures or SOPs cannot possibly compete, however much firepower it 
has, with fanatical or inspired, but at any rate extremely flexible, thinking, 
cause-oriented fighters who are the very embodiment of mission-command 
and Auftragstaktik.90 
Others think soldiers superior. Victor Davis Hanson takes an ethnocentric view: he 
highlights the ancient Greeks, disciplined and educated with technological advantage 
who generally defeated uncivilised warrior or barbarian armies (though his argument 
does involve ‘a modest amount of straining’).91 Harari echoes Hanson, lauding soldiers 
who ‘easily routed disorganised hordes’. 92  Their premise is that organisation beats 
fighting spirit: the importance of the debate is in acknowledging there are different types. 
 
Porter distinguishes the soldier by purpose. For warriors conflict has a meaning of its 
own and they exercise freedom of action and thought; soldiers, disciplined and 
organised, are ‘directed for instrumental purpose and expediency’. 93  Ralph Peters 
differentiates similarly. 94  Bury and King emphasise soldierly responses to ritualised 
words of command and the adherence to the choreography of battle.95 In their study into 
military cohesion, training is preferred over the ‘older sociology’96 that privileges primary 
group association (though choreography, the ‘mechanical, quasi-automatic aspects of 
Army operation’ is recognised there too).97 Porter reduces the soldier’s independence of 
action; the others reduce independence of thought with soldiers responding instinctively 
to orders and ‘drills’. The discipline that soldiers exhibit, that Hanson thought progressive 
and enabling also constrains, with homo furens denied opportunity to act from conviction, 
acting instead from compulsion,98 in an automated manner. 
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The first modern army, military servants of the monarch with ‘uniform composition’,99 was 
raised in 1445 by decree of the French King Charles VII.100 The ‘big men’101 in society, 
warriors of antiquity, ‘ignorant, miserable, brutal, and violent,’ 102  and ‘non-
professionals’103 agreed to fight for others, as stipendiary troops, or ‘soldi’, for pay.104 
They brought under control others ‘neglectful of the obligations they owed a Crown.’105 
By 1900, states had abolished all non-state military actors.106 Soldiers as citizens in arms 
under comitia centuriata or the people’s assembly, not the tribal comitia curiata 107 
controlled or forcibly disbanded ‘the mercenary bands pullulating about the country.’108 
Culture modified what evolution shaped, says Ken Payne.109 Service grew in importance 
– ‘to fight but to advance its society’s political ends by doing so.’110 Soldiering ‘reduced 
the wolf pack’ to obedient gun dogs;111 and established a ‘social construction defined by 
shared expectations and values’: 
Some of these are embodied in formal regulations, defined authority, 
written orders, ranks, incentives, punishments, and formal task and 
occupational definitions. Others circulate as traditions, archetypal stories of 
things to be emulated or shunned, and accepted truth about what is 
praiseworthy and what is culpable. Altogether, these form a moral world 
that most of the participants most of the time regard as legitimate, “natural,” 
and personally binding.112 
Under instruction and control, soldiers preserved the state, safeguarded its monopoly on 
violence113 and protected it from the military itself.114 
 
Soldiering, a collective activity, for others, to a stipulated standard eclipsed warriorship 
and fighting for ‘base motives’.115 Greater discipline was found in the soldier and structure 
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with third party control was imposed: soldiers specialised and evolved (swordsmen and 
archers then riflemen and gunners). Militaries became professions, with expertise, 
responsibility and corporateness116 ‘commissioned by their parent societies to perform a 
function’ that varies from society to society117 but generally the ‘ordered application of 
force’ in pursuit of the resolution of social problems.118 Uniforms, promotions and medals, 
visible representations of association and insignia demonstrated membership of the 
team: personal reputation was promoted through the regiment.119 Emotionally charged 
symbols, won or invented came to represent the ‘memories of past events.’ 120 The 
journey from pre-historic through classical times,121 and beyond culminated in the Great 
War and Europe’s evolution into a soldier society.122 With the peace of 1945 a further 
shift occurred: ‘Western Europe, in the aftermath of two world wars and the Holocaust, 
has been demoralized, guilt-ridden, and essentially debellicized, averse to raising even 
modest defences.’123 With the rise of war as an industrial endeavour then its rejection as 
a means of conflict resolution came the death of warriorship as an artisan undertaking.124 
 
Martial activity became transactional, involving ‘a relationship with a client.125 In common 
with other professionals the soldier offered: depth of knowledge in the field; monopoly of 
skill; and a service required by others.126 These criteria are clear cut. Brick continues: the 
custody of knowledge ‘creates a duty in the professional to act in the interest of the client.’ 
This stipulation constrains homo furens: it is unclear if the client to whom a duty is owed 
is the government, the leader or society at large. Further where the professional is paid, 
self-interest must exist alongside loyalty: soldi act in the interest of the client where the 
client pays. Brick’s final criterion is more questionable: self-regulation, she says, as much 
as institutional control establishes accountability. Where this is allowed it tempts a return 
to warrior like behaviour. Soldiers as servants don’t self-regulate – they follow guidelines 
and operate according to ‘subordinate sovereignty’,127 and ‘objective civilian control’.128 
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Adherence to a stipulated code – ‘a stratified set of rules that serves as a model for 
actors in the society to follow’129 – informs action. Rules are how society shapes the self 
which ‘shapes social behaviour.’130 This is an important concept in Identity Theory:131 
society attributes role and therefore regulates martial behaviour. There is a part played 
by both external and internal control.132 The rules set by the military themselves as 
professional code133 ‘can seem very remote’ to others;134 equally Harries-Jenkins’ internal 
‘social action,’ can fail to have a moderating effect. To assume that either of these matter 
much is wrong and places responsibility inappropriately. Rules set by others and 
enforced by institutional control are those that are immutable. 
 
The autonomous warrior became malleable and bent to society’s wishes. Domesticated 
and made agreeable homo furens was welcomed by instrumentalists as a tool of 
government: warrior self-agency reduced. For soldiers, fighting is to be a deliberate act 
not an emotional enterprise, war is political not personal and detachment from the act is 
fundamental to legitimacy. Organisational coherence takes precedence over personal 
drive, and loyalty is as important as fighting efficiency. The focus is on ‘the instrumental 
problem of defeating the enemy’ not the intrinsic value of violence for its own sake.135 
The mantra that strategy is the domain of the warrior ‘fully independent of policy’ and 
with ‘a free hand to pursue that elusive quarry, tactical victory, the attainment of which 
serves policy best’136 was dismissed in the years after 1945 when militarism became 
intolerable.137 The soldier is society’s servant; society’s purpose is no longer primarily or 
even significantly to support homo furens. The value of service, the myth of obligation,138 
and a code of responsibility139 is instead given emphasis. 
 
Soldiers fight due to peer relationships, friendships and primary social groups.140 The ‘Big 
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Three’141 thus promoted ‘mateship’ not self-motivation as the primary motivating factor – 
though this is increasingly queried.142 It is suggested now that the bonds that tie homo 
furens together are fundamentally different and different motivations apply:143 ‘it has 
become fashionable to emphasise how soldiers fight for their mates, we should not forget 
men also fight because somebody tells them to’.144The reviled SS, for example, is widely 
accepted as an ideologically motivated organisation145 that fought on when others quit. 
However, to dismiss their heinous behaviour only as a consequence only of the highly 
politicised environment in which they served, or to attribute it to nationality or race would 
be wrong. How many did so from fear that otherwise they would be ‘stripped of all rank, 
expelled from the SS’ and committed to a concentration camp as an inmate146 such was 
the disciplinary process where they demonstrated disobedience cannot be known. How 
many fought on because they wanted, or because their comrades were so behaving is 
similarly indeterminate. The number of Soviet citizens who went into battle to prevent 
their families being persecuted or their own assignment to a punishment battalion is 
equally impossible to determine.147 Discipline and compulsion, through external or self-
induced pressure, a fear of shame or disgrace;148 military efficiency; closer control and 
more formal command all matter and motivate as well as ‘mateship’; so too does better 
organisation, welfare provision and training, morale and the sense of professionalism.149 
The armies mentioned above are not directly comparable to a relatively small, modern 
professional armed force like the British Army but the point here is more particularly that 
the soldier acts on many different and separate motivations and is rarely an independent 
actor with self-agency acting only on personal initiative. 
 
Marshall’s famous 1947 work suggests ‘automation’ is actually necessary.150 Where 
soldiers exercise choice, they fail to fight – and even die before they can overcome their 
reticence.151 Of any 100 soldiers perhaps only 15 would fire their weapons. 
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The heroic few are relatively unaffected, and indeed their willingness to 
expose themselves to danger in order to further the unit's mission can be 
an inspiration to their comrades-in-arms. However, for the remainder the 
range of behaviour can stretch from competence, but without initiative, right 
through to non-participation.152 
That some soldiers have little fighting spirit and abstinence is their preference is a 
sociological phenomenon.153 All armies are endowed ‘with a class of men in whom the 
primal urge for self-preservation is unusually well pronounced.’154 The British Army is not 
exempt and has its quota too. Whilst ‘drilling’ soldiers to comply with orders is assumed 
a remedy and is unremarkable in army routine we could actually be concerned at those 
who act on compulsion and ‘fearful of those who would kill simply out of a sense of duty 
without considering a deeper meaning’.155  Soldiers, as devices with limited agency, 
utilitarians 156  who ‘fight as avatars of a nation’s sanctioned violence’ 157  compare 
unfavourably to homo furens with individual existential, even noble purpose. The 
‘mindless brick in a moving wall of flesh, instantly responsive to the orders’ of superiors158 
who never question or think, and simply ‘follow and obey’159 are automatons, parts of a 
machine,160 who ‘function like cells in a military organism,’ and do what is expected of 
them ‘because it has become automatic.’161 The rigid authority and agency of leaders in 
such circumstances obliterates that of followers.162 However, this homo furens might also 
hold the key to success in war. ‘Success in hand-to-hand combat often depends on a 
rapid and accurate interpretation of environmental information and the production of 
highly automated movements.’163 
 
With belligerent urges assumed controlled in homo furens, war was no longer considered 
the destiny of mankind.164 Increases in technology made the traditional fighter less of a 
commodity and battles were increasingly fought beyond the eyeline of the commander 
involving more than those physically present. Hand to hand combat where necessary 
was to finalise the victory and intimate engagement with the enemy was only to confirm 
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defeat. Combat in its historical, physical form was the last act over the decisive one. War, 
a ‘full orchestra’165 affair, involves all soldiers not just combat arms and civilian personnel 
too. The place of the soldier shifted: no longer ‘a warrior class that stands apart from the 
people’166 rather one tool amongst many167 to be applied to wicked problems.168 
 
This demise prompts a ‘lament for a dying class’.169 The soldier emasculated the warrior, 
and homo furens, reduced, became an object not the subject of his or her destiny.170 
Coker warns that the warrior tradition is then just surviving. The attack is ‘based on three 
melancholy currents: postmodern relativism, the self-esteem movement, and the cult of 
celebrity.' 171  Those drawn to warriorship find themselves adrift and their desire 
increasingly alien to society. Narratives of illness,172 trauma as a ‘pervasive idiom of 
distress in Western culture,173 and soldiers expected to break down after combat174 place 
warriorship in a precarious and isolated position. Helen McCartney175 presents the soldier 
as victim, eulogised in this form since violence is no longer glorified.176 Her representation 
is actively challenged by the military and the government 177  who wish alternative 
emphasis but the ‘socially designated status and official medical classification of disabled 
veterans as ‘Wounded Warriors’ fuels her argument.178 The positive effect of illuminated 
sacrifice is negated by the visible reality of injury and death – and associated requirement 
for charity and societal advocacy.179 The depiction ‘latches on to the most sacred military 
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symbol, the warrior, and re-purposes it.’180 The soldier who wishes to be warrior, and 
hero – a term that is also weaponised181 – is instead ‘paid man…a glorious pauper, victim, 
and executioner, a scapegoat daily sacrificed to his people and for his people’. 182 
Commiserated as victims, presented as villains183 these are imperfect homo furens. They 
earn pity; their conscience is subordinated to necessity184 and the violence they deliver, 
the responsibility of the institution,185 is enacted by the oppressed man. 
 
The soldier who broke from the warrior mould was to be an improved homo furens. This 
characterisation as automaton suggests regression. Soldiers operating to a machinist’s 
instructions reintroduces that which is reviled: the abdication of personal responsibility 
and reliance on a ‘Nuremberg Defence’ to excuse wrongdoing. Disallowing that is 
essential. ‘Soldiers can never be transformed into mere instruments of war...Trained to 
obey without hesitation,’ says Walzer. ‘It is a mistake to treat soldiers as if they were 
automatons who make no judgments at all.’186 Yet history suggests otherwise. Society 
satisfies itself that such behaviours are ‘an aberration that civilized societies do not 
tolerate’:187 the individual must then be at fault when a breach occurs and self-regulation. 
has failed since the rules are clear. Soldiers are to respond to instruction; they are to be 
ethically sound and socially aware, and responsible for their actions. Liberal society, 
increasingly sceptical about the glory of war,188 and rejecting it as alien to human nature189 
prefers the world as it should be, and not necessarily as it is.190 It validates homo furens 
only in a singular form. That soldiers as servants are unempowered or have within them 




Opposition to the idea of the soldier as automaton is not the sole reserve of society’s 
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guardians. Soldiers also reject the notion of unthinking, mechanical military manoeuvre. 
‘We are not just the Poor Bloody Infantry. We are not the cannon fodder. We are more 
than that’.191 The thinking soldier who self-regulates is a more favoured prospect.192 
Soldiers are disciplined masters of warfare, acting out of a sense of duty 
and devotion to their homeland, families, or an ideal, who do not love 
violence but understand that there are cases where violence is necessary. 
They are self-sacrificial, putting the needs of others over their own. They 
do not seek glory, they seek victory. They are thinkers who understand that 
passions must be controlled in the heat of battle, that sometimes the 
answer is not always to attack in a frenzy. 193 
Comparison to ‘Viking raiders or Genghis Khan’s marauders’ is rejected. 194  The 
undisciplined and chaotic warrior, tribal and lawless, governed by a ‘rampant’195 code 
and dedicated to violence who fights only for themselves holds little attraction. This homo 
furens is not just ‘concerned primarily’ with a relationship to combat196 or alternatively, 
adherence to orders through some ‘contractual obligation and exchange’. 197  This 
individual aspires to modern-day chivalry198 typified by competition, the application of 
cold steel, participation in aerial combat or man-stalking199 and veers from industrial 
practice or the ‘passivity of the mass.’200 Measured autonomy and admiration for the 
virtues,201 that ‘give ‘dignity to a man’s fighting instincts’,202 is strong and with that comes 
recognition of the need to act with restraint. These homo furens are ‘value-based or they 
are nothing.’203 The opportunity to satisfy one’s ‘darker’, more aggressive nature, detailed 
in philosophy and history as the ‘hominid behavioural repertoire’ of cruelty in war, in 
sacrificial rites, and as entertainment204 is resisted. This second variant of T1, that I term 
the soldier-warrior, is a ‘biopolitical military professional’, a Janus-faced figure who 
engages in violence but also partakes of ‘forms of military participation that are life-
enriching.’205 
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Patrick Bury explains: ‘I was attracted to the glory of war. The fantasy. The heroes with 
their citations and medals were almost other-worldly, untouchable.’206 Caputo thought 
war seductive;207 Karl Marlantes emphasised the lack of introspection as explanation for 
its attractiveness.208 
Armies are traditionally the preserve of young males, based on their 
propensity to be risk-takers, tending to overconfidence, lacking experience 
and imagination as to the consequences of the activities, together with their 
physical strength in energetic and, if necessary, violent activity over the 
short to medium period.209 
Whether warriorlike behaviour is a consequence of pent up energy, a lack of considered 
analysis due to limited experience (young men know nothing about war)210 or rejection of 
mortality is unclear, the suggestion that warriorship might be age, time or maturity 
bounded has value. More certain, it attracts and is embraced as a standard by individuals 
as part of their identity.211 The soldier-warrior variant demands a voice in martial activity 
and won’t stand in the ranks either metaphorically or literally. This Type closes ‘the 
chasm between the senior officer’s view of chivalry, the junior officer’s view of combat, 
the warrior concept, and the twenty-first-century idea that all combatants must be 
warriors’.212 They comprehend warriorship as self-realisation but interpret its demands in 
line with the Just Warrior tradition. Responsibility rests roundly on their shoulders. ‘Far 
from the self-aggrandizing and honor-loving conceptions’ associated with the warriors of 
antiquity, behaviour is ‘marked by reluctance and humility; a subjugation of the self and 
personal honor to justice as the highest good’.213 Their standard is not ‘individual morality 
but rather ethical norms in the context of military professionalism.’214 
 
Cicero rejected the idea that individuals are motivated only by fear, honour, status and 
self-interest,215 preferring instead duty and service as impetus. Good men endure pain 
and danger for others, ‘not only not seeking pleasure, but actually renouncing pleasures 
altogether, and preferring to undergo every sort of pain rather than be false to any portion 
of their duty’.216 A sense of ‘pragmatism and cynicism’217 sets them ‘a class-apart’, a 
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model for others. 218  Huntington recognised the tension in the military ethic that 
emphasises evil over good. The military view is ‘decidedly pessimistic. Man has elements 
of goodness, strength, and reason, but he is also evil, weak, and irrational.’219 The 
soldier-warrior internalises these aspects and resists nefarious urges in favour of 
honourable intent. 
 
Nancy Sherman220 introduces the modern-day stoic as a multiphrenic221 figure impacted 
by many influences; an individual who is ‘socially constituted within the boundaries of 
culture, context, and language.’ 222  Her warrior is a self-sufficient, tough individual, 
‘detached from sticky emotions’ in pursuit of completing the tasks they have accepted; 
soldiers who can apply cognitive control to emotional responses, according to 
McMaster.223  Adherents are given to ‘the rigorous cultivation of self-command, self-
reliance and autonomy in which one seeks to develop inner character based on the four 
cardinal virtues of courage, justice, temperance and wisdom.’224 The soldier-warrior does 
not exist with just single purpose but compartmentalises: they ‘switch from one moral 
world to another’,225 and moderate ‘runaway passion – the most rabid and unbridled of 
all emotions’, according to the ancient Seneca.226 The defining quality is self-control over 
self-reference. This soldier ‘swims in ever-shifting, concatenating, and contentious 
currents of being.’227  
 
An internet search of soldiers’ public personae demonstrates the point: one declares 
himself rifleman (a regimental identity) and soldier; another father, husband, soldier; a 
third is a ‘Commandant, Director, Fusilier’ (this first two are appointments and will shift, 
the last again is a regimental identification that is more enduring).228 Others are: advisor, 
mental health and well-being champion;229 ‘CO, voice of the soldier, and conscience of 
the army’;230 and ‘family, soldier and mental health advocate.’231 These soldiers recognise 
‘multiple components of self as identities.’232 The core of their identities is their self-
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categorisation as occupants of their preferred roles.233 They minimise the number of 
competing identities with three the optimal number of roles through which they wish to 
present and be seen. This illustrates that the ‘greater the number of related identities, 
the greater the difficulty in dealing simultaneously with relationships between them.’234 
Critically for this thesis, none of those found on social media declare as warriors. 
 
The soldier-warrior is swayed by an inherent ‘peace ego’, and Sherman emphasises 
humanity, but allows too for a ‘war ego’:235 a ‘stony faced Marine colonel’ whose most 
wrenching experience was to leave his family as he deployed, not the prospect of killing 
his fellow man; Chief Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson,236 the ‘Hero of My Lai’ who 
refused to allow American soldiers to commit genocide and viewed ‘enemy communities’ 
as more than that.237 Alternately, Milgram discovered ‘ordinary people, simply doing their 
jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part’ who become agents in a terrible 
destructive process238 capable of bureaucratised killing239 like this drone operator: ‘I feel 
no emotional attachment to the enemy, I have a duty, and I execute that duty.’240 Gray 
presents an officer who executes a collaborator at the end of World War Two whose 
different identities could ‘succeed each other with lightning rapidity.’241 Treating the victim 
as an object allowed the officer a temporary suspension of humanity.242 The concept of 
multiple identities allows ‘domains’ where varying influence is evident.243 
 
The first of these, the Marine Colonel, puts duty before family; the second the values he 
has sworn to uphold; the third and fourth separate their action against the enemy from 
other references. Each adheres to a commitment and satisfies the expectation they feel 
is upon them. They differentiate through personal interpretation and are capable of the 
‘disciplined disobedience’ 244  the servant or automaton cannot comprehend: soldier-
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warriors are ‘virtuosic individuals in a mass of unmotivated and unskilled non-
participants.’ 245  This evolution shouldn’t surprise: in ‘premodern and modern times 
people interacted in precious few contexts…in the postmodern psychological world 
people mix and match realities and identities in an increasingly complex array of 
circumstances.’246 The soldier-warrior accepts war as ‘both senseless and necessary, 
squalid and fulfilling, terrifying and sometimes jolly. This is like life. Humans are at home 
in war (though they seldom admit this).’247 The requirement to adjust behaviour and 
identity to the ever-changing and multifarious circumstances of war is understood by the 
soldier-warrior. 
 
Soldier-warriors are chameleon-like and surrounded by layers. Few soldiers take their 
identity only from the Army or they ‘would be the only people existing in human society 
who had a single identity’.248 Multiple identities are not just possible: they are inevitable. 
The Stoic Hierocles, writing in the first century AD, refers to the notion of 
cosmopolitanism in the following way: ‘each one of us’ he describes as 
‘entirely encompassed by many circles, some smaller, others larger’. ‘The 
first circle contains parents, siblings, wife, and children’. As we move 
outward, we move through grandparents, to neighbors, to fellow tribesmen 
and citizens, and ultimately to the whole human race.249 
Stoicism – a remarkable philosophy uniquely suited to the battlefield and the predecessor 
of modern Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 250  – provides contemporary soldiers with 
traces of the ancient warrior. The soldier-warrior has adapted to the paymaster but 
retains personal motivation. This is a thinking not reactive, considered not reflexive, 
individual who rehearses. ‘One ought to question, argue, discuss and reflect well in 
advance of the shooting, so that when it comes time to act, one is ready and comfortable 
in carrying out the moral obligations of the Profession of Arms.’251 
 
The critical obligation is ethical, and value theory or ‘questions about how one ought to 
live.’252 This is fundamental to cultural construct and guidance for ‘living well and dying 
well’.253 Culture though ‘is like natural selection. Both are colour blind when it comes to 
morality’254 and so morality must be imposed: it’s not necessarily intuitive or apparent. 
Ethical behaviours are human artefacts, ‘cultural, contingent & contextual’, and on 
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occasion contested,255 they are transcendental and a mix of conscience, assumption and 
organisational preference. Ethics is not law or policy but allows ‘the study or reflection 
upon moral belief, moral systems and moral practices’256 to prevent ‘moral injury’. It is 
how the armed forces are kept in check257 and how the state arbitrates between desire 
and direction: ‘the former emphasises difference and the latter similarity’.258 
 
Behaviour is governed by rules or ‘situational proprieties’259 that keep brutish nature 
under control,260 and the code of necroethics that ‘holds forth on the procedures of 
homicide and turns them into the objects of complacent moral evaluation’.261 
The conversion of socialised people into dedicated fighters is achieved not 
by altering their personality structures, aggressive drives or moral 
standards. Rather, it is accomplished by cognitively redefining the morality 
of killing so that it can be done free from self-censure.262 
Advocates promote ethics as pre-requisite for homo furens: these are non-negotiable 
rules, constraints that ensure adherence to domestic societal norms, where the premium 
is placed on ‘cooperative, non-violent behaviours’.263 Actions are sanctioned by statutes 
believed ‘congruent with the warrior ethos that frames military identity’.264 They privilege 
a particular martial character. The edicts are to ‘limit, contain, and to establish criteria 
that sanction the use of violence’ to differentiate killing from murder.265 To reduce or 
negate ‘dastardly’ actions266 a hard framework of law situates the military: the softer layer 
of ethics fills the gaps.267 The rules allow killing and punishment where breaches occur 
but also facilitate the quenching of passion through procedure. This homo furens accepts 
the rules: the servant had them imposed. In becoming a soldier: 
one enters into a new moral community of practice, taking up new roles and 
obligations that one did not have prior to taking that oath. With this comes 
a new moral identity and obligations related to that role and membership in 
this community.268 
Oaths counter self-interest: 269  they are a ‘moral shield that can safeguard soldiers’ 
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humanity’ in war,270 and provide spiritual protection against the moral harms of war.271 In 
The Code of the Warrior it is declared that the ‘absolutely fundamental battlefield ethics 
lessons’ are restraint, discrimination, and proportionality. However, that these are 
‘timeless principles’ that informed warrior codes for millennia272 is overstating the case. 
Fighting is brutal and often wont adhere to these constraints that Caputo terms, ‘the 
mincing distinctions of civilized warfare – that code of battlefield ethics that attempted to 
humanize.’273 
 
Gray emphasises the importance of a code but warns against compliance with ethical 
standards promulgated by others. He declares homo furens a professional who regards 
‘himself as an instrument of the state’274 but adds a note of caution: ‘You must act as a 
man and not as an instrument of another’s will’.275 That homo furens must censor ‘illegal 
orders’ would be recognised through well-known historical instances where this was not 
the case; it may even be necessary to disobey legal orders. 
…the military officer is not an automaton. He has an obligation to the nation, 
derived from his oath to defend the constitution, and to his subordinates, 
implicit in the extraordinary position of authority he has over them, to 
exercise some degree of moral autonomy in the gap between receipt of 
order and execution.276 
Such caution prompts deep consideration. It allows freedom in how homo furens 
answers the call, free will, choice and the opportunity to refuse orders; but re-introduces 
an issue of split loyalties. Whether the ‘loyalty enshrined in a particular warrior code is 
primarily to the parent society and its constitution, or to the institutional military’ is a 
quandary: the potential exists ‘for sharp conflict between the two approaches’.277 This 
conflict is sharper for introducing a third division still where homo furens adheres to a 
self-generated code. 
 
French separates warriors (I suggest soldiers), from murderers278 through recognition of 
honourable intent.279 She emphasises moral and social responsibility – homo furens 
within the ‘communities that spawned them’280 – and legal constraint. What happens in 
battle can be criticised in its aftermath: ethics aims to reduce the opportunity and 
necessity of this. Such criticism involves complex consideration but can also be arbitrary, 
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highly subjective and culturally bound: accusations of ‘moral relativism’281 are easily laid. 
Morality is relative to time and place, and can even be superficial or cosmetic: ‘the varnish 
of two thousand years’ of learning so thin as to be transparent. 282  In advocating 
warriorship in line with societal norms, away from martial norms (the ‘technical scripts 
and moral codes’283 specific to the warrior), ethos is manipulated and commentators 
preside over a ‘vast redefinition of warrior virtues.’284 The clash is between justification 
and impulse: the dilemma of cosmopolitan soldiering. 285  It is the critical difference 
between T1 and T2 homo furens. 
 
Both variants of this first Type, the soldier-servant and soldier-warrior, operate within the 
bounds of humanity – and personal values are mostly if not fully synonymous with those 
of the institution. They are the people’s sword but they also shield themselves from the 
horrors of war by care and attention to a stipulated code.286 The soldier-servant exists 
under Janowitz’s socially inclusive doctrine with Huntington’s martial caste under 
supervision more applicable to the soldier-warrior.287 Their shared mantra is service, a 
choice that can evolve into a compulsion. To perform their duty homo furens is malleable 
and accepts personal agency is limited in pursuit of organisational cohesion and 
success. The actions taken can be simplified as Doing, adherence to a virtual contract, 
over Being288 and reacting more intuitively. Doing and Being is the watershed between 
T1 and T2, though the boundary is not absolute: ‘being and doing are both central 
features of one’s identity.’289 The individuals measured by Doing are judged by how they 
perform against externally derived culturally constructed criteria. Identity is taken from 
the relationship with and to others. ‘It is a process – identification – not a ‘thing’. It is not 
something one can have, or not; it is something one does.’290 
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The theorist John Locke thought the mind a ‘white paper, void of all characters, without 
any ideas’,291 or tabula rasa meaning Blank Slate. He suggested that differences ‘among 
races, ethnic groups, sexes, and individuals come not from differences in their innate 
constitution but from differences in their experiences.’ 292  Such belief underpins 
contemporary liberal, social constructivist thought, and military training. Judith Harris and 
John Watson provide further foundation through their work on the socialisation of children 
(and whether the influence of peers or ‘parental determinism’ is critical).293 This seems 
relatively straightforward but the question of what motivates homo furens is a more 
vexing one.294 Soldiers don’t enlist only on the basis of tempting recruitment campaigns 
and fight as a consequence of training alone. Motivation involves more personal and 
individual processes. 
War is not just a matter of politics, or something societal, war is a matter of 
human nature. It is undertaken for particular and definable gain. The rather 
smug disdain for war and warriors reflects a mistaken view that modernity 
and the Enlightenment have not only changed international politics, but 
human nature at large.295 
To fight involves choice: ‘under enemy fire, there are some that seek cover and there 
are others that stand-up and charge. The latter are warriors.’296 That this ‘response can 
be trained in and out’297 is possible but it is also owned by the individual. Presented as 
fight or flight298 it is an ‘expressive’ instinct.299 
 
The Blank Slate as a sole measure for behaviour analysis isn’t wholly convincing. 
Evolutionary psychologists, against the ‘strongest opposition’300 oppose such ‘standard’ 
social science models of open-ended, non-genetic evolutionary processes where 
individuals and groups adapt to their environments. 301  They reject the ‘naïve 
nature/nurture dichotomy,’ that overlooks heavy and complex biological machinery that 
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is necessary for the working of each of them and the interplay between them302 and prefer 
the work of socio-biologists who reveal ‘the enormously complicated circuitry’ required 
to perform ‘such “simple” acts as seeing, hearing, and remembering’.303 Social science 
alone can’t explain why individuals are personally drawn to warriorship and war – the 
joining of personal desire and the opportunity for social flourishing.304 The ‘sense of the 
tragic’ where ‘a personal test of will and skill often at great individual risk’ provides 
meaning305 is not elucidated. The Blank Slate theory is dismissed as ‘a total failure as a 
mechanistic conception of the mind.’306 
 
Type 1 is pensive, passive and malleable. Where one can find a singularly focussed and 
constructed individual, they comply with the Blank Slate theory: Type 2, more active, 
responsive and intuitive, is inclined to internal reference and personal desire: they 
neglect ‘the social contractarian trinity’.307 For ‘true warriors, war-making is not so much 
about what they do but what they are.’308 The focus switches from Doing to Being, and: 
…her own philosophy, her own personal growth, her personal 
understanding of the martial dance, her own personal will and skill and, in 
the end, the personal risk she alone faces. Unimpeded by the nature of the 
war around her, the death of her friends, and the killing of her enemies, this 
warrior ethos is defined entirely in terms of self.309 
Warrior-soldiers stand in opposition to the idea that killing is unnatural and ’makes most 
healthy people uneasy.’310 They are the ‘hard core’ of 10-15% of homo furens.311 General 
Adrian Carton de Wiart is an example: ‘war was in my blood. I was determined to fight 
and I didn’t mind who or what.’312 A Happy Warrior,313 essentially apolitical,314 (welcome 
to society) but not putty in the hands of society nor a victim.315 Unmotivated by the idea 
of service, uninterested in bureaucratised standards, he was enthused by war pursuing 
what ‘must be tasted’ before one has enjoyed the full flavour of life.316  
The enduring attraction of war is this: Even with its destruction and carnage 
it can give us what we long for in life. It can give us purpose, meaning, a 
reason for living. Only when we are in the midst of conflict does the 
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shallowness and vapidness of much of our lives become apparent…war is 
an enticing elixir. It gives us resolve, a cause. It allows us to be noble.317 
And de Wiart is not anomalous: Grossman highlights the WW2 fighter pilot who declares 
‘the love of the sport rather than the sense of duty that makes you go on.’ Another 
veteran: ‘The fact is, it was fun’; the ‘benchmark of all my experiences’ according to a 
third. A helicopter pilot explains that he and his colleagues ‘became very efficient 
executioners’.318 Even Great War veterans have claimed that war is not as traumatic as 
the narrative would suggest. 
I saw far more fighting than Siegfried Sassoon, or Edward Blunden, or 
Robert Graves, far more than Liddell Hart, four or five times as much as 
much (sic) as Wilfred Owen, and I didn’t go home with a nervous 
breakdown.319 
Presenting the soldier as victim not warrior is incomprehensible to T2 but the narrative 
of tragedy is ‘hard to dislodge.’320 T2 finds ‘in war a master text by which they came to 
know themselves better’.321 
 
The human condition322 and Tragic Vision where war is a ‘rational and tempting strategy’ 
for personal and national gain323 remains valid. There are still: 
hardy, adventurous men who embrace the sweat, heat, cold, bruises, 
vomit, cordite smell, blasts, rifle cracks, screams, and camaraderie, 
knowing that some of them will lose limbs or bleed out. They don’t need a 
patriotic war or sacrifices by the public. We cannot explain why they choose 
the rough life. They march to a different drummer. They like to fight and are 
highly skilled at it.324 
Fighting is intuitive and emotional, ‘an entirely human enterprise’;325 illogical to some, it 
belongs more properly alongside chaos than order but it is enduring. Consider the tribal 
chief who instinctively realised the advantage new technology would afford him: 
Despite never having seen an airplane before, the tribal leader immediately 
asked for a ride, a request that was granted. When finally seated, he said 
that he wanted to bring a few heavy stones with him on the flight. Asked what 
the rocks were for, he replied that if he were flown over the village of his 
enemies, he would drop these rocks on them.326 
The chief grasped the utility of air power quicker than those at the turn of the 20th Century 
who initially employed aircraft for observation. He is no Blank Slate. That idea is 
‘addictively attractive to people because we want to believe that anyone can achieve 
 
317 Chris Hedges, War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning (Oxford, UK: PublicAffairs, 2002), 3. 
318 Grossman, On Killing, 236-40. 
319 Robert Kershaw, 24hrs At The Somme, (London: Penguin Random House, 2016), 379, quoting Charles 
Carrington MC, scholar and Professor of History at Cambridge University. 
320 Fox, Learning to Fight, 2. 
321 Coker, Waging War, 58. Bury explains that he had an epiphany after one combat action having ‘proved 
myself to myself.’ Bury, Callsign Hades, 178-9. 
322 Hanson, Father of Us All, xii. 
323 Pinker, The Blank Slate, 292. 
324 Bing West, “The Way Out of Afghanistan”, Military Review, (Mar/Apri2011): 94. 
325 Hanson, The Father of Us All, xi. 
326 Keeley, War Before Civilization, location 1704-8. 
 
59 
anything. It’s a lovely story, and it’s one our culture tells us repeatedly. But it’s not true.’327 
Dick Winters’ infantry company, the subject of the TV series ‘Band of Brothers’, 
comprised a core of killers ‘who instinctively understood the intricacies of battle.’ 
In both training and combat, a leader senses who his killers are. I merely 
put them in a position where I could utilize their talents most effectively. 
Many other soldiers thought they were killers and wanted to prove it. In 
reality, however, your killers are few and far between. Nor is it always 
possible to determine who your killers are by the results of a single 
engagement. In combat, a commander hopes that nonkillers will learn by 
their association with those soldiers who instinctively wage war without 
restraint and without regard to their personal safety. The problem, of 
course, lies in the fact that casualties are highest among your killers, hence 
the need to return them to the front as soon as possible in the hope that 
other “killers” emerge. This core of warriors survived, at least until the fates 
finally abandoned them, because they developed animal-like instincts of 
self-preservation. Around this group of battle-hardened veterans the 
remainder of Easy Company coalesced.328 
Winters acknowledges his killers separately from his other soldiers; he observes that 
they developed with experience but that their approach was innate. He could identify 
them in training, not after training. A respondent major had a similar view: ‘You need a 
‘splattering’ of warriors throughout the force’, he said, ‘it’s that ‘splattering’ that gives the 
confidence to the soldiers, and drives the formation forward’.329 
 
These lay bare the ‘illusory and inconsequential glorification’330 of the warrior who acts 
for others. They present the warrior who performs according to instinct with ‘a strong 
undercurrent of independence from society and even at times deviation from its moral 
structures.’ Scheipers continues: ‘This should make us wary of postulating too strong a 
connection between the moral foundations of heroism and the subjective sources of 
combat motivation.’331 This is ‘Mad Jack’, charging up beaches ‘dressed only in a kilt and 
brandishing a dirk, killing with a bow and arrow, playing the bagpipes at moments of 
extreme peril’;332 and ‘Mad Mark’ not berserker-like but rather ‘insanely calm. He never 
showed fear. He was a professional soldier, an ideal leader of men in the field. It was 
that kind of madness, the perfect guardian for the Platonic Republic.…’333 Such figures 
are ‘problematic’: separate from society they ‘strip conflict of its political context.’334 War 
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is a destructive but also generative force like no other, say Barakwi and Brighton.335 This 
type relishes it. Descendants of warrior societies336 they succeed those who existed as a 
consequence of societal expectation, as a rite of passage, and systems of obligatory 
militarism.337 Warriorship here is a calling, not just an avenue for social mobility.338 
 
Membership of the historical community339 may be influenced by heritability. ‘Nearly 
every reliably measured psychological phenotype (normal and abnormal) is significantly 
influenced by genetic factors’ 340  and over time, just as society ‘weeded out those 
individuals with a tendency toward greater aggression,’341 so too those incapable or 
squeamish in battle who couldn’t kill were extinguished or retreated from the caste. 
Given the frequency and selective importance of aggression and combat 
during human evolutionary history, it would be surprising if humans had not 
been tailored by selection to assess the fighting ability of conspecific 
males.342 
The ‘systematic long-lasting environmental effects’ and radical, enduring culture, led to 
genetic changes: experience complements genetic propensity.343 ‘Cultural changes in 
political and social organization – phenomena that are unique to human beings – may 
extend their reach into patterns of genetic variation in ways yet to be discovered.’344 
 
An officer, returned from Iraq, asked if a drone pilot was at war, said: ‘No. He doesn’t 
meet my definition’.345 Rear-based personnel neither meet the warrior standard: ‘no one 
with the warrior calling joined the Army to be a logistician, administrator or educator’.346 
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T2 think themselves a warrior caste347 and thesis respondents tended to reserve the 
term. ‘It’s a choice to be a frontline soldier and maybe die’ and that earns the title warrior 
since the descriptor is inextricably linked to danger: those ‘cooking burgers’348 don’t 
qualify. ‘Some fella…who cooks sausages 2 weekends a month’ 349  set against 
infantrymen ‘on courses in Brecon350 for weeks on end, doesn’t really compare, two 
completely opposite ends of the scale’.351 Those who qualify are ‘boys who are like us, 
boys who fight on the frontline…who are attached to us,352 [they can] take the title warrior, 
but boys in Bastion 353  cooking scoff 354  or whatever I wouldn’t really say they’d be 
warriors…’355 
 
Self-categorisation and ‘accentuation of the perceived similarities between the self and 
the other in-group members’356 was evident in my research: aggrandisement the result 
of training but also choice. ‘With good training and good leadership anyone can get into 
warriorship’: 
…but the benefit and advantage of a volunteer army like ours is that you 
end up with people who are pre-disposed toward infantry and they mentally 
accept that’s the space they are going to be in…[thankfully there are also] 
some people who want to drive trucks…357 
Operating in close proximity to the enemy differentiates. Soldiers who kill in less 
traditional ways or from distance don’t qualify: ‘anyone can pull a trigger at 600 metres 
but can everyone go into a knife fight?’358 
Progress has purged actual warfare of much of the emotional anger which 
accompanied the struggles of olden times. Except among the infantry, 
killing has become so impersonal that the killer resembles a boy with a toy 
gun, or a man in a bathroom stepping on cockroaches.359 
‘Making war’ or involvement in the endeavour doesn’t alone qualify warriors. Warriors 
who engage in intimate combat are separate from their soldier peers: the warrior-soldier 
may have more in common with non-institutional homo furens than with fellow soldiers.360 
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In a study, before the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the top three reasons for 
joining the Army were: for adventure; ‘to be a soldier’; and to get a trade. Soldiers were 
not asked if they wanted to fight.361 During my research the opportunity arose to conduct 
a similar exercise.362 The cohort’s reasons for joining are grouped as follows: 
 
Theme Mentions(%) 
To Serve: For the Country, Pride and ‘Status’. 20 (17%) 
The ‘Offer’: Challenge, Opportunity, Limited Alternatives, Family, Housing, Job Security 62 (52%) 
To Fight: War, Infantry pull, Belonging and Camaraderie. 37(31%) 
Fig. 3.2: Reasons For Joining 
 
What the infantry provides – the opportunity to fight – attracted one third of those 
consulted: it allows them to express their identity. 363  Respondents pointed to TV 
programmes364 and news footage of the campaign in Afghanistan ‘as instrumental’365 in 
awakening their interest. ‘Service’ was prioritised by less than one fifth of those 
consulted; roughly half were attracted by the ‘Army Offer’ and might have joined any 
branch. Respondents demonstrate the split allegiances of institution and occupation.366 
 
The draw to the infantry is better explained by the ‘Ghost in the Machine’367 than the Blank 
Slate. This requires the same faith as that found in religious doctrine, or belief in a soul. 
Adherents ascribe behaviour to a celestial or Supreme Being and believe mankind is 
born with pre-existing ideas and principles. Differences are explained by inherent 
behaviours, not learned or imitated, but rather revealed.368 Wright explains human nature 
as consisting of knobs and mechanisms for turning the knobs:369 both are invisible. 
Culture and environment determine the design of the knobs; free will, or the Ghost, turns 
them.370 ‘Moral standards do not function as fixed internal regulators of conduct. Self-
regulatory mechanisms do not operate unless they are activated.’371 Free will, a tenet of 
existentialist thought, is ‘the re-assertion of the free man against the totality or the 
collectivity or any tendency to depersonalization’: it is akin to personalism and 
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pragmatism.372 To exist constitutes identity:373 T1 inclines to the collective and is a cog in 
a political machine; T2 to individual identity over group, and are systems in themselves.374 
 
The Ghost explains good and evil. The idea that humans may be inherently cruel, the 
mind innately organised, is rejected only because it suggests something ‘immoral to 
think’ 375  and an unmentionable taboo; 376  to discuss it might normalise behaviour or 
absolve the perpetrators.377 The concept is a battleground to be avoided entirely rather 
than a battle to be fought. To acknowledge it might demand action that would trap the 
unwary: so it is ignored. That good and evil might be awakened by circumstances, and 
so nature and nurture have bearing, is also worth consideration. ‘The evil was not 
inherent in the men – except in the sense that a devil dwells in us all – but in the 
circumstances on which they had to live and fight.’378 There is something fundamentally 
human about this and ‘dispassionate reading of the evidence leads to the inescapable 
conclusion that genetic factors play a substantial role in the origins of individual 
differences with respect to all psychological traits, both normal and abnormal.’379 
 
The Ghost, suggesting fate, and free will allowing choice (albeit some ‘have more free 
will than others’)380 come together in genetic disposition. This is the nexus of existence, 
or how we live, and the ‘essence’381 of being, or how we will live. Internal and external 
influences endure382 but the actualisation of essence, the ‘desire to assert one’s essential 
“self” in the act of killing’383 is more intangible. Where an individual assumes or pursues 
warrior identity they have consciously chosen certain behaviours. Gray understands the 
warrior in this existential form and explains the warrior philosophically. ‘Man as a warrior’ 
he says ‘is only partly a man. Yet, fatefully enough, this aspect of him is capable of 
transforming the whole.’384 He highlights those who in war have no desire to fight and 
‘die in battle, miserable, alone, and embittered, without any conviction of self-sacrifice 
and without any other satisfactions’ but counters with the warrior for whom war presents 
no fear: ‘those who in every battle are seized by the passion for self-sacrifice, dying has 
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lost its terrors because reality has vanished’.385 Their reality differs: for those seized by 
the experience the terrors of war have disappeared and they are their authentic self. 
 
The existentialist concept of ‘authenticity’ explains the individual who decides who to be 
and lives the consequences. Being authentic is being autonomous and self-reference is 
key so norms such as duty, ethics, and even humanity are less compelling. Humanity 
‘classically has two meanings: on one hand, what human beings are, their essence; on 
the other, a norm of conduct’ or acting humanely.386 Where the warrior acts according to 
‘essence’ the former definition applies: action defined as inhumanity relies on the latter 
meaning and the assumptions of others. Warrior identity then cannot be denied due to 
the imposed criteria of others387 and the individual who chooses it may stand against the 
desire for a marginalisation of violence:388  the warrior-soldier would be acting in an 
inauthentic manner where ‘acceptable’ behaviour is determined by others. 
With regard to what I want to do, I need only consult myself: all that I feel 
to be good is good; all that I feel to be bad is bad. Conscience is the best 
casuist, and it is only when one haggles with conscience that one has 
recourse to the subtleties of reasoning.389 
The issue of group identity and association, and practically, the training of soldiers is 
pertinent. The individual as well as the collective must be understood and consciously 
manipulated. Aligning individual authenticity with group norms is as challenging as 
matching the ‘social solidarity’390 of the small group to organisational culture. 
 
That homo furens can enjoy war is easily grasped where we accept the ‘type’ who seeks 
it. Offered ‘values and standards’ might be inapplicable, a tyranny of the majority, or even 
of the minority, ‘formed by those who really have an opinion.’391 Any presumption that the 
stated norms of others are immutable or universally applicable is incorrect.392 Where 
values are not meaningful they can also be rejected. 
I asked how to incorporate the Marine Corps values — Honor. Courage. 
Commitment — into my training. The millennials provided the expected 
answer: explicitly and frequently. But the responses from those under 20 
stunned me. All of them echoed one corporal’s statement: “Don’t even say 
those words to us. We hear that phrase, and we know what’s coming next 
is just more Marine Corps propaganda.” The motto was an immediate tune-
out trigger. The marines had no problem with the values themselves, but 
believed they should be taught as part of being a good person — not a 
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good marine. One junior marine added, “I take off this uniform when I go 
home. I’m a person first, not a marine.”393 
A recent survey by the US Department of Defense revealed that only ‘47 percent of 
soldiers and 38 percent of Marines agreed that non-combatants should be treated with 
dignity and respect’. More than one-third thought torture should be allowed, less than 
half would report a team member for unethical behaviour. Mistreating non-combatants 
or damaging property ‘when it was not necessary’ was admitted by one in ten.394 
 
There is a tendency to assume norms (for the British Army its Values and Standards, or 
V&S), because they are taught, are then accepted and agreed. That V&S are ingrained 
and universal across the ranks with all adhering to them as part of their identity is 
questionable as evidenced above but also in observations made of the British Army. A 
survey conducted at one of the British Army’s ‘fighting brigades’ in 2018 found that just 
44% of young soldiers (under 26) had ‘affinity’ for the V&S. It is accepted that there could 
be a sampling issue here – young soldiers such as these, and the marines above, may 
not have seen combat but their views, their personal values and beliefs as detailed make 
their opinions worth recording, particularly given the fact that over 80% of officers 
expressed affinity. This figure was stated to be ‘world class’ and unseen in 6 years of 
similar surveys across non-military organisations. V&S therefore may be as much of an 
imposition as the term warrior is, and maybe even particular to officers or the attitudes 
of gatekeepers. 395  Hockey in his study of British soldiers highlights the finding that 
soldiers more often have a value system which is ‘oppositional to those in command’ 
rather than acquiescent.396 Where ‘norms’ sits at odds with alternative belief, a Code is 




Where warriorship is an individual endeavour then it is to the physiological and 
psychological construct of homo furens that we should look for insight. ‘Even those who 
are sceptical about direct inferences from primate studies and evolutionary theory agree 
that biology has something to offer the study of war and conflict in general.’397 The 
science of genetics reveals ‘the essence of our individuality’398 and even sceptical writers 
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who wish to ‘confront and dispel’ the idea that genes are fate399 concede that DNA400 
reveals behaviour. Genomics401 makes the Ghost less supernatural phenomenon, and 
more discoverable human trait: 
…the search for ‘genes for war’ is bound to fail, but the contrary dogmatic 
insistence that war is a pure product of culture written on the blank slate of 
impressionable minds is equally foolish. There could well be psychological 
mechanisms in the mind, placed there by natural selection acting in the 
past upon sets of genes, that predispose most people to react to some 
circumstances in warlike ways.402 
Genetic analysis that allows understanding of the influence of ancestors and heritability403 
won’t necessarily uncover programming but can highlight ‘probabilistic propensities’.404 
Free will is important, environment too, but ‘what look like systematic environmental 
effects are often due to us choosing environments’ that match our genetic bent.405 
 
The human blueprint is not obvious and only ‘thorny maths’ impenetrable to all but a 
handful of geneticists406 will expose it. The ‘link between gene action at a molecular level 
and expression of traits at a behavioral level’ is too indirect, nonspecific, and 
combinatorial407 to trace relationships – but genomics allows a partial map.  
Understanding how social and cultural processes affect the genetic 
patterns of human populations over time has brought together 
anthropologists, geneticists and evolutionary biologists, and the availability 
of genomic data and powerful statistical methods widens the scope of 
questions that analyses of genetic information can answer.408 
We are beginning to open ‘new windows’409 that may eventually allow us to ‘know enough 
to localize ‘‘cruelty’’ in one brain area or to explain individual differences.’ 410  The 
amygdala, a specific area of the brain provides one such window. Repeatedly associated 
with aggressive behaviour411 Kiehl’s research involving prisoners established ‘deficits in 
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emotional processing’ 412  separating affective murderers from predatory. 413  Other 
windows are provided through studies of conditioned emotional responses;414 how anger 
is regulated; 415  management of stress; 416  the impact of high testosterone on 
aggression’;417 and the effects of cortisol.418 These afford insight to how individuals might 
behave in stressful situations like war. Much ‘new thinking’ 419  is required but ‘the 
converging results from behavioral, physiological and neural measures point to a multi-
level mechanism related to an implicit and spontaneous process’420 regarding anger, 
cooperation and chances of conflict. These discoveries are beginning to explain how ‘our 
modern skulls house a stone age mind.’421 
 
It is defensible that 10-15% of soldiers are T2 homo furens, the fighter most influenced 
by nature. The identification of the warrior gene,422 whose carriers are predisposed ‘to 
aggressive, impulsive, and even violent behavior’ 423 the ‘ruthless’ and ‘psycho’ genes,424 
and ‘pseudogenes’ that alter ‘fear and memory symptoms’ and reduce anxiety425 allows 
a more reduced group comprising the ‘occasional soldier’ who has proven capable of 
with-standing combat ‘for an inordinate length of time.’  
Perhaps less than 2 per cent (as judged by numerous conversations with 
veteran soldiers) fall into this class. No personality type dominates this 
small, "abnormal," group, but it is interesting that aggressive psychopathic 
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personalities, who were poorly disciplined before combat, stand out.426 
This aligns with that ‘1% of the general population’427 (to include CEOs, spies, surgeons, 
politicians and the military as well as serial killers, assassins and bank robbers)428 who 
demonstrate ‘dark traits’.429 Psychopathy ‘a term grounded in biology and genetics’, truly 
agnostic to causes or etiology,430 and sociopathy431 are therefore relevant to warriorship. 
 
Sociopathy, or antisocial personality disorder, is a consequence of environmental 
influence: ‘those already demonstrating antisocial behaviour prior to joining the military 
are more likely to continue on this trajectory’.432 Such recruits also seem to settle easier 
into military life: the social learning of violence is ‘magnified when you are from a broken 
home and are searching for a role model.’433 The army promotes role models and leaders 
set and promote the localised standards:434 the organisation expects them to reflect 
corporate norms. However, small groups can determine their own benchmarks, 
institutionalising ‘deviant cohesion’435 where local standards are preferred. MacKenzie 
explains the concept in her article on sexual violence in the Australian Army where she 
highlights elite masculinity and toxic military culture (and demands intervention). 436 
Soldiers ‘will do almost anything to conform’437 to subculture (‘groups of people that are 
in some way represented as non-normative and/or marginal through their particular 
interests and practices’)438 as they perceive it, and not necessarily as taught. Where this 
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takes hold ‘group absolution’439 wins out over hierarchical approval to the point where 
excesses are even celebrated.440 The challenge is setting the group reference: the army 
expects soldiers to look to army norms for guidance; it must take care they don’t look 
elsewhere else and are otherwise influenced. 
 
One of the respondents recognised the power of army sub-culture: ‘the culture of [a 
certain unit] is such that they then form a story and that story is stuck to rigidly’.441 The 
‘private world’ of the regiment, a small group, ‘is a silent, often secretive one’ and 
members are ‘expert at concealing their business from outside authority.’442 These are 
‘micro-ethics’ where the ‘call’ or judgement,443 the influence of peers and the exercise of 
instinct is the guide. In a study of deserters in WW2, sociopathic tendency, (actions that 
contravene stipulated norms) was evident: 
only 43 per cent of them had 'normal stable personalities', 21 per cent were 
classified as being immature, 5.5 per cent were 'dullards', the same 
proportion were psychopaths who exhibited anti-social tendencies, and a 
quarter of them had, according to the psychiatrists who examined them, 
inadequate personalities.444 
Sociopathy and psychopathy are separable; they are conflated above though sociopathy 
is more closely related to culture whilst psychopathy ‘is driven by a biosocial jigsaw.’445  
 
A recent study by Arcelia Ruíz Vásquez, a research psychologist at the University of 
Guanajuato, provides insight to the behaviour of those who demonstrate ‘dark traits.’ 
She neatly separates the sociopath from the psychopath in her report, “X-Ray of a 
Mexican Sicario”, derived from interviews of dozens of inmates in a Mexican penitentiary, 
through her identification of four main personality types among cartel foot soldiers.446 The 
first two are sociopathic: they are the ‘Marginals’ on the periphery of society who see 
crime as way to escape a life of poverty; and the ‘Antisocials’ for whom ‘impulsivity, 
hedonism, recklessness, and the search for immediate satisfaction’ are motivations. 
These types are known to demonstrate remorse for their actions. Vasquez’s second two 
types are more clinically defined and less common. The Psychopath and the Sadist 
comprise around 15% of sicarios and are characterized by ‘emotional coldness, total 
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absence of remorse, cruelty and lack of empathy.’ Their difference is that the former kills 
primarily for profit, the latter does it for pleasure. Though no causal link is suggested 
between sicario and warrior the types are all relevant in some measure to homo furens. 
 
Behaviourists argue that ‘the human brain was a blank slate at birth and all processes, 
even psychopathic traits, were formed through social forces.’447 However, psychopathy 
seems more involved.448 It is ‘a constellation of affective, interpersonal, and behavioral 
characteristics, including egocentricity; impulsivity; irresponsibility; shallow emotions; 
lack of empathy, guilt, or remorse; pathological lying; manipulativeness and the 
persistent violation of social norms and expectations.’ 449  It is a ‘lay synonym for 
incorrigible’.450 Hare declares it a clinical, genetic construct and physiological system that 
requires attention. Condemned as a malfunction, psychopathy provides Winters’ killers, 
members of the Greatest Generation. 451  So there are ‘good psychopaths and bad 
psychopaths.’452 The condition isn’t borne of a ‘blank slate’ but it can be influenced: 
a phenotype is a contextually elaborated lived human identity that 
manifests in certain ways the genotype it is based on but is not fully 
determined by that genotype. Other aspects that might be particularly 
important in the psychological characteristics that form an important part of 
a person’s identity are the social, cultural (or subcultural) and political 
forces that a person is surrounded by.453 
As a pliable trait there may be utility in actively promoting ‘uniformed’454 or ‘functioning 
psychopaths’.455 Performance enhancement456 (‘improving the efficiency of one’s own 
forces’) using the ‘forces of modern pharmacology’457 seems a less efficient (and ethically 
dubious) approach to harnessing the latent propensity toward violence where an 
‘instrumental, dispassionate, and predatory’ manner is discoverable.458 Psychopaths are 
surely in the minority but in ‘times of danger a nation needs them desperately.’459 We 
might ‘factor in this inevitable component of necessary ruthlessness’460 when we consider 
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the type of homo furens who qualifies as a warrior. 
 
King provides insight into the mental states of soldiers engaged in close combat through 
the speculative ‘Cooper Colour Code’. White is for disengaged soldiers; yellow for those 
in the early stages of arousal; orange when soldiers concentrate; red suggests total 
focus; and black, a state of panic, or rage, 461  with ‘adrenaline-induced physical 
responses.’462 These colour states may be circumstantial (and aperiodic) but they read 
well into my analysis: white, yellow and orange for T1; red and black for T2. 
Physiological, neurological and pharmacological studies are not performed on homo 
furens to confirm ‘colours’ but they would allow better understanding of the ‘interactions 
of hundreds of different cell types, organized into highly specific circuits’, the 
microcircuits and brain connectivity463 that impact individual biochemistry. Research tools 
and checklists ‘for operationalizing the construct of psychopathy’464 can make this less 
‘hidden’465 where militaries wish to be better informed. 
 
We ‘know very little about the neuroscience of individuals who commit homicide’466 but 
there are many examples of it in war. There are those who kill ‘methodically and without 
apparent feeling’;467 there are the ‘ideologically motivated warriors’468 whose miasmic 
ethos and conscious dehumanisation of their adversary are well documented. But we 
should be careful before we declare such behaviour the sole preserve of soldiers of 
totalitarian regimes or ideological indoctrination. Browning also speaks of American units 
in the Pacific who had a ‘take no prisoners’ policy and collected body parts of Japanese 
soldiers as souvenirs; Dower of the racially motivated hatred that drove this behaviour.469 
The massacre at My Lai highlights those who perpetrate such crimes as rarely extra-
ordinary.470 Kenneth Hodges, a 73 year old farmer from southern Georgia, accused of 
rape and murder there explains: “It’s easy to sit back and analyse things and maybe 
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even pass judgement if you were not there…If you have not been to Vietnam, out in the 
field, if you have never been in a war it’s easy for you to say ‘oh my God, how could you 
do this?’… [But] you really have to have been there”. In more modern times and recent 
wars Pryer highlights American soldiers who committed assault, manslaughter and 
homicide in the course of ‘brutal’ interrogations and descended into thuggery ‘just for the 
perverse pleasure of it’.471 The activities of the French in Algeria,472 where torture was 
routinely conducted are well documented. The British too answer for activity in Malaya,473 
Kenya,474 murder in Aden and ‘mass assault’ upon hundreds of Cypriot civilians in 1958475 
as it retreated from Empire. Burke reminds us of soldiers who committed murder in 
Northern Ireland in Army of Tribes; Huw Bennett explains command level complicity in 
illegal acts there.476 The Falklands War provides examples of alleged ‘excess’ in recent 
conflicts477 and the actions of Sergeant Blackman, brings the list up to date.478 Atrocity ‘a 
seemingly ineradicable by-product’ is committed in every war.479 Studies ‘show men and 
women “like us” are capable of grotesque acts of violence against fellow human beings’: 
it is unnecessary to seek extraordinary people or circumstances480 and naïve to think all 
soldiers ‘who conceive of their service as a calling or a vocation do so with honorable 
intent’.481 Whether those who perpetrate such action are Berserkers or automatons is 
debatable: what is less so is that homo furens is capable of committing such acts. 'War 
makes murderers out of otherwise decent people. All wars, and all decent people.'482 
 
The warrior makes war and is also ‘a persecutor’.483 Here is T2, the ‘bad apples’,484 and 
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most extreme version, or the ‘top’ 1-2% of the force that seem to persevere in all modern 
armies485 and might exist in larger numbers or more commonly than is acknowledged. 
The soldier emerged to counter this figure and the ‘terror inspired by the devouring 
beast'.486  Their confrontation renders the conflation of the terms warrior and soldier 
invalid: the former attacks, the latter defends. These are not just tactical or functional 
terms. Cors et al dismisses interchangeability and purposive or cultural distinctions. She 
refuses ‘soldier’ as an evolved, modern warrior and declares the two incompatible: 
In comparison to the synonymous word ‘soldier,’ a ‘warrior’ is frenzied and 
kinetic. The word’s adoption into military usage through such phrases as 
‘warrior culture’ and ‘wounded warrior’ underscores the value of the 
aggressive male. However, the warrior Achilles is set apart from his fellow 
soldiers. He refuses their company and food – and hungers instead for the 
“slaughter and blood and the choking groans of men”.487 
Militaries like the term – they embrace aggression as positive – but employ it in limited 
fashion ignoring those ‘whose personal gospel’ is savagery488 and who lack the facility to 
choose when to behave aggressively or otherwise. The currency of the warrior is 
slaughter and blood; the individual is ‘beastlike, godlike, socially disconnected, crazy, 
mad, insane, enraged, cruel, without restraint or discrimination, insatiable, devoid of fear, 
inattentive to own safety, distractible, indiscriminate, reckless, feeling invulnerable, 
exalted, intoxicated, frenzied, cold, indifferent, insensible to pain, suspicious of friends’.489 
Yet the term remains attractive, and archetypal.490 The volatile, anguished, predatory 
state and ‘emotional “hot rush” – involving rage, frenzy, and elation’491 should concern 
those who declare soldiers as warriors. 
 
485 Winslow blames an ‘exaggerated warfighting culture’ in Canadian forces for war crime in Somalia borne 
of an acceptance of stereotyping in “Misplaced Loyalties”; King thinks it a failure of professionalism, the 
triumph of hyper-masculinity and a contravention of the externally stipulated code. King, Combat Soldier, 
209. Special Forces have occasionally in the course of the recent wars been accused of having a ‘rogue 
culture’. Matthew Cole, “The Crimes Of Seal Team 6,” 10 Jan 2017, at https://theintercept.com/2017/01/ 
10/the-crimes-of-seal-team-6/?fbclid=IwAR3ie3TjCzdLODszz3tauziSnHPONIIGpy-zZHHYfpOzaZ3iWa 
EN2Grjx3k; and Rachel E. VanLandingham, Geoffrey S. Corn & Robert Bracknell, “Is There A Values 
Crisis In Special Operations Forces? National Security Could Be At Risk,” USA Today, 26 July 2019, at 
https://eu.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/07/26/special-forces-values-crisis-congress-must-investigate-
fix-column/1790315001/ highlight problems with US Special Forces. UK Special Forces are neither exempt 
from accusation. Greg Wilford, “SAS Soldiers 'Suspected' of Executing Unarmed Afghans and Covering 
Up Potential War Crimes,” The Independent, 02 Jul 2017 at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ 
home-news/sas-special-air-service-war-crimes-civilians-cover-up-ministry-of-defence-operation-
northmoor-royal-a7819006.html on 23 Nov 2018. Australian SAS Regiment soldiers have been identified 
as ‘psychopaths’ and ‘killer angels’ who apply lethal force without hesitation. Masters & McKenzie, 
“Compassionate Psychopaths”. Jim Frederick details criminality in a US infantry regiment in Iraq in Black 
Hearts and Caputo discusses the ‘sudden disintegration’ of his platoon from disciplined soldiers into an 
incendiary mob (Caputo, Rumor, 304) - ‘atrocity by situation’ according to Paolo Tripodi, “Deconstructing 
the Evil Zone: How Ordinary Individuals Can Commit Atrocities,” in Tripodi & Wolfendale New Soldiers, 
201. 
486 Barbara Ehrenreich, Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War, (NY: Henry Holt & 
Company, 1997), 47. 
487 Cynthia Cors, Stephanie Lau & David John Farmer, “Fragmented Warrior,” Administrative Theory & 
Praxis, 35:3 (2013), 428, https://doi.org/10.2753/ATP1084-1806350305. 
488 Snydor, Soldiers of Destruction, 321. 
489 Shay, Achilles, 82. 
490 Rick Fields, The Code of the Warrior in History, Myth, and Everyday Life, (NY: Harper Perennial, 1991), 
62. 
491 Bury & King, “Profession of Love,” 207 
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Homer’s Achilles is the exemplar: he personifies the sense of abstractness.492 A frenzied 
and kinetic Berserker, 493  who hurls souls into Hades, 494  he revels in war, seeks 
separateness and abhors union with his fellow man.495 His ‘ethic of combat’ is that of 
putting to death’496 beyond the doctrine of necroethics. Any fair fight degenerates quickly 
into dishonourable act – dragging Hector’s body behind a chariot, now posing with an 
enemy corpse 497  or collecting body parts as ‘trophies’. 498  Warriors like Achilles kill, 
instinctively, easily and brutally and reject the strict and closely defined criteria imposed 
on the soldier. Authority and circumstance that the ethicist champions are unimportant 
to this type; killing is not carried out in a proscribed manner and there is no ‘good killing 
or bad killing – there is just killing.’499 Warriorship involves selection from strategies of 
barbarism500  depending on which pays the greater dividend. 501  The ‘utilitarianism of 
extremity’502 is the basis of the code. There is no ‘cognitive restructuring’ through moral 
justification, no ‘sanitising language and exonerating comparisons’ and no attempt at 
self-exemption ‘from gross inhumanities by displacement of responsibility.’ 503  Such 
individuals are ‘hand-hired killers, each of which possesses all the aptitudes of murder 
and all the extraordinary instruments to kill’504 fulfilling a function not just a duty. 
 
The triggers of ‘moral indignation are quite mysterious sometimes’. 505  Judgment is 
influenced by difference and distinction, and grounded in relativism. Bowden observes 
that we admire bravery and courage in our own but dismiss the enemy’s as fanaticism.506 
 
492 Hannah Arendt, “Introduction,” (dated 1966) to Gray, Warriors, viii. 
493 Shay, Achilles, 77-99. 
494 Homer, The Iliad, trans. Martin Hammond, (London: Penguin Books, 1987), 3. 
495 Gray, Warriors, 53. 
496 Chamayou, Drone Theory, 163 
497 Jared Keller, “Reenlisting Next To An Enemy Corpse Isn't A War Crime, Navy Judge Rules” Task & 
Purpose, 02 Feb 2019, at https://taskandpurpose.com/reenlisting-enemy-corpse-war-crime on 5 March 
2019. 
498 Burke, Army of Tribes, 192. Parr, Our Boys, 178. Bourke, Intimate History, 25-31. Walker S. Schneider, 
"Skull Questions: The Public Discussion of American Human Trophy Collection During World War II," Penn 
History Review 25:2 (2018), 125-151. 
499 Adam Linehan, “Just Kills: How The Marine Corps Blew The Biggest War Crimes Case Since Vietnam,” 
Task & Purpose, published 23 May 2018 at https://taskandpurpose.com/true-story-marine-corps-blew-
biggest-war-crimes-case on 5 Mar 2018 
500 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International Security, 
26:1 (Summer 2001), 101. 
501 Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 47. 
502 Thomas McDermott, “Burning the Village to Save it: Moral Absolutism, Strategy, and the Challenge of 
the 21st Century,” 18 Oct 2016, at https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/10/18/burning-the-village-
to-save-it-moral-absolutism-strategy-and-the-challenge-of-the-21st-century on 05 Jan 17. Moral absolutism 
and moral relativism are explained in ‘The Basics of Philosophy’, at http://www.philosophybasics.com/ 
branch_moral_absolutism.html on 07 Dec 17. 
503 Bandura, “Moral Disengagement,” 106. 
504 This comment in response to a proposal for the creation of a French warrior elite. ‘When will this Army 
then march on Paris?’ Lefranc & Moulin, Dialogue Sur L’armee, 13, cited in Kier, Imagining War, 81-2. Kier 
also highlights the French fear, in contravention of the traditional levee en masse, of retaining a conscript 
army for longer than necessary. ‘[The army] would be able to elicit passive obedience and to use this force 
for domestic repression.’ Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars,” 
International Security, 19:4, (Spring 1995): 72. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539120  
505 Chamayou, Drone Theory, 31 




The ‘good’ institutional soldiers, ‘our boys’ are favourably compared to ‘evil’ dissident 
warriors, the ‘bad apples’ and those who ‘drift’ from the established values,507 but all are 
killers and perform often in very similar fashion. Moral qualifiers (like improper, wrong 
and bad) are simple but complicated. All act according to rules, but some to ‘local’ rules, 
internally derived, specifically defined and unsanctioned by society over the rules laid 
down by external agents. Jean Larteguy’s paratroopers are exemplars: ‘They’re 
dangerous because they go to any lengths…beyond the conventional notion of good and 
evil’.508 As warriors they have their own self-determined ethical standards which they 
apply to the circumstances. A cautionary, if subjective, note is added: they should not be 
‘too inhuman.’509 Aristotelian freedom is granted. 
Morally right conduct, for Aristotle, is an expression of a virtuous character, 
and doing the right thing depends on the context you’re in. Being virtuous is 
a matter of doing the right thing at the right time, with the right feelings, in the 
right way and for the right reason. There’s no set of moral rules to follow.510 
For homo furens choice exists over the code to be followed: personal or institutional; 
small group or organisational; civilised or barbaric. What is ‘personal or social depends 
on the particular fit of individual to context’.511 
 
Some archetypes are no longer appropriate for the times or for a people 512  but 
contemplation of law alone ‘as a natural social phenomenon quickly reveals that it cannot 
be reduced to purely rational processes and explicit reasoning.’513 Burkart says morality 
and some sense of right and wrong are fundamental but the perceived context and one’s 
social construct is also central. ‘If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously 
committing evil deeds, and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest of us 
and destroy them. But the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every 
human being.’514 Normative or deontological ethics, the moral algorithm, is assumed 
infectious, and ever progressive: its champions express strong feelings that others ought 
to conform and that it be enforced.515 Meta-ethics ‘the presuppositions behind our ethical 
concerns’ allows an alternative frame.516 Here, virtue ethics, a self-referential framework 
and teleological or consequential ethics where the ends might justify the means have 
purchase. These are militant ethics and ‘criminality’ is assumed inevitable in the climate 
 
507 James Clark “Top SEAL Says The Service's Special Operations Community Has 'Drifted From Our 
Navy Core Values',” Task and Purpose, 24 Aug 2019 https://taskandpurpose.com/navy-seal-commander-
discipline-problem 
508 Jean Lartéguy, Xan Fielding & Robert D. Kaplan, The Centurions, (NY: Penguin Books, 2015), xii. 
509 Lartéguy et al, Centurions, 46. 
510 Garvey & Stangroom, Philosophy, 99. 
511 Deaux, “Reconstructing Social Identity,” 5. 
512 Carol S. Pearson, “Are You A Warrior?” 23 Apr 18, accessed at https://www.psychologytoday.com/ 
intl/blog/the-hero-within/201804/are-you-warrior-and-if-so-what-kind?eml on 20 Oct 18. 
513 Burkart et al, “Evolutionary Origins.” 
514 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation, 
trans. Thomas P. Whitney, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 168. 
515 Burkart et al, “Evolutionary Origins,” 
516 Garvey & Stangroom, Philosophy, 5. 
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of battle. 517  One may derive ‘humanity from war’ 518  but war also provides for self-
actualisation in darker ways that explain the persistence of ‘plain old killers’, the 
fundamentalists of human behaviour.519 To ‘meat eaters’520 like Achilles, war is a game 
of winner takes all, a competition between predator and prey and ‘it is inappropriate to 
show outrage or surprise that people are killed and maimed when there is war. If there 
is war, that’s the way it is’.521 Warriors act in the moment on the basis of emotional, 
intuitive and subconscious522 drives. Dangerous, unconstrained, operating through self-
expression and likely for self-satisfaction the warrior exhibits still the traits of his primitive 




Warriorship is presented in the literature from two distinct perspectives. The first advises 
how to fight and suggests culture, and ethics as overriding factors (Shannon E. French, 
Coker, Jonathan Shay, King, Victor Davis Hanson, Gat and Strozzi-Heckler are the 
authorities cited most here): the second examines why homo furens fights, and 
emphasises the physical, neurological and psychological aspects of warriorship. 
Grossman, Bourke, Kiehl, Neitzel and Welzer, Browning and Hare provide a solid 
foundation. There is also a bank of literature that explains more extensively the draw of 
humankind to war as a consequence of nature, nurture or both that includes the work of 
Payne, Pinker, Wright, Turchin, Diamond and Lawrence Keeley, and the biographies and 
autobiographies by and of homo furens (Marlantes, Caputo, de Wiart, Bury, O’Brien and 
Parr). The history and meaning of war is provided by Edwards, Michael Howard, Keegan 
and Hew Strachan who mostly recommend in Platonic fashion that we have not yet seen 
the end of war, so we have not then seen the last of the warrior. There is consensus524 
or near-consensus that warrior is a valid contemporary term, mostly restricted to those 
who go to war; that these individuals are motivated by some mix of nature and nurture; 
and that warrior is a term reserved for those who fight. 
 
There is also disagreement and a fissure exists between those who think homo furens 
possesses self-control, and those who are recognised as seeking ‘thrill’.525 The soldier 
 
517 Parr, Our Boys, 181. 
518 Coker, The Warrior Ethos, 24. 
519 Peters, “New Warrior Class Revisited,” 17. 
520 Conrad, Heart of Darkness. 
521 Neitzel & Welzer, Soldaten, 342. 
522 Martin, “On Why We Fight.” 
523 O’Brien, If I Die, 219. 
524 The literature review highlights areas of consensus, disagreement and gaps. Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Doing a 
Literature Review,” Political Science & Politics, 39:1 (2006): 129-30, https://doi.org/10.1017/ 
S1049096506060264 
525 Orna Sasson-Levy, “Individual Bodies, Collective State Interests: The Case of Israeli Combat Soldiers,” 
Men & Masculinities, 10:3 (2008): 298, https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X06287760  
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school recognises martial skill and expertise but expects homo furens to respond to 
external authority: warrior and soldier are then synonyms and homo furens is the 
automaton who complies to direction and the stoic who does as they think they should. 
They serve for a stipend to rules with which they either passively or actively agree. 
Service is their overriding motivation and ‘Doing’ trumps ‘Being’ in the philosophical 
sense. For the soldier, or ‘anti-warrior’ 526  the collective is king and culture through 
teaching, imitation and the influence of environment dominates. The Blank Slate brings 
soldiers to battle and the major difference within this type is between those with little 
choice who serve in civilian, often conscripted, mass armies and those who are 
‘professional’, members of volunteer forces – institutionally or occupationally driven,527 
the mechanical and the organic.528 The alternative, the warrior school, is where ‘natural’, 
not nurtured, fighters and killers who do as they wish and berserkers and psychopaths 
who do as they must, are found. They fight because it allows personal realisation, and 
they live according to ‘essence’: they exercise their Being and perform according to free 
will. The Ghost in the Machine, or genetic propensity, motivates. 
 
The literature review allows a model of homo furens by type and variant, with the Cooper 
Colour Code as background. It illustrates, proportionally, the 4 descriptors I have used. 
 
 
Fig. 3.3: Warrior Types Model 
Kaurin suggests 3 categories (Guardian, Citizen-Soldier, Warrior) as sufficient: more 
significantly however she emphasises the importance of getting this right.  
The discussion about the warrior ethos in the military goes to the heart of 
 
526 Morris, War! 90-1. 
527 Moskos, “From Institution to Occupation,” 41–50. 































how military and veteran think of themselves, how society looks at them 
and how we are to honor service in an authentic way in an age when many 
civilians have no idea what they are honoring, a fact which angers and 
frustrates many in the military community.’ 529 
The model disguises a ‘puzzle for geneticists and evolutionists, as well as 
psychologists’530 but it delivers clarity regarding the various employments and reading of 
the term warrior. The enclosed area bounds a professional, volunteer army (the dashed 
lines allow extension of the model for a conscripted or compelled fighting force). 
 
There is a gap in the literature. Whilst there is a lot of information and opinion on what it 
means to be a warrior there is very little regarding its application to British soldiers. Yet 
the word is now prevalent. It is not clear which of the four variants the British Army is 
promoting: the militarised, institutionalised, and responsive servant; the professional 
Stoic soldier who operates with personal agency; the natural born, self-motivated fighter; 
or that most dangerous of homo furens, the Berserker. We might assume it is neither the 
psychopathic ‘warrior’ nor the automaton ‘soldier’ shown at the extremes but that is not 
certain, and there is a requirement for the term to be both clarified and justified. 
Depending on one’s view homo furens might be placed anywhere on the model and 
warrior is allowed throughout it. It seems impossible to define exactly what is meant by 
the term and so further research is merited. The question of what British soldiers think 
warrior means and whether it is appropriate for them is valid. Examination of culture – 
‘an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of 
inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men 
communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes to life’531  – 
provides access to how the term warrior is understood in the British Army. The next 
chapter concerns organisational expectation and the sources of learning and imitation in 
the British Army. 
 
 
529 Pauline M. Kaurin, “Warrior, Citizen Solider or Guardian: Thoughts After a Kerfuffle,” Blog Post 
published 20 Dec 2016, at https://shankskaurin.wordpress.com/2016/12/20/warrior-citizen-solider-or-
guardian-thoughts-after-a-kerfuffle/ on 16 Dec 2019. 
530 Bouchard, “Genetic Influence,” 151. 
531 Geertz, Interpretation, 89. 
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4. British Army Organisational Culture 
 
Culture and Myth 
 
As part of the research process what must be considered ‘and is often ignored in the 
literature concerns contextualization.’ 1  Warriorship appears routinely in academia 
agnostic of national culture and set instead against some broader international standard. 
The discussion to follow, that complements the consideration of the ‘types’ of warrior in 
Chapter Three, will focus on British culture. In this chapter I explore British strategic 
culture, British military culture and the ways in which these have developed. These are 
the funnels down which warriorship is poured and the lenses though which it is viewed. 
The discussion comprises further academic reference but more significantly introduces 
a swathe of the primary research data. First: what is culture? 
 
Culture is the full range of learned behaviours.2 It is not the determinant of human nature3 
but it is a significant component in the development of human behaviour: our ‘rationality 
is culturally conditioned’.4 The customs, ideas and behaviour of a particular people or 
group,5 culture is ‘the totality of socially transmitted behaviour patterns’.6 It provides ‘a 
definition of the world for a group or organization and guides for action’; it comprises 
formal and informal elements, specific rules or prohibitions.7 Geertz advises that it is ‘best 
seen not as complexes of concrete behavior patterns – customs, usages, traditions, habit 
clusters’ but as a set of control mechanisms – plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what 
computer engineers call “programs”) – for governing behaviour’.8 Once absorbed culture 
provides a ’set of assumptions so unselfconscious as to seem a natural, transparent, 
undeniable part of the structure of the world’.9 What is understood is unquestioned. 
 
Culture is given by or taken from others. It is instrumental10 and plays ‘the role of genes 
in non-genetic evolutionary processes’.11 Identifiable and observable, it can be promoted, 
 
1 Julia Brannen, “Mixing Methods: The Entry of Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches into the Research 
Process,” International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 8:3, (Jul 2005): 173, https://doi.org/ 
10.1080/13645570500154642 
2 Culture was first defined in 1871 as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, 
law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” Edward 
Burnett Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion. 
Language, Art & Custom, Vol. 1, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2017), 1. 
3 Ridley, Nature via Nurture, location 3299. 
4 Kier, Imagining War, 38. 
5 OED. 
6 Pinker, The Blank Slate, 21. 
7 Dandeker & Gow, “Military Culture,” 59. 
8 Geertz, Interpretation, 44. 
9 Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American Sociological Review, 51:2 (Apr 
1986): 279, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095521. 
10 Kier, Imagining War, 33. 
11 Wilson, “Social Constructivism,” 35. 
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denigrated, ‘created,’ imagined or invented12 and is slow to change (though quicker to 
adjust than genetic evolution).13 Definitions suffer from ‘crippling imprecision’14 and the 
study of culture is ‘as dangerous as an unmarked minefield on a dark night’,15 but it is 
critical to understanding homo furens: ‘erroneous simplifications that merely allow our 
limited mental apparatus to cope with the vast complexity of the world’16 though must be 
resisted. Boundaries are opaque and specificity difficult but two elements are identifiable: 
One is the narratives that people are nurtured on – the stories and myths 
they and their religious and national leaders tell themselves – and how these 
narratives feed their imaginations one way or another. The other is the 
context in which people grow up, which has a huge impact on shaping how 
they see the world and others.’17 
Value-laden stories that encourage emulation are key: they inspire through ‘actors and 
actions that confound the conventions of routine experience’18 
 
Culture is not a ‘power’ but provides for context.19  It allows understanding of the world 
and our place in it. It ‘is not only about what is written and taught. It is also about what 
one lives and what one hears and sees in myths and visual images.’20 These remind 
people ‘they are part of something bigger and older than they are, in which those going 
before have set standards of conduct and behaviour that today’s people are expected to 
keep up’.21 Myths, images, legends, symbols and stories, in particular of heroes ‘more 
for copying than adapting’ 22  are how army culture is transmitted and social action 
articulated. 23  They attain a kind of immortality: their ‘inherent archetypal beauty, 
profundity, and power have inspired rewarding renewal and transformation by 
successive generations.’ 24  Social facts, 25  ‘manners of acting, thinking, and feeling 
external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which 
 
12 Anderson, Imagined Communities; Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger, eds. The Invention of Tradition, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983). 
13 Wilson, “Social Constructivism,” 26. 
14 Andrew M Johnston, “Does America Have a Strategic Culture,” The Journal of Conflict Studies, 18:2 
(Fall 1998), https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/11700/12457. 
15 Rashed Uz Zaman, “Strategic Culture: A ‘Cultural’ Understanding of War,” Comparative Strategy, 28:1 
(2009): 69, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495930802679785. 
16 Haslam et al, New Psychology, 64. 
17 Thomas L Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century, (NY: Farrar, Straus & 
Giroux, 2005), 452-3. 
18 John McDowell, “Perspectives: What is Myth?” Folklore Forum, 29:2 (1998): 80, https://scholarworks.iu 
.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/2022/2275/29%282%29%2075-89%20alt.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y on 
06 May 2019. 
19 Geertz, Interpretation, 14. 
20 Kier, Imagining War, 162. Terraine differentiates myth that ‘is mischievous’ from legend that is ‘relatively 
innocent’. John Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire: Myths and Anti-Myths of War, 1861–1945, (London: 
Sidgwick & Jackson, 1980), 13,17. The two terms are similar enough to be treated synonymously here. 
21 Simon Anglim, “An Educated Military: Professional Education and the Profession of Arms,” in Finney & 
Mayfield, Redefining, 143. 
22 Raymond Kimball, “Mentoring for a Military Professional Identity,” in Finney & Mayfield, Redefining, 153. 
23 Geertz, Interpretation, 17. 
24 Mark Morford et al, “Classical Mythology,” at https://global.oup.com/us/companion.websites/ 
9780199997329/student/materials/chapter1/summary/ on 29 Dec 17. 
25 Durkheim, Rules, 90. Social facts and subject are related unlike the ‘scientist and chemical compound’: 
interpretation matters. Ford, “Learning the Right Lessons,” 250. How the fact is received is critical. 
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they exercise control’26 are established through story. Mythos as a misrepresentation of 
the truth27 can be of little consequence. ‘If you are known as fighters’ one focus group 
attendee explained, ‘like the Irish, then you feel like you have to live up to it…there’s 
pressure both physical and mental if you are known to be a warrior…there’s an 
expectation…how many VCs28 were pressured and how many wanted to do it…?’29 
 
‘Colours’ (revered artefacts)30 embroidered with battle honours, 31 associated stories and 
tales of derring-do, provide the altar at which the deeds of previous generations in foreign 
and vaguely imaginable places and times 
are made real. They simplify meaning and 
provide a rally point. Items recovered from 
battlefields, ‘sacred things’ 32  that are also 
‘knowledge-laden frames’33 are held in awe 
and promoted as near holy relics: they serve 
similar functions to the Colours. These are 
totems and soldiers ‘fix themselves to the 
idea of the totem rather than that of the clan: 
for the clan is too complex a reality to be 
represented clearly in all its complex unity by such rudimentary intelligences.’34 The 
deeds immortalised in paintings, invested in the regimental badge, and shown off by 
parading the Colours persuades that success was won, whether that is true or not. 
 
The stories create a matrix (‘a composite of our stories’)35 and homo furens becomes 
‘suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun.’ 36  ‘Regimental Days’, 
celebrating significant battles (the pattern of activities is very similar regardless of unit)37 
demonstrate the power of myth. These usually involve parades, a church service and 
formal dinners, tables adorned with regimental silver and an atmosphere as ‘dim and 
 
26 Durkheim, Rules, 21. 
27 OED. 
28 Victoria Cross winners. Constituted in 1857, the VC is Britain’s highest award for valour. 
29 FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 30:00. 
30 Greenberg et al., “Evidence of a Terror Management Function of Cultural Icons: The Effects of Mortality 
Salience on the Inappropriate Use of Cherished Cultural Symbols.” Personality & Social Psychology 
Bulletin 21:11 (Nov 1995): 1221, https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672952111010. 
31 Fig. 4.1 is the Regimental Colour of 1st Battalion The Royal Irish Regiment at https://www.royal-
irish.com/stories/queens-and-regimental-colours-royal-irish-regiment on 10 Dec 19 © Copyright 2019, The 
Royal Irish, All Rights Reserved. 
32 Collective ideals fixed on material objects: ‘moral forces, they are made up of the ideas and sentiments 
awakened in us by the spectacle of society, and not of sensations coming from the physical world.’ Sacred 
things are distinguished by Durkheim from the ‘profane’ that relate to ‘men’s ordinary life’, Steven Lukes, 
Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work, a Historical and Critical Study, (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1985), 25-6. 
33 Ford, “Learning the Right Lessons,” 247. 
34 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms, 220. 
35 Wilson, “Social Constructivism,” 30. 
36 Geertz, Interpretation, 5. 
37 Richard Holmes, Soldiers, (London: HarperPress, 2011), 453. 
Fig. 4.1: Regimental Colour 
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secretive as the dining hall in a monastery.’38 The ‘group's symbolic life’ reflects its war 
behavior, and vice versa.’ 39 Ritual40  ‘reminds those dining of the sanctity placed on 
combat by the unit and the ability of their ancestors to master it’.41 
People say you fight for your buddies. That’s true, but that’s a floor not a 
ceiling. People say you fight because you’re well trained and well led. That 
is also true. But truly great military organizations have fought well because 
they hold themselves accountable for their own history and traditions.42 
Charters for warriorship define martial consciousness, and the extremity of existence.43 
Humans have ‘sacralized the act of killing’ and surrounded it with ritual and awe to 
overcome its reality.44 Models for human behaviour, ‘the world of myth provides guidance 
for crucial elements in human existence – war and peace, life and death, truth and 
falsehood, good and evil.’45  
 
Myth will make homo furens ‘go that bit further and work that bit harder than they believe 
is possible.’46 It heralds action which soldiers wish to emulate and demonstrates how to 
earn renown. Stories about close combat inspire most of all: the tale of the soldier who 
eschewing technology kills with the bayonet or knife, for example. ‘There is always 
hushed awe for any citation describing that sort of fighting’47 and the resultant medals 
are most valued.48 These play a huge part in mythology: that ‘soldiers will fight long and 
hard for a piece of ribbon’49 is a military maxim and efforts toward earning trade badges 
is testament to its truth. Symbols, ‘associated with primary gratification,’ 50 also assist in 
creating cohesion. They promote martial endeavour as ‘cool’51 not just tough. 
 
Myth can be dismissed as imaginary or fantastic, like dragons or fairies though it’s very 
unattainability makes it inspirational. Coker appreciates it as a phenomenon ‘powered 
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by nostalgia’; 52  its purpose is to sustain authority, validate practice and provide a 
framework for action. It promotes values to be adhered to, and defended, less they 
disappear or are assumed outdated. Myth counters the decomposition of ideological 
residue53 that militaries wish to retain and provides reference to the past. It delivers 
comfort and reassurance from historical authority that the martial undertaking is noble. 
 
Kate Germano54 thinks myth constraining. She challenges the historic approach that 
equates ‘hyper-masculinity’ with warriorship and limits the utility of the term. Though 
warrior is not a gender specific term the myth of the warrior of antiquity who was 
predominantly if not exclusively55 male persists and warriorship can be ‘highly gendered, 
often to the point of misogyny’. 56  It can emphasise separateness and allows the 
presentation of adherents as special, even elite. Anthropologist and folklorist Paul Radin 
says: ‘A myth is always explanatory. The explanatory theme often is so completely 
dominant that everything else becomes subordinated to it.’57 So the approach of the 
narrator (who explains) and those listening is critical. Imprecision and even ambiguity 
due to the deliberate abuse of language58 can create advantage or problems. What 
happened may be unimportant: it is how it is remembered that matters. We take from the 
story what we wish: detail that contradicts and the integrity of the tale is neglected in 
favour of a preferred understanding. Myths are believed stories: their telling brings 
responsibility for the creation of collective consciousness, ‘a determinate system that has 
its own life.’ 59  Standard-bearers, guardians and followers must believe the offered 
framework more than they do temporal opinion or fleeting direction. Identity comes from 
‘myths about our forefathers that are not historical but help to explain current attitudes 
about our environment, neighbours and customs.’ 60  Culture, contemporary and 
importantly, ‘functional,’ can then be better understood.61 The mythic ‘is everything that 
preserves the underlying substance of a living culture.’62 
 
Myth ‘sticks’ where it reinforces existing belief or perception: prior commitment is difficult 
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to undo.63 Bias facilitates resistance to disconfirmation, and demythologising, but this 
requires social support. Myth and ‘invented tradition’ is ‘reinforced and institutionalized 
over centuries64 ‘almost by accident’65 through networks that exacerbate, and do not 
contest, myth. Where everyone believes something there is no question at all to its 
validity66 particularly where it assists in coping with a ‘problematic human predicament’67 
– like killing or being killed. ‘A warrior is somebody who embraces the possibility of death 
and subordinates it to the unit and the mission. This preparedness to die is what confers 
the moral authority to take life.’68 This, the myth of reciprocity, justifies the taking of life. 
Stories that offer immortality, fame, even notoriety, dock with terror management 
theory.69 Myth is the antidote to slipping from human consciousness. ‘Someday soon, 
perhaps in forty years, there will be no one alive who has ever known me. That's when I 
will be truly dead – when I exist in no one's memory.’70 Death is less frightening where 
one is remembered. The military facilitates this in statue form, written history or mess 
painting. ‘The cure for the horror is story’.71 
There is never a single, orthodox version of a myth. As our circumstances 
change, we need to tell our stories differently in order to bring out their 
timeless truth…every time men and women took a major step forward, they 
reviewed their mythology and made it speak to the new conditions.72 
Myth provides ‘a repertoire or "tool kit" of habits, skills, and styles from which people 
construct "strategies of action".’73 
 
Myth fictionalises but mobilises coherent structure of meaning.74 An integral part of the 
‘meaning-making’75 process it allows ‘the creation of an image of the past, through careful 
selection and interpretation, in order to create or sustain certain emotions or beliefs.’76 
Where soldiers require motivating this is essential. Myth allows action through ‘ideas and 
experiences that we cannot explain rationally’ 77  and makes sense of extraordinary 
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circumstances. It seizes our interest, creating memory and imagination – ‘the essential 
ingredients of war’78 – and focusses aspiration.79 
My Regimental Duty (RD) was mostly spent in 2 PARA and undoubtedly 
the most celebrated events are the fight to hold Arnhem Bridge (centre 
piece painting in the Officers’ Mess) and the two battles fought in the 
Falklands Campaign but in particular The Battle of Goose Green.80 
This officer doesn’t say these battles were the best or most fierce rather they are retold 
and remembered. ‘We were telling ourselves stories about ourselves’,81 indulging in that 
‘natural human process’ of constructing stories to help individuals understand their 
experiences and themselves.82 This is ‘viable mythology’83 that reduces the necessity of 
mathematical calculation in war. A more artistic, human endeavour becomes apparent 
promoting a tendency to believe in possibilities arithmetic suggests are improbable. 
 
By emphasising a chosen or offered myth such as chivalry in combat or the importance 
of valour ‘we silence’ through mutually assured deception the nastier, less attractive side 
of war.84 Hannah Arendt cautions that lies or mistruths, ‘secrecy and deliberate deception 
have always played a significant role’ in human interaction. But ‘self-deception is a 
danger par excellence; the self-deceived deceiver loses all contact, not only with his 
audience but with the real world which will catch up with him, as he can remove only his 
mind from it and not his body.’85 Where we seize the myths we prefer, we become 
disorientated by believing them incontrovertible. Stories then excuse responsibility. 
French highlights British wars of decolonisation where ‘liberal notions of right and wrong’ 
were made compatible with successful counter-insurgency operations.86 The myth says 
the UK excelled, ‘winning hearts and minds’ and succeeding in war amongst the people.87 
The truth is that the army exercised ‘wholesale and indiscriminate coercion’88 sometimes 
beyond the laws of war.89 Yet the image of the benevolent colonial custodian persists. 
Officials ‘intent on sanitising the experience of fighting wars of decolonisation’ 90 
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presented activity as revolutionary whilst denying the reality of the use of force. This 
exposes a clash and contradiction. Soldiers like the myths of warriors who fight; the army 
prefers to emphasise soldiers who don’t, yet promotes the term. 
 
In mythology, ‘we entertain a hypothesis, bring it to life by means of ritual, act upon it, 
contemplate its effect upon our lives, and discover that we have achieved new insight 
into the disturbing puzzle of our world.’ 91  That soldiers are warriors entertains a 
hypothesis, maybe a ‘distorted vestige of a wishful phantasy’.92 Without comprehensive 
understanding of what is involved, risk is taken. If myth ‘does not give us new insight into 
the deeper meaning of life, it has failed.’ 
If it works, that is, if it forces us to change our minds and hearts, gives us 
new hope, and compels us to live more fully, it is a valid myth. Mythology 
will only transform us if we follow its directives. A myth is essentially a guide; 
it tells us what we must do in order to live more richly. If we do not apply it 
to our own situation and make the myth a reality in our own lives, it will 
remain as incomprehensible and remote as the rules of a board game, 
which often seem confusing and boring until we start to play.93 
Where the British Army is an army of warriors it must understand the ‘directives’ of the 
myth, or it will be the victim of cognitive dissonance with consequence apparent much 
later. The nature of the ‘lived’ myth must register. Storytelling is afforded the freedom to 
reveal meaning without committing the error of defining it 94  but some stories are 
frameworks for action, not entertainment. The danger is that myth can be meaningless, 
or worse, promotes the prejudice of chauvinism95 and meaning that only a small number 
comprehend or ‘own’. It requires embedding in strategic and military culture.96 
 
British Strategic Culture 
 
Strategic culture – ‘a system of shared meaning held by members that distinguishes that 
organisation for others’97 – involves the ‘moral codes and technical scripts’ that guide and 
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regulate the use of force.98 Jack L. Snyder first coined the term99 as he searched to 
uncover the ‘dominant behavioural propensities’ 100  of Soviet decision-making. His 
analysis of doctrine, military bias101 and other influences102 aimed to reduce emphasis on 
the ‘ahistorical, non-cultural neorealist’103 perspective that neglected human factors in 
decision-making. He defined strategic culture as the ‘sum total of ideals, conditional 
emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of the national 
strategic community have acquired though instruction or imitation and share with each 
other.’104 He popularised the term promoting discussion on national ways of war. ‘Each 
country or nation’s strategic culture cannot but bear the imprint of cultural traditions, 
which in a subconscious and complex way, prescribes and defines strategy making.’105 
 
A ‘powerful analytical device for understanding variation’106 the concept ‘has blossomed 
as a field of study, with scholars seeking evidence of national or strategic behaviours that 
reflect underlying cultural norms.’107 Colin S. Gray defined strategic culture as ‘thought 
and action with respect to force, which derives from perception of the national historical 
experience.’108 He suggested a difference between ‘declaratory’ and operational strategy 
where decision makers in ‘security communities’109 can ‘rise above strategic cultural 
constraints which they manipulate’.110 Kier highlights the interaction of domestic politics 
and durable military culture as important.111 For Johnston about the use of force and may 
not be unique to any state.112 Longhurst sees practice arising gradually over time that 
‘can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures’ 113  and under 
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transformative pressure.114 Change can be can be deliberate or accidental.115 Strategic 
culture comprises ‘discerning tendencies, not rigid determinants’ 116  and each 
commentator allows interpretive freedom: none of their views are definitive. 
 
A framework will help to understand the interaction of policymakers, political elites, and 
the military.117 Fox says strategic culture is influenced by a ‘number of factors, including, 
inter alia, perceptions of national character, geostrategic politics, military initiatives, and 
the social make-up of the officer corps’.118 Lord stratifies it into geopolitics, international 
relationships, political ideology, civil-military bureaucracy, technology, military history and 
culture.119 This provides for fuller analysis and allows caution against overemphasising 
‘cultural variables’120 or the actions of gatekeepers. Organisations must guard against 
becoming ethnocentric or ‘culture-bound’121 so a broader view is useful. Lord cautions 
against the ‘tendency to overlook ‘big picture’ constructs like language, history, and 
culture in favour of intrapsychic and interpersonal processes’;122 he reminds that strategic 
culture is realised through a wide base. 
 
An island nation, Britain’s geostrategic position affects force size, structure and ‘strategic 
orientation’.123 But naval power, preferred for centuries as the critical means of national 
security, bred complacency says Tony Corn and Britain then built an ‘unimaginative army’ 
capable only against an equally unimaginative opponent: no match for ‘German 
“blitzkrieg” yesterday or Chinese “unrestricted warfare” tomorrow.’124 MacMillan asked if 
‘a history of success in war, and fighting largely on the territory of others’ made Britain 
unconcerned and sanguine about the use of force, and therefore less warriorlike, than 
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continental states ‘which experienced defeat and far greater destruction.’125 The tradition 
of the exercise of naval power and relative isolation shaped commercial attitudes, but 
also ‘national objectives and approaches to war’.126  
 
A belief in multilateralism127 and astute alliance making128 provides ‘a medium-ranking 
economic and military power…a disproportionately high level of ambition in, and a sense 
of responsibility for international security policy.’129 Politically attractive this can though 
be militarily constraining. Alliances require investment and often constraint: where 
reliance on partner capabilities, or ‘burden-sharing’ is part of the agreement, nations 
reduce sovereign capability; and alliances can lead to mimicry and a reduction in one’s 
own military ethos and structure. The UK government has recently admitted that it 
‘needed to rethink military assumptions, in place since 2010, that the UK would always 
be fighting alongside the Americans…’ 130  Maintaining balance is also challenging. 
Strategy doyen Michael Howard claimed the maintenance of UK security and 
independence relied on military action in Europe.131 Liddell-Hart saw the continent as a 
dead end and anticipated deployment there to result in reduced mobility, a lack of 
surprise, and damage to alternate alliances,132 contrary to his recommended British Way 
of Warfare. 133 Maintaining colonial (now Commonwealth) relationships; the UK as a 
bridge between the US and Europe;134 and the defence of continental Europe, each 
merits differently shaped armed forces beyond the primary function of national defence: 
the multiple foci demand a multiphrenic force with manifold identities. Whether critical 
allies are European, American or ‘old empire’, or the best force mix is heavy or light 
armour, the British Army is caught in ‘an enduring investment dilemma with historical 
roots.135 
 
Britain has a long martial history based on opposition to Roman Rule, the religious edicts 
of early Christianity, the relationship between serf and landowner, the Magna Carta, and 
 
125 MacMillan, “Strategic Culture and National Ways,” 37. 
126 Lord, “American Strategic Culture,” 273. 
127 Alister Miskimmon, “Continuity in the Face of Upheaval – British Strategic Culture and the Impact of the 
Blair Government,” European Security eds. Kerry Longhurst & Marcin Zaborowski, 5, 
https://pure.royalholloway.ac.uk/portal/files/1382821/miskimmonukstrategicculture2004web_1_.pdf. 
128 Lawrence Freedman, “Alliance and the British Way in Warfare,” Review of International Studies, 21:2 
(Apr 1995): 145-158, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210500117590. 
129 Cornish, “Strategic Culture in the UK,” 361. 
130 Tim Shipman, “Ben Wallace Interview: We Can’t Rely on US,” The Sunday Times, 12 Jan 2020, 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ben-wallace-interview-we-cant-rely-on-us-pmwcgv398. 
131 Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the 
Two World Wars, (London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd. 1972), 9-10. 
132 MacMillan, “Strategic Culture and National Ways,” 34. 
133 Liddell-Hart promoted mechanised warfare as a ‘more promising alternative’ for the conduct of war by 
British forces over the ‘abortive and self-exhausting battles of 1914-18’. B. H. Liddell-Hart, Memoirs Vol. 1, 
(London: Cassell, 1965), 222-3. 
134 Tony Blair, Speech to the European Research Institute, University of Birmingham, 23 Nov 2001. 
135 G. C. Peden, “The Burden of Imperial Defence and the Continental Commitment Reconsidered,” The 
Historical Journal, 27:2 (Jun 1984): 405–23, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X00017854. 
 
90 
establishment of parliamentary government.136 Over the centuries though the perception 
of war as the natural order has shifted to the belief that war is avoidable: democracies 
like the UK ‘are deeply disinclined to prepare adequately for war, or to foster the 
institutions and types of men capable of waging it.’137 It is not that they are incapable of 
war: when war comes they are ‘peculiarly inclined toward’ it138 but the state does not exist 
in a state of permanent readiness for war. The consequence is that the British Army is 
often unprepared and rarely victorious in ‘early battles, losing men, equipment, 
confidence and respect.’139 It takes time to align political intent and military capability; 
and the army’s functional competencies often require adjustment. 
 
The English Civil War140 brought the army to a pivotal but not central national position.141 
It has since then been politically neutral (a proud boast) and doesn’t present as a ‘political 
actor.’ 142  Harries-Jenkins describes the professional military officer as ‘above all, 
obedient and loyal to the authority of the state, competent in military expertise, dedicated 
to using his skill to provide for the security of the state whilst politically and morally 
neutral’.143 He provides substantial foundation to the idea of the British soldier as a 
servant or automaton who works to direction. The ‘dominant factor is not the existence 
of armed forces, but the prevalence of political sentiments.’144 Control of the military is 
through constitutional means (though ‘there are surprisingly few authoritative statements 
as to what purposes the army exists to fulfil’)145 and legal constraint. The Lieber Code, 
Hague and Geneva Conventions, and the findings of War Crimes Tribunals, International 
Criminal and European Courts are incorporated into the Law of Armed Conflict, and 
taught to every soldier. ‘Civilised life requires, in addition to humane personal codes, 
social systems that uphold compassionate behaviour and renounce cruelty.’ 146  The 
‘trinity’ of people, state and armed forces is balanced with ‘the people’ primus inter pares. 
The people – of whom soldiers are a part – increasingly perceive the state as something 
that serves them and not vice versa147 and this has implications for the army. It challenges 
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the notion of ‘service over self’ – an army mantra. The organisation is to provide for the 
happiness and well-being of soldiers in line with societal expectation and the army too is 
to behave within the law as ‘a normal, all-inclusive employer.’ This presents problems for 
the institution where it is argued that the demands of military service requires the 
restriction and even denial of some of the rights and individual dues as citizens.148 
 
Lord’s fifth strata, technology, is the means by which the UK pursues ‘’Tier One’ status 
and an ‘international reputation for excellence’.149 
The most advanced armies of the twenty-first century rely far more on 
cutting-edge technology. Instead of limitless cannon fodder, countries now 
need only small numbers of highly trained soldiers, even smaller numbers 
of special forces super-warriors and a handful of experts who know how to 
produce and use sophisticated technology.150 
Exquisite technology is protected as ‘the key to operational superiority, manpower has 
been seen more as an overhead.’151 Machines ‘substitute for infantrymen’,152 and fighting 
ability can be compromised as a result. The ‘question of harmonising conventional and 
nuclear capabilities’ is understood but colonial operations,153 now expeditionary warfare, 
requires servicing too. Technological deficiency contrarily is a point of pride. The British 
emphasise ‘low-key’ (and inexpensive) soldiering with reduced armoured potential 
compared to other armies,154 and less reliance on high-technology and mass firepower.155 
Troops are thought more agile when ‘not weighed down with technology’ relying instead 
on ‘their diplomatic skills’.156  
 
Technology facilitates civilian control of the military: ‘when they can see what’s going on 
they control what’s going on.’157 Battlefield activity is then more socially acceptable158 as 
war is sanitised.159 
The essence of social liberalism is to avoid harm wherever possible, and 
technology affords a way of doing so, while happily also conferring a war-
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fighting advantage. Combat deaths risk undermining public support for 
ongoing operations. For the leadership of the armed forces themselves, 
there is an acute dilemma here.160 
This dilemma is ethical and functional; it belongs to the political leader as well as the 
uniformed officer and is much debated.161 Technology incapacitates and kills people, 
degrades, damages and destroys objects;162 lasers dazzle, beams damage molecular 
structure;163  chemical enhancement of soldiers is real;164 and cyber-attack makes an 
‘enemy’ population combatants. Technology sterilises war but makes it more horrendous 
too: that the UK doesn’t embrace it for its potential to guarantee victory, albeit at 
significant cost, provides insight to strategic culture. Technology is desired but can be 
unaffordable; it is welcome but gives concern;165 a useful replacement for manpower, it 
is uncertain how much, and it cannot replace personal interactive skills. Contrarily 
technology is ‘counter-cultural’ but it is an element of strategic culture. The UK likes its 
army to be ‘low-tech and high-tech simultaneously’.166 
 
Examination of ‘core military culture’167 elsewhere provides comparators. Russia has 
relied on its geo-political position, to absorb the energy of an attacker, and nuclear 
technology (or artillery in 1944):168 the Chinese depend on upon ‘several million surplus 
single males ready to die for their country’.169 Weigley says US military culture is based 
on industrial and technological capability;170 Eliot Cohen points to a ‘predilection for direct 
and violent assault’171 as its determining characteristic; Ignatieff declares it ‘the West's 
last military nation-state: Europeans, he posits, are ‘post national and post military’172 as 
evidenced by the German doctrine of Innere Fuehrung.173 Martial culture is adaptable, 
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though often slow moving, and ‘Ways of War’ or military strategy as cultural practice174 
are rarely static: the German example shows it can though change quickly where critical 
junctures (like defeat) are met. Treated as shorthand for military culture175 ‘ways of war’ 
require cautious handling. It is from sweeping assumption that the reductive martial tribes 
theories of the 19th Century originated. Observers must resist templating: understanding 
strategic culture requires ‘more than a few salty quotes from Sun Tzu’ to count as 
expertise.176 There are instead ways that nations fight wars at critical junctures and so 
behaviours are transient. 
 
Support for the military is akin to ‘civic religion’ in the US:177 UK civil-military relations are 
not comparable. The British Way of War178 ‘is compatible with notions of limited rationality 
(where strategic culture simplifies reality), with process rationality (defining ranked 
preferences or narrowing options) and adaptive rationality (historical choices, analogies, 
metaphors, and precedents are invoked to guide choice)’.179 Historic victories, stories 
and myths, including those built on ‘wobbly historical foundations’, 180  support an 
approach where previous success will assumedly allow future victory. This attitude 
provide freedom for inattention to martial matters in peacetime. Cornish thinks UK 
strategic culture is mostly descriptive (as Snyder says) and contextual (Kier) with Gray’s 
instrumentality though the intervening or dependent variable is unclear.181 He explains 
 
learning-from-germanys-inner-guidance-the-ethical-citizen-soldier/ There is also value in considering ‘non-
national’ ways of war grounded in religious doctrine, coalitions or centred on ethnicity. See Andrew J 
Bacevich, “The Islamic Way of War,” The American Conservative, 11 Sep 2006, at 
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-islamic-way-of-war/; Christopher Coker, “Between 
Iraq and a Hard Place: Multinational Co-operation, Afghanistan and Strategic Culture,” The RUSI Journal, 
151:5 (Oct 2006): 14–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840608522868; Paul Cornish & Geoffrey Edwards, 
“Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture,” International Affairs, 
77:3 (Jul 2001): 587-603, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3095439; Paul Cornish & Geoffrey Edwards, “The 
Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report,” International Affairs 81:4 (Jul 2005), 801-20, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00485.x; Sten Rynning, “The European Union: Towards a 
Strategic Culture?” Security Dialogue, 34:3 (2003): 479–496, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010603344007 
and Thomas U. Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-militarism,” International 
Security, 17:4 (Spring 1993): 119-50, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539024. 
174 Bradley S Klein, “Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence 
Politics,” Review of International Studies, 14:2 (Apr 1988): 135, https://doi.org/10.1017/ 
S026021050011335X 
175 Many more examples exist. Ireland, Turkey and Japan, and Russia are discussed in Farrell & Terriff, 
eds., The Sources of Military Change; Robert Johnson examines The Afghan Way of War: How and Why 
They Fight, (NY: OUP, 2011); Peter J. Katzenstein & Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security: 
Structures, Norms and Policies.” International Security, 17:4 (Spring 1993): 84–118, https://www.jstor.org/ 
stable/2539023; Ray Murphy, “Ireland, the United Nations and Peacekeeping Operations.” International 
Peacekeeping, 5:1 (1998): 22-45, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533319808413706. 
176 Peter Mattis, “So You Want to Be a PLA Expert?” War on the Rocks, 19 Nov 2019, 
https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/so-you-want-to-be-a-pla-expert-2/ 
177 Peter D. Feaver ‘Public Confidence in the Military’, lunchtime seminar 22 Nov 2019, IISS, London. 
178 The ‘British Way’ is associated most with Sir Basil Liddell Hart. Brian Holden Reid, “The British Way in 
Warfare,” The RUSI Journal, 156:6 (Dec 2011): 70-76, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2011.642691. 
See B. H. Liddell Hart, “Economic Pressure or Continental Victories,” Royal United Services Institution. 
Journal, 76:503 (Jan 1931): 486-510, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071843109426155.  
179 Johnston, “Strategic Culture,” 34. 
180 Douglas Porch, “The Dangerous Myths and Dubious Promise of COIN,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 
22:02 (2011): 249, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2011.574490. 
181 Kier, Imagining War, 148. 
 
94 
that for the UK ‘the most decisive cultural influence upon strategy is not to have a 
strategic culture’, or framework ‘which is authoritative.’182 To get a more detailed picture 
of what warriorship means to British soldiers army culture must now be examined. 
 
British Army Culture 
 
History matters for its influence on culture that ‘changes slowly. Scholars who prefer to 
look only to recent history as the determining influence upon contemporary strategic 
culture, would be well advised to change concepts.’183 British military culture has evolved 
over centuries with the army in recognisable form established in 1661184 ‘from a small 
force of foot and horse guards, which Charles II raised and paid out of his own pocket to 
protect his person and safeguard his throne’.185 His Royal Warrant created regiments186 
and the ’first peacetime standing army since the Roman occupation of Britain.’187 Martial 
references were won at the Boyne, Culloden and Minden. America was conquered, the 
Raj established and swathes of Africa colonised. An empire containing ‘a fifth of the 
world's surface’ and a quarter of its population188 was built on the UK and overseas. 
 
In 1755 Parliament recognised ‘the Army’: previously it was ‘a small, marginal institution’ 
whose authority was ‘sullenly granted’ on an annual basis189 and known only as ‘guards 
and garrisons’.190 The civil war cautioned against large standing armies and established 
anti-military attitudes.191 The godly192 ‘Rule of the Major-Generals’ from 1655-7 gave 
Britain a taste, and further aversion to militarism where ‘specialists on violence are the 
most powerful group in society.’ 193  Opposition to a ‘strong centralized institution’ or 
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military caste with interests potentially at odds with government’s took time to 
reconcile.194 A perceived threat to liberalism, the army was feared for its potential as the 
tool of an autocrat ‘for political repression at home’ as well as wars abroad. 195  By 
preventing a ‘strong organisational identity’196 the army would support government and 
never to substitute for it. Cost was also a concern. 
 
The King, Parliament, and their Colonel (like Zachariah Tiffin who raised a Regiment) 
gave soldiers direction. The Army was national, and local. The Acts of Union of 1707 and 
1800, supreme acts of human imagination,197 created a British identity over a Regimental 
System198 – ‘the principal vehicle of the nation’s military culture.’199 The Regiment, known 
first by its Colonel’s name was later identified numerically (Tiffin’s became the 27th of 
Foot),200 then geographically and functionally (the 27th renamed as the Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers). Process linked regular army to militia units (and ‘amateur military tradition’).201 
Heritage and identity – the pursuit of which ‘most human beings indulge in all their lives’202 
– was protected and the regiment became ‘a living Leviathan’.203 Soldiers joined a total 
institution, ‘a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated 
individuals cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead 
an enclosed, formally administered round of life’.204 
 
The army, unlike a gang, strengthened social institutions: 205  Whitehall recognised 
instrumental utility206 and homo furens as ‘a creative, cooperative political agent’.207 No 
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longer ‘tools of the propertied classes’208 warriors facilitated government responsibility for 
law and order and kept ‘in check the anarchy that individualism might spawn’.209  It 
provided a constabulary, through militia and yeomanry units,210 and posse comitatus,211 
to supress domestic unrest, as well as warfighting forces. Martial activity was nested 
within a bounded framework. ‘Undirected by culture patterns – organized systems of 
significant symbols – man’s behavior would be virtually ungovernable, a mere chaos of 
pointless acts and, exploding emotions, his experience virtually shapeless.’212 
 
The army’s development ‘from a collection of independent and heterogeneous regiments 
to a centralized and unified force’ was complete by 1700 in its ‘essential outlines’: 
a state machine responsible for, and capable of, maintaining a full-time 
force on foot in war and peace – paying, feeding, arming, and clothing it; 
and a coherent hierarchy of men with a distinct subculture of their own, set 
apart not only by their function but by the habits, the dress, the outlook, the 
interpersonal relations, the privileges, and the responsibilities which that 
function demanded.’213 
The machine was employed in continental tussles; suppression of risings; imperial 
expansion and ‘markedly different’214 war in America that culminated in a rare British 
military defeat at Yorktown. 215  The responsibility of the coloniser (during and after 
colonisation) became apparent;216 strategies for containing insurrection; the ethics of the 
use of mercenaries 217  and ‘British-officered levies’; 218  and the evolution of martial 
technique – skirmishing for example – became evident in the British Army’s repertoire. 
 
The Nineteenth Century influenced thoughts of Republic versus Monarchy and the nation 
in arms. The Napoleonic Wars taught logistics, discipline and tactics lessons and ‘the 
soldier’s lot was much improved, officers had a greater sense of what was professional 
conduct, and regimental identities and loyalties were stronger.’219 The wars brought self-
belief: the British were the only military force not to suffer a major defeat by Napoleon. 
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With routine duties in the interim220 the Crimean War was then joined. Focus on the 
humanitarian foundation of the army221 and soldiering’s social dimension brought change 
with ‘increasing speed’:222 even the army’s formal disciplinary code was ‘liberalised and 
humanised.’223 Front-line journalism, most famously through William Howard Russell, 
established societal debt to soldiers through greater public awareness of the reality of 
the battlefield and returned veterans. The British soldier became humanly recognisable 
and applauded for sacrifice, less known as a tool for internal control: ‘the agents of 
Christian militarism abroad, not the enemy of Chartism or nascent socialism at home.’224 
 
The army of the 1900s is traceable to the nineteenth century,225 and ‘a moment in history 
which had already disappeared.’226 Tasked to police the empire227 the critical juncture in 
Sarajevo demanded required rapid evolution ‘from a small colonial gendarmerie in 1914 
to a mass citizen army capable of sophisticated operations in industrial warfare in 
1918’.228 Tommy229 replaced the Redcoat but the fragmented nature230 of the British Army 
endured, with additional strata. The regular army (‘Old Contemptibles’) provided for the 
Western Front; Haldane’s Territorial Force and Kitchener’s New Army or ‘Pals’ Battalions 
delivered reinforcements. Dominion recruited units, then conscripts were added to the 
mix. Each brought its own character231 and impact on culture. The Great War increased 
the number of Britons with access to regimental identity and by extension ethos232 – 
though their absorption of either is questionable. The norms that comprise culture take 
time to embed where they are not in evidence through previous socialisation.233 A Home 
Counties unit reorganised into a Highland regiment will ‘take to the kilt rather kindly’234 
because ethos in a mass army is Doing not Being. But this is functional not emotional; 
commitment not calling; and those enlisted were co-opted. ‘Wartime volunteers and 
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conscripts perhaps identified less powerfully with the regiment as an institution, and 
much more strongly with the people they had served alongside.’235 Their ‘preference for 
amateurism, a distaste for prescription, and an emphasis on the character of the 
individual’236 overwhelmed pre-war reference: army ethos was challenged by ‘changing 
needs and demography’. 237  Citizen-soldiers, ‘non-martial, non-ideological and less 
deferential men’ required the army to adapt to them as much as vice versa.238 Warriorship 
was a dying or at best a temporal endeavour. 
 
The machine gun eradicated chivalry and had a ‘fundamental impact on the warrior elite,’ 
reducing status and the possibilities of the solo fighter pitching for honours and reward.239 
Soldiers were ‘employed at least as much for their skills as machine manipulators as 
they were for their skills as warriors.’240 Balancing the role of technologist with hero241 and 
embracing technology proved difficult. 
Britain had a tough time dealing with the tank because of its old regimental 
system, which is the idea that officers took their identity from this particular 
kind of unit that had a history going back centuries. That culture was more 
important to them than a new, more effective approach.242 
It ‘meant the destruction of an entire way of life’243 for some, the eclipse of a country 
lifestyle for others.244 The character of war changed but the army resisted: the decline of 
horse cavalry explained apologetically still in the 1930s.245 The Tank Corps expanded,246 
communications, medical and logistics branches grew and combat forces reduced. In 
1881, 77% of the army was infantry or cavalry; in 1939 it was 60 per cent; and 34% by 
1991.247 Armies no longer comprised champions. ‘They were instruments through which 
the belligerents could bleed one another dry of resources and of men.’248 Industrial War 
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made homo furens machine cogs: skill, bearing, breeding, and other warrior hallmarks 
became less significant. 
 
The Minimal Force Tradition (‘the degree to which maximal force was impracticable’)249 
required maintaining for duties not involving ‘the annihilation of an enemy but the 
suppression of a temporary disorder’.250 This introduced a ‘schizoid character’251 splitting 
martial focus across high-intensity conflict and gendarmerie type duties, though this latter 
emphasis was rarely benign. Declining and limited resource252 required ex-soldiers to 
work as auxiliary policemen in Ireland in 1920. These ‘ordinary men’253 demonstrated 
why making combat hardened soldiers, maybe warriors, into policemen254 is optimal only 
where the desire is toward the exercise of ‘the brutal tactics of forcible resettlement, 
promotion of faction against faction and political concessions.255 They prove, by example, 
that separating policing, soldiering and warriorship is more difficult than maybe first 
assumed and a schizoid approach can be untenable. 
 
The line between society and the military ‘blurred.’256 WW1 set the conditions for a 
‘decision to ‘civilianize’ everyday life in the Army’.257 Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for 
War (1937-40) thought the Army should acknowledge the national mood 258  and 
initiatives259 launched then and throughout the 20th Century nudged the Army toward a 
new place in society. A contracted career was established, and with that attendant 
schemes of increasing professionalism (officers would work ‘not only in the morning but 
in the afternoon as well’).260 Regiments became ‘family friendly’ and catered not only for 
young single male recruits: family housing was created; pay was aligned to civilian 
norms; and recruitment practice was expanded to allow greater access not least ‘the 
admission of bourgeois officers into the closed circle of the officer class’. 261  The 
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‘stranglehold that birth and social status, rather than brains’ had over the officer ranks 
was broken.262 The approach created a ‘spirit of social cohesion’ with profound results.263 
Service became less ‘a burden of masculine duty to be accepted without complaint, and 
more a set of special skills that can be taught to all people, not just to men’.264 
 
The British Expeditionary Force constituted on 2nd September 1939 (Britain declared war 
on the 3rd) is an example of the national tendency toward ‘limited liability until the last 
possible moment’.265 The evacuation from Dunkirk in May 1940 ‘encapsulates features 
of British history that are enduringly popular: British isolationism, patriotic sacrifice and 
the success of the few against impossible odds due to intrinsically noble qualities plus a 
capacity for improvisation.’266 The ‘Armed Services intruded into daily life’ again.267 
For the second time in a quarter century, the British army, a small, 
conservative, professional force, mostly designed for imperial duties, had 
to be rapidly transformed into a conscript force more than ten times its 
peacetime size, capable of fighting a modern, mechanized war in North 
Africa, Southeast Asia, and the European continent.268 
The ‘disagreeable necessity’269 of wartime service, lack of preparation and defeat at 
Dunkirk meant the army ‘was far from being an efficient and fearsome instrument’.270 The 
war of 1939-45 followed the pattern of 1914-18: a shaky start; alliance exploitation then 
‘building up materiel superiority and fighting in an attritionalist style.’271 It left in its wake 
the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) that dominated British doctrine272 after 1945 and 
resonates still273  but also the enduring requirement for multi-functionality. The army 
provided defensive forces274 for Europe; a ‘continental campaign-winning machine’275 to 
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fight in Korea; patrolled Cypriot villages and conducted arrest operations in Malaya and 
Kenya; policed India and garrisoned Hong Kong. Throughout, it stood ready to assist UK 
civil authorities at home. Mixing counter-insurgency, a politico-military endeavour, with 
anti-terrorism, a policing and security consideration,276 with high intensity warfighting 
where failure means state defeat whilst providing domestic support became routine, and 
with it the multiple foci of the British Army. 
 
The 1957 ‘Sandys’ White Paper halved the army and cancelled National Service277 
creating a ‘chasm’ between the army and society.278 The cuts – ‘a watershed moment’279 
– forced the army back to a peripheral societal position yet it conducted ‘no fewer than 
thirty-five overseas military operations in more than twenty countries’280 between 1949 
and 1970. Its longest ever enduring campaign,281 Operation Banner then commenced in 
Northern Ireland (NI) and the army assumed responsibility for security, and militarised a 
part of the UK. It involved army effort in the raising of a local militia,282 the establishment 
of relationships with government departments, intelligence agencies, political parties and 
civilian organisations: paramilitary groups who challenged the state’s monopoly on 
violence were tolerated, even partnered. 283  The army, an essential, critical lever of 
domestic policy also presented as an anachronism, an instrument of oppression 284 
‘singularly untouched’ 285  by national progress. NI operations exposed soldiers with 
certain ‘habits and traditions’ as unsuited for duties of this nature.286 
 
A fracturing, and partial anonymisation of the regimental system occurred in 1971 with 
the introduction of a policy of centralised recruitment,287 the closure of regimental depots 
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and greater cross posting of personnel between regiments. Soldiers were no longer 
expected ‘or in many cases willing, to regard their regiment as their real, as opposed to 
their metaphorical, family’.288 The work-based culture shifted to one ‘focused on home 
life’.289 The invasion of the Falklands altered the trajectory and reminded of the necessity 
for a ‘warfighting’ army: for the first time in a generation ‘British soldiers engaged a static 
enemy on open fields and ridges’.290 Pronouncements that the ‘post-imperial maritime 
intervention’ in the Falklands, then ‘continental armoured warfare’ in Kuwait in 1991 were 
‘the last operations of their type for generations291 proved premature when the UK went 
to war again in 2003. The fighting function refused relegation to ‘secondary importance’292 
regardless of optimistic desire to the contrary and army attention to alternative duties. 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall brought wars, against ‘troublemakers, criminals and pests’:293 
the army was assumed to have ‘unique insight’.294 However the contradiction ‘between 
the ‘warrior’ self-image of soldiers and the extreme frustrations of soldiering in a low 
intensity conflict’295 gave rise to disquiet. Operations like those in the Balkans296 a ‘curious 
legal hybrid, somewhere between warfare and policing,’297 were thought detrimental to 
the army’s health: the lack of an identifiable enemy and inability to apply traditional 
military principles frustrated. 298  Kiszely suggests such activity be more favourably 
regarded but recognises the inherently conservative and anti-intellectual stance of 
militaries prevents it.299 The preference for ‘conventional’ soldiering limits the expansion 
of the martial base beyond a focus on high intensity warfighting: ‘proper’ soldiering is 
preferred to the 'wet philosophy’ of peacekeeping. 300  Humanitarian strategy is less 
attractive than warrior ethos.301 
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Iraq presented an awkward unrecognisable conflict environment. With the regime 
defeated in open warfare it was assumed the army’s constabulary skills would be useful 
as the campaign transitioned.302 Such thinking quickly evaporated in the light of violence: 
…altogether more complicated and multifaceted, being motivated by a 
mixture of power-seeking, religion, and criminality rather than nationalism 
or sectarianism. The tacit constraints common in Northern Ireland were 
also absent. Militia fighters were often suicidally brave and utterly indifferent 
to humanitarian considerations, being prepared to employ human shields 
in combat, and torture and execute prisoners.303 
Berets adopted after warfighting304 were replaced with helmets; reconstruction activity 
was suspended, and troops resumed combat operations. The Army’s ‘venerated 
reputation for waging small wars’ and multi-functionality should have allowed adaptability 
and quick adjustment. The failure to do so is judged a consequence of ‘complacency, 
ineptitude, cost-cutting and laurel gazing’.305 It may equally be grounded in the refusal to 
acknowledge the difference between soldiers and warriors.306 
 
Military forces can be bifurcated into those for ‘high-tech big violence war’ and others for 
‘security generation and routine crisis response.307 Lovelace advised separate armies for 
a ‘three tier’ model of threats308 that today would be recognised as sub-threshold activity, 
conventional war and constant competition. Nagl recognises that organisations 
optimised to succeed in one activity ‘have great difficulty’ in others and struggle to 
adapt.309 The British have only one army and its soldiers historically are nation-builders, 
policemen, soldiers and warriors simultaneously – ‘jacks of all trades’, not masters of 
one. Warfighting is not privileged so functional brilliance is difficult to achieve. By 
promoting split, not hierarchical nor necessarily related identities, and assuming soldiers 
can perform multifariously, the British Army has ‘no single experience of anything.’310 The 
options the army offers are impressive but a lack of singular focus means no tangible or 
discernible military culture exists – ‘there has never been’311 a British way of war says 
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Strachan: nor any singular soldier identity. ‘The much-cited differentiation of roles is in 
fact a practical effect of the multi-functionality of modern armies, but precisely because 
of this differentiation, modern armies can offer soldiers no consistent social role.’312 The 
requirement for diverse political options means the army is in perpetual organisational 
survival mode. This is a distraction from the pursuit of warfighting excellence, or 
warriorship, and something that makes defining British Army culture and therefore 
identity, near impossible. 
 
British Army Myth 
 
Analysis thus far has been at the levels of State, Society and Organisation. Connable et 
al suggest ‘willingness to fight’ as a critical component of warriorship be analysed at Unit 
and Individual level too.313 Events that ‘happened once and which also happen all the 
time’314 to soldiers, that provide stories and that matter are now considered. These are 
‘symbolic narrative, that ostensibly relates actual or extraordinary events, or 
circumstances apart from ordinary human experience’.315 My questionnaire asked: What 
do you consider to be the most iconic actions/events in British Army history? John Kiszely 
thinks ‘Agincourt, Hougoumont Farm and the Squares at Waterloo, the Thin Red Line in 
the Crimea, Rorke’s Drift, Dunkirk. Kohima and Imphal’ resonate in British Army 
mythology:316 Keegan too chose Agincourt and Waterloo and added the Somme for his 
chronicle. 317  Respondents demonstrated historical depth from Agincourt in 1415 to 
events of this century318 but presented much more diverse examples of cultural memory 
from folk, commemorative and mediatised frameworks.319 They also recognised personal 
prejudice and that their regiments, ‘sites of ceremonies, commemorations, and 
entertainments’320 promoted events and traditions to provide focus and causes ‘with 
which they identified so closely that they would be willing to fight and die for it.’321 Stories 
‘play an extremely important role in communication, including the ways that 
organisations talk about themselves’:322 they impact self-perception and how soldiers 
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view the army and their peers and the past is important ‘not for its own sake, but because 
it might help to motivate soldiers in the future’323 Responses from 105 soldiers were 
collated into themes (shown in Fig. 4.2) that encompass the canonical episodes, 
impressive324 and ‘favourite’325 stories. 
 
 
Fig. 4.2: Word Cloud - Iconic Events 
 
Agincourt invokes images of chivalric warriorship (though one CO did mention that we 
neglect of mention of ‘knifing knights through the visor’)326 It offers knights, coloured 
banners, kings taking the field, that rousing Shakespearian ‘Band of Brothers’ eve of 
battle speech and it was thought it would be inspiring at least for its historical prominence. 
In fact only 6 respondents mentioned it, 5 of them officers. Maybe it is regarded as an 
English battle, fought by another force, not the British Army. None of the Royal Irish 
soldiers suggested it as iconic, suggesting the knightly figure may be relatable only to 
English officers. The Battle of the Somme and the ‘blood sacrifice’327 of Ulstermen was 
emphasised by Irish soldiers. Myth resonates tribally with ‘significant cultural meaning, 
imbued with traditions, memories and reflecting’ imagined and real communities.328 It can 
overwhelm military training and take precedence over army culture. Agincourt also stood 
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out as an historical anomaly: no other battle of the Hundred Years War (Crecy and 
Poitiers for example) gained mention. Bannockburn or Culloden were not iconic; the 
Battle of the Boyne in Ireland, was mentioned just twice. The Wars of the Roses were 
neglected and English Civil War actions were disregarded. The ‘birthing pains’ of the UK 
were ignored, possibly again as a consequence of the research sample which was 
weighted toward an Irish cohort. Few mentions were made of battles in America – 
Quebec once, Yorktown not at all: India earned mostly singleton references for all the 
political implications of battles there. More than a sampling issue, these battles are 
clearly thought less significant. They occurred mostly before the British Army was 
established: the stories belong to others and are not relatable. 
 
Some respondents specified individuals as iconic. Nelson, Montgomery and Slim were 
mentioned though no leaders since 1945 figured (Templer or Kitson for example); nor 
were British soldier-scholars (like Liddell-Hart, Fuller or Bagnall) discussed. Two soldiers 
offered the Iranian Embassy siege of 1980 as iconic. Below the threshold of ‘battle’ this 
is well known from television – the modern-day camp fire round which stories are told 
though this can be a source of ‘absurdity’ and inventiveness too.329 ‘The more heavily 
mediatised memory becomes, the more it is disembedded from frameworks of particular 
places and social groups, and the more individualised and mutable our relationship to 
the past.’330 Memory though is no less vivid and the narrative is more accessible. Several 
contributors focussed on commemorative memory, and non-battle events like parades. 
Focus groups were held two months after the Royal Irish were presented with new 
Colours; the 200th anniversary of Waterloo was in 2015; and the centenary of the ending 
of the First World War was in 2018. The events were prominent in responses due to this. 
The ‘most iconic events have to be those that are most commemorated.’331 Events 
involving ‘boys who are like us’332 create ‘a special communication license’ between past 
and present: such licence can exclude those who were actually present in the situation.333 
 
Proximity plays a major role. The ‘history of an army is, above all, that of its deeds’334 and 
local deeds resonate most. The siege of Musa Qala in 2006 involved soldiers who 
contributed to the study; several highlighted operations in Afghanistan in 2008, ’09 and 
2010 ‘when proper fighting was done by my generation’.335 Strategic culture is partly a 
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product of military experience, and ‘combat is its great educator.’336 Many of the soldiers 
consulted consider their schooling to have been on these operations. The point was 
made that events that qualified as iconic were those ‘within my lifetime that I have had 
experience with’. 337  Soldiers interpret reality according to local logic and bear 
consequences that others ‘find wildly unreasonable’338 for the meaning it provides them. 
 
Official historians ‘consciously or unconsciously sustain the view that his regiment has 
usually been flawlessly brave and efficient, especially during its recent past.’ 
Without any sense of ill-doing he will emphasize the glorious episodes in 
its history and pass with a light hand over its murkier passages; knowing 
full well that his work is to serve a practical purpose in sustaining regimental 
morale in future.339 
Contrarily, reprehensible behaviours, failure and defeat in my research were offered by 
soldiers as ‘iconic’. The collapse of discipline at Badajoz340, the retreat from Kabul,341 
massacre at Amritsar,342 the Dunkirk evacuation,343 loss of Singapore344 and the events 
of Bloody Sunday345 were all highlighted. The death of a detainee in Basra whilst in army 
custody,346 and the killing of a wounded Taliban in 2011 were so recognised as well. 
Events mentioned most often are now examined in more detail. 
Waterloo. The Napoleonic Wars were mentioned 65 times (Waterloo on 43 specific 
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Toby Harnden, Dead Men Risen: The Welsh Guards in Afghanistan and the Real Story of Britain's War in 
Afghanistan, (London: Quercus, 2011). 
336 Yitzhak Klein, “A Theory of Strategic Culture,” Comparative Strategy, 10:1 (Jan–Mar 1991): 13, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01495939108402827. 
337 Instr02. 
338 Colin S. Gray, “In Praise of Strategy,” Review of International Studies, 29:2 (Apr 2003): 292, 
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339 Howard, “Use and Abuse,” 4. 
340 The sack of Badajoz is ‘considered ‘shameful’ and helped establish the reputation of Wellington’s 
redcoats as ‘scum of the earth’.’ Gavin Daly, ‘The Sacking of a Town is an Abomination’: Siege, Sack and 
Violence to Civilians in British Officers’ Writings on the Peninsular War – the Case of Badajoz,” Historical 
Research, 92:255 (Feb 2019): 160, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2281.12252. 
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occasions and by 24 of 31 Commanding Officers). Of the few COs who failed to mention 
it, one was a Royal Marine and one a paratrooper; neither have regimental tradition 
there. One respondent, with broader 
historical appreciation, reflected on the 
negatives: ‘John Moore’s retreat to 
Corunna (not glorious), Albuhera (bloody 
and close-run), and Badajoz (not glorious 
– a city sacked after a violent siege)’.347 
Mostly though this period was lauded. 
Waterloo ‘changed the course of 
European history’ and ‘saved a continent’; 
it ‘set the British Army as the world’s reference’, proved the ability to operate overseas, 
and tenacity in battle – ‘outnumbered men barging against the doors of Hougoumont 
Farm etc’.348 That it was more than a British victory was ignored.349 The Inniskillings 
defending against French cavalry (Fig. 4.3)350 make it doubly celebrated by Royal Irish.351 
 
Myth establishes the army as a Tier One force and model for others;352 Waterloo as the 
‘cultural bedrock of our regimental system’.353 The story drives belief, and behaviour. 
‘[F]or better and for worse it still influences how we think about soldiering: bravery; 
restraint; gentlemanly soldiering’.354 This is a significant declaration by a guardian of 
regimental narrative and gatekeeper of tradition. He promotes a Victorian stereotype that 
contemporary British society may find difficult and a narrative that would fit awkwardly 
 
347 CO10. 
348 CO01; CO24; CO16; CO25; CO12. 
349 Arguments continue about what or who won Waterloo: ‘the earth was too wet for the French artillery, 
the French marshals were faint-hearted, the Prussians arrived in the nick of time…’ Alan Mallinson, The 
Making of the British Army, (London: Transworld Publishers, 2009), 183; cf. Jasper Heinzen, "A 
Negotiated Truce: The Battle of Waterloo in European Memory since the Second World War," History and 
Memory, 26:1 (Spring/Summer 2014): 39-74, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/histmemo.26.1.39 
350 Image from https://www.royal-irish.com/events/battle-honour-waterloo © Copyright 2019. The Royal 
Irish. All Rights Reserved. Original Painting by Peter Archer, © Peter Archer. 
351 The Inniskilling Fusiliers were allegedly complemented by Wellington. Their action ‘saved the centre of 
my line at Waterloo’ and by Napoleon who observed: “That regiment with the castles on their caps is 
composed of the most obstinate mules I ever saw; they don’t know when they are beaten.” The 
compliments are worn by all Royal Irish soldiers now. The Royal Irish Virtual Gallery, at https://www.royal-
irish.com/events/the-27th-inniskilling-regiment-of-foot on 02 Sept 2019. The Irish made the bulk of the 
British Army at the time of Waterloo hence its resonance: 100,000 joined between 1800-14 according to 
Terence Denman, “The Red Livery of Shame: The Campaign against Army Recruitment in Ireland, 1899–
1914,” Irish Historical Studies 29:114 (Nov 1994): 209, https://www.jstor.org/stable/30006743. See also 
Jane Ohlmeyer, “Ireland, India and the British Empire,” Studies in People’s History, 2.2 (2015): 179, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2348448915600920; Keith Jeffery, ‘The Irish Military Tradition in the British 
Empire’, in ‘An Irish Empire’? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire, ed., K. Jeffery (Manchester, 
Manchester UP, 1996), 94-122; Peter Karsten, "Irish Soldiers in the British Army, 1792-1922: Suborned or 
Subordinate?" Journal of Social History, 17:1 (Autumn 1983): 31-64, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3787238 
352 The ‘full spectrum of military capabilities, including an independent nuclear deterrent and a navy, army 
and air force capable of being deployed anywhere in the world.’ David Bond, “Defence Secretary Pledges 




Fig. 4.3: Inniskillings at Waterloo 
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with army recruiting campaigns.355 Myth allows army culture to self-sustain. 
 
Rorke’s Drift. Mentioned by 11 respondents, 356  desperate and hopeless but brave 
actions like that at Rorke’s Drift, ‘examples of courage against the odds’ 357  figured 
prominently in responses. A calamitous yet renowned day ‘in the august history of 
Britain’s standing army’,358 British soldiers celebrate such ‘pluck, futility and/or dignity’: 
Agincourt – outnumbered bowmen…Waterloo – outnumbered…Balaclava 
(Charge of the Light Brigade) – manic and futile courage (God forbid we’d 
question orders); Rorke’s Drift – outnumbered. We wowed the natives into 
clemency; Ypres – outnumbered again. Somme – see above…3rd Ypres – 
see above (the pattern forms) Dunkirk – salvaged our dignity with the help 
of RN and RAF; Arnhem – outnumbered, futile, went into the bag with 
dignity again. Etc359 
Rorke’s Drift was ‘tenacious defence against overwhelming odds’:360 it is a reference 
action and soldiers talked of ‘dozens of Rorke’s Drifts’ every day in scattered platoon 
posts in Helmand, says Mallinson. 361 
‘British culture is drawn to the narrative of 
the plucky underdog overcoming a 
superior opponent or sometimes even 
valiantly losing…’. 362  That Rorke’s Drift 
was ‘a skirmish’363 is unimportant: it is the 
desperate ‘last stand’ spirit (Fig. 4.4)364 of 
this battle, its defensive nature, and 
others like it that appeals. Had the story been less of a box office hit365 perhaps fewer 
British soldiers would offer the event as iconic, despite the 11 VCs won.366 The screen 
presentation nonetheless shows too the standard for soldiering that the British soldier 
thinks illustrative of British army endeavour and martial identity. 
 
 
355 ‘This Is Belonging’ at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1vCe3BAnws. The army seeks recruits of all 
persuasions (not just ‘gentlemen’). See also ‘Army Campaign Targets 'Snowflake' Millennials,’ BBC News 
dated 03 Jan 2019, at https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-46747862 on 03 Jan 2019.  
356 15 times where Isandlwana (3) and ‘Zulu Wars’ are included.  
357 CO10. 
358 Mike Snook, Like Wolves on the Fold: The Defence of Rorke's Drift, (London: Greenhill, 2006), xi. 
359 CO12. 
360 CO11. 
361 Mallinson, British Army, 235. 
362 CO18. 
363 CO10. 
364 Image available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Défense_de_Rorke%27s_Drift.jpg 
accessed 02 Jan 20 under Creative Commons SA. Painting by Alphonse de Neuville (1836-1885). 
365 Zulu (1964), Cy Enfield, starring Michael Caine is a ‘memory artefact’ produced by a secondary agent 
(Enfield), championed by primary agents (soldiers). Farrell, Norms, 89-90. The action at Isandlwana was 
less mentioned though the two battles are intimately connected. See Mike Snook, How Can Man Die 
Better: The Secrets of Isandlwana Revealed, (London: Greenhill Books, 2005). 
366 24 were won on 16 Nov 1856 during the Indian Mutiny; 7 were awarded 21 Aug1860 in the Third China 
War; 5 on the Andaman Islands Expedition of 1867. None of these were appeared as ‘iconic’. 
Fig. 4.4: 24th of Foot at Rorke’s Drift 
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The battle at Arnhem,367 another defeat (and ‘military cock-up’)368 based on small teams 
is also mediatised.369 It figured in 12 CO responses and at focus groups: 19 times in total. 
The Korean War was remembered and mentioned 9 times (Imjin on another 6 
occasions): the ‘actions of the Glosters in the face of dire circumstances’ according to 
one respondent ‘embodies warrior spirit and the drive and determination of infantry to 
win’.370 That they lost is irrelevant: it is ‘the British soldier in defence…a stubborn and 
formidable foe’371 fighting against overwhelming odds that is celebrated.372 ‘Actions such 
as Rorke’s’ Drift, Arnhem or the Old Contemptibles on the Marne exemplify this spirit. 
Each one was physical, combative and relied heavily on the soldiers’ warrior spirit.’373 
Myth makes loss more agreeable and suppresses war’s ‘bitter and repugnant reality.’374 
 
WW1 and WW2. The British Army, in both world wars, ‘has been subject to a degree of 
myth-making.’ Buckley and Sheffield highlight the underplayed role of the RAF and Royal 
Navy; the neglect of the importance of the Grand Alliance (US material and Russian 
manpower) and the promotion of the 
seemingly invincible German soldier. In 
the Great War the enduring memory, 
myth and perception is of the 
incompetency of British Generals and 
accepted cultural history that is ‘largely 
based on the experience of a handful of 
officer-poets…wholly unrepresentative 
of the mass of British soldiers.’375 For this 
thesis too significant mythical 
underpinning was evident and the frequent mentions of these wars demonstrate they 
resonate still amongst contemporary British soldiers. WW1 and associated events were 
discussed 89 times; WW2 gained 127 mentions. Though mass citizen armies are 
anomalies in British strategic culture, ‘Pals’ Battalions and those who stood in the ‘good 
wars’ of public consciousness376 against Nazism are the archetype British Soldier. This 
 
367 Antony Beevor, Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges, 1944, (London: Viking, 2018). 
368 Julian Thompson, Ready For Anything: The Parachute Regiment At War, (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicholson, 1989), 147, quoting Major Dover, 2 PARA. 
369 A Bridge Too Far (1977), Richard Attenborough. 
370 Instr15. 
371 Battle of the Imjin River, The National Army Museum. https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/battle-imjin. 
372 Outnumbered ten to one according to Tim Carew, The Glorious Glosters, (London: Leo Cooper, 1970), 
83. See also ‘The Day 650 Glosters Faced 10,000 Chinese’ The Telegraph, dated 20 Apr 2001 at 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1316777/The-day-650-Glosters-faced-10000-Chinese.html. 
373 CO18. 
374 Wilhelm Deist & E.J. Feuchtwanger, “The Military Collapse of the German Empire: The Reality Behind 
the Stab-in-the-Back Myth,” War in History 3:2 (Apr 1996): 207, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
096834459600300203. 
375 Buckley & Sheffield, “Haig and Montgomery,” 26. 
376 Fennell, Fighting the People's War, 52. 




figure, honoured on Armistice Day, 377  situates the army in society, democratises 
soldiering and allows war as national endeavour.378 The summer of 1916 ‘imprinted itself 
on British culture more than any others’379 through the folly of the loss, the ‘cost of total 
war’ and national commitment not warriorship.380 One officer thought commemoration 
ironic. 
We honour the dead, we don’t honour the killers, events like the Somme 
are commemorated on the basis of the casualties we sustained, not the 
number we inflicted; our honours and awards are based on self-sacrifice, 
duty not the extent to which you had an effect on the enemy. 381 
 
The global spread of WW2 was easily recalled (WW1 actions beyond the Western Front 
less so). Normandy382 gained 15 mentions and ‘D-Day’ a further 22. Montgomery’s Eighth 
Army ‘whose exploits are remembered’383 though not understood384 gained comment; 
Slim’s Fourteenth Army was not forgotten. Both these commanders were declared iconic 
but none from the Great War registered, a consequence likely of the good versus evil 
dynamic: the army was ‘on the side of good’385 in WW2, a war ‘widely seen as purposeful, 
necessary and crucial to the re-establishment of a sustainable international order’.386 
That it was not a UK only action (like Waterloo) is again inconsequential and actions 
were understood once more through the ‘saving Europe’ narrative. 
 
Northern Ireland. The campaign in NI was assessed as iconic 16 times – more often 
than Rorke’s Drift and nearly as frequently as ‘Iraq’. It is remembered as successful 
‘counter-insurgency on home soil’. 387  This is interesting as the campaign is more 
regularly advanced as having simply created space for a political settlement: it ‘is seldom 
included in chronicles of Britain’s military triumphs.’388 It might even be termed Military 
Aid to the Civil Authorities, maybe peace support, or Stabilisation, according to the 
 
377 The appropriation of the war dead and commemoration in rituals of national mourning ‘has the effect of 
establishing social unity.’ Scheipers, Heroism, 5. 
378 David Englander, "Soldiering and Identity: Reflections on the Great War," War in History, 1:3 (1994): 
300-318, https://doi.org/10.1177/096834459400100304. 
379 CO10. The image at Fig. 4.5 shows troops on the opening day of the Battle of the Somme. Mentioned 
37 times it was the second most quoted singular term alongside the Falklands. Accessed at 
https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205193964.© IWM (Q 1), 
380 CO09. 
381 FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 36:20. 
382 Antony Beevor, D-Day: The Battle for Normandy, (London: Viking, 2009). The image shows infantry on 
6 June 1944, https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205205810 on 02 Feb 20, © IWM (B 5039) 
383 Robin Neillands, Eighth Army: From the Western Desert to the Alps, 1939-1945, (London: John Murray, 
2004), xxv. 
384 It was ‘averagely led, inadequately trained, poorly equipped, uncertain of the cause it was fighting for, 
and deprived of the effective support…’. Jonathan Fennell, “Courage and Cowardice in the North African 
Campaign: The Eighth Army and Defeat in the Summer of 1942,” War in History, 20:1 (Jan 2013): 122. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344512454251. This is scarcely the stuff of legend. 
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doctrinal ‘spectrum of operations.’ Counter-insurgency confers alternative status. 
Applying terminology loosely like this undermined credibility in Iraq where the NI 
campaign was advanced as a reference and template389 regardless of the difference in 
intensity of combat actions in Iraq. One CO 
was less ambitious about what the army 
gained from NI. ‘I might add Northern 
Ireland’ but only, he explained, for 
experience in patrolling and riot control.390 
The image at Fig. 4.6 shows soldiers 
typically employed, searching a vehicle to 
interdict munitions and the movement of 
terrorist suspects.391 This requires the skills 
of a militia or a para-military force over an 
army of warriors. Regarded as ‘less 
challenging’ than war-fighting it is still equal 
employment for British soldiers. The ‘degree 
to which the warrior ethos’,392  combat focus and fighting spirit should be privileged 
however is questionable. ‘I find it difficult to think of any instance in my career soldiering 
in Northern Ireland that feels like warriorship…single gunmen, petrol bombs doesn’t 
seem to allow it’.393 
We need to be careful. The danger is that we can’t appeal solely to 
warriors…what we have to do is make sure the lived experience matches 
the adverts, and they have to show what we are doing today. And what we 
are doing today is not fighting in Afghanistan. We are doing other things – 
still exciting, still high-end stuff but not actually fighting.394 
 
Falklands. The ‘reconquest’395 of the Falklands in 1982 was judged iconic by more than 
half of CO respondents (17) and twenty focus group participants with the battles of Mount 
Harriet, Two Sisters and Goose Green specifically mentioned. It was the second most 
quoted singular event after ‘Waterloo’ and equal to the Somme with 37 mentions. The 
COs thought it ‘flavoured the 1980s’396 and images from it such as the one shown at Fig. 
4.7397 remain live in their memories, not least one imagines as most of the COs at the 
 




391 Soldiers from the UDR at a checkpoint in County Down in 1972. Accessed at https://www.iwm.org.uk/ 
collections/item/object/205189636 on 12 Jan 20, © Crown copyright. IWM (MH 30540). 
392 Shanks-Kaurin, “Questioning,” 12. 
393 FG1: RHQ 14 Nov 18, 11:50. 
394 GS7: 29 Mar 19, 30:30. 
395 CO30. 
396 Parr, Our Boys, 196. 
397 Image at https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205194942 accessed 15 Dec 19, © Crown 
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time would have been in their formative childhood years. Fought at company and 
battalion level and not through Corps or Army manoeuvre this sort of war is attractive to 
COs. It is war they can personally 
influence and where individual soldiers 
are most empowered. It is remembered 
too as a ‘soldier’s war: clean; restrained; 
with acts of bravery and demonstrative of 
the utility of a well-trained and motivated 
soldier over one who is poorly trained with 
low moral’.398 It created a standard that 
continues to influence training ‘at the 
Infantry Training Centre, RMAS, Infantry 
Battle School’ and resonates ‘more than 
anything else.’ 399  Until the Falklands, 
‘referential status’ (Tier One standing) 
was waning; 400  the war ‘reaffirmed our 
ability to fight’. 401  It validated inherent 
warfighting aptitude and the 
‘expeditionary demonstration of national 
will/resolve’.402 It showed 'the ability of the 
Army (and other Services) to deliver a decisive outcome in extreme circumstances’403 
and ‘saw the British soldier overcome significant odds.404 
The Falklands had been a very near-run thing indeed. Nevertheless it had 
been the finest thing, too; and in June 1982 the standing of the British Army 
in the eyes of the nation and of the world had probably never stood 
higher.405 
The soldiers surveyed agreed and remembered it, Britain’s first televised war, for the use 
of bayonets, the taking of prisoners and evocative footage of field burials of soldiers killed 
in action as well as the VCs won by Lieutenant Colonel ‘H’ Jones and Sergeant McKay. 
Neither accusations of mistreatment of prisoners nor the dogmatic doctrinal approach 
mentioned by those who fought there were commented upon by the current generation 
of soldiers.406 
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Iraq. Activity in Kuwait, Gulf War 1 (Operation Granby), and Gulf War 2 (Operation Telic) 
tended to be discussed collectively as 
‘Iraq’. 407  The merging of distinctly 
separate deployments, albeit the 2003 
war was most prominent, suggests that 
operations from 1991 until 2009 are 
recognised as one single campaign – 
betraying in itself some lack of 
understanding of events and growing 
myth. Activity was recognised as war, in 
traditional form and a departure from what 
had gone before, where troops were 
waiting for war in Germany or conducting 
non-war-fighting constabulary-like duties 
in NI. The uniforms were different from the 
woodland camouflage worn previously 
(the image at Fig 4.8 shows a soldier in 
desert uniform but with European pattern 
equipment) 408  and it was the first time 
since 1945 that the army deployed with 
full warfighting capability: tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery and helicopters. 
The army was doing the job which its supposes to be its existential purpose. 
 
Iraq ‘stifled the British Army’s true ability because the politics interfered with the 
tactics.’409 This is not a ‘stab in the back’ accusation410 but the campaign was disruptive. 
It redefined warfighting and the idea of security. It challenged the 
relationships between war-fighting (and the war-fighters), politics and the 
nation. The legal ramifications are still being felt today. The invasion re-
opened the debate on what an Army is for and shattered the Army’s image 
of being a ‘Force for Good’. We are only now starting to re-define what the 
Army is for.411 
That the army needed to redefine itself emphasises a lack of recognisable martial or 
strategic culture: it gives a glimpse for why ‘warrior,’ years later, has become an attractive 
 
407 Iraq as a theme was mentioned 32 times, 20 of those specifically though it was never certain ‘which 
Iraq’ was being referred to. 
408 Image accessed at https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205219065 on 15 Jan 20, © Crown 
copyright. IWM (OP-TELIC 03-010-09-026). 
409 CO25. Afghanistan was as ‘political’ as Iraq (see Theo Farrell, Unwinnable, (London: Bodley Head, 
2017) but it isn’t similarly remembered. 
410 The German army after 1918 is best known for this accusation. Deist & Feuchtwanger, “The Reality 
Behind the Stab-in-the-Back Myth.” The French defeat in Algeria and the US experiences in Vietnam are 
further examples of this well-rehearsed military refrain. Horne highlights an earlier accusation of betrayal 
from Marcus Flavinius of the Augusta Legion of the Roman Army. Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 81. 
411 CO21. 




proposition. It might equally be some other term. The ‘unglamorous and uncomfortable’ 
irregular warfare 412  involving insurgents, guerrillas and partisan types 413  left raw 
organisational wounds. One CO dismissed the venture: ‘incredible displays of our ability 
but don’t hit iconic.’414 Another reminded that ‘iconic does not necessarily equal glorious. 
Nor…does it necessarily equate to strategic importance.’415 That these are the some of 
the conclusions drawn from that war is astonishing. Activity was remembered as the 
most significant ‘for a generation’ but not for the reasons expected. Tactical actions and 
the invasion are sources of pride; events at Camp Bread Basket, Abu Moussa’s death in 
detention and the withdrawal from Basra416 are not. ‘Very few of our iconic events were 
successes in COIN or stabilisation.’ 417  These wars, personally familiar to many 
respondents are recalled without demonstrable pride. 418  The Falklands known only 
through story was more fondly remembered. 
 
Afghanistan. Operations in Afghanistan that ran from 2001 through an intensive period 
of combat and continue in less intense form at the time of writing were dismissed much 
less quickly than those in Iraq, and 
mentioned twice as often (65 times 
against 32). ‘Helmand casts a very long 
shadow. It was the greatest and defining 
event of my career and for my Coy 
Comds, WOs and SNCOs. It is the frame 
of reference for everything we do.’ 419 
Experiences ‘changed the entire way we 
do business in every department’;420 they 
drive behaviours, perceptions of role and 
purpose for those who served there, and 
expectations of those that weren’t or 
since enlisted.421 These are meaningful statements. Afghanistan is how contemporary 
 
412 Ian F.W. Beckett, “British Counter-insurgency: a Historiographical Reflection,” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, 23:4-5, (2012): 787, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2012.709770 781-798. 
413 The historiography of such types, both progressive and reactionary, is well covered by Beatrice Heuser, 
“Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed Between Partisan War and People's War,” Journal 
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highlights that the significant continuity in British Army organisational culture. Charles Kirke, Red Coat, 
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soldiers understand their purpose. The application of ‘iconic’ to Afghanistan and its 
denial for Iraq shows the two campaigns are very differently remembered and discussed. 
Soldiers (Fig. 4.9)422 in Afghanistan were differently oriented to those who deployed to 
Iraq: there are evident differences in the quality of clothing, equipment and weaponry but 
also in the activities undertaken and the relative freedoms enjoyed. The recognition of 
the efforts of those who served there, accessible through YouTube videos where soldiers 
could be seen, by fellow soldiers not deployed and the national at large, in battle, 
engaged in activity that qualitied as ‘real soldiering’ allows Afghanistan a place alongside 
the Falklands War. 
While historic actions and campaigns (i.e. Waterloo etc) are a cultural 
bedrock of our Regtl [regimental] system, they are in many ways an 
unconscious and irrelevant part of the lived experience in the Army. 
Therefore, I am not certain they are the most iconic. Rather, the most iconic 
are the more recent actions, namely Afghanistan.423 
A consequence perhaps of the ‘tyranny of the present’,424 declarations of iconic were 
recognised as ‘based on a short memory and some diverse and news attracting 
actions’.425 One CO acknowledged the fact that he was naming events relevant ‘to me’, 
others have meaning ‘to the older public,’ and young people might prefer something 
different again. 426  The Falklands is iconic ‘for a certain generation of public’ and 
‘Iraq/Afghanistan (again for a certain generation)’.427 
 
Journals. Kevin Linch says that British military history develops from narrative accounts 
of campaigns like those shared during my research, from biographies (of generals 
mostly) and from regimental histories.428 A search of the journals of the Royal Irish 
Regiment (‘Blackthorn’) revealed actions celebrated and stories told at regimental level. 
The citations published there are also judged as valorous by the army and so give insight 
into wider organisational culture. Over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
soldiers of the Royal Irish have been publicly recognised for their endeavours on 11 
separate occasions. These comprise one Distinguished Service Order (DSO) and 3 
Conspicuous Gallantry Crosses (CGC) – defined as level two awards – and 7 Military 
Crosses (MC) which are level three awards.429 
 
 
422 Image taken in 2012 (attributed to Cpl Mike O'Neill RLC LBIPP/MOD and licensed under the Open 
Government Licence, image cropped by this author, accessed at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ 
File:Soldiers_Patrolling_in_Afghanistan_MOD_45154539.jpg. on 02 Feb 20. 
423 CO02. 
424 Paul Barnes, “Neophilia, Presentism, and their Deleterious Consequences for Western Military 





428 Linch, Wellington’s Army  4. 
429 The Victoria Cross, the highest state honour for bravery, is a level one award. 
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The award citations detail acts of derring-do, demonstrations of courage and bravery in 
keeping with traditional perceptions. One JNCO ‘charged the enemy firing from the 
hip’;430 another ‘rallied his force, directing and leading a series of frontal and flanking 
assaults over a period of 6 hours’;431 a sergeant ‘with bayonet fixed, then stormed across 
the open field towards the main enemy positions’;432 and a captain ‘led the manoeuvre 
through constant small arms fire out of the exposed ground to the relative safety of a 
nearby compound.’433 There is equal recognition of acts of selflessness where soldiers 
put others, and in particular the civilian population first. A soldier is honoured for ‘gallant 
and inspirational leadership’; his efforts to recover four casualties from the battlefield are 
highlighted.434 Another for hitching a bogged vehicle at great personal risk to rescue 
colleagues from an ambush.435  
 
The captain was recognised for ‘distinguished command, leadership and tactical skill’ in 
his efforts to ensure that only the enemy were killed in clashes and for his compassion. 
The [ANA]436 were beating and kicking a Taliban prisoner…Only Rainey’s 
arrival and intervention defused the situation…Rainey ignoring an enemy 
bullet an inch from his face, extracted the pinned down cover group whilst 
instructing [his soldiers] to apply splints and dressings to the brutalised 
prisoner…once safely back at the Patrol Base, Rainey’s first concern was 
for the welfare of the prisoner.437 
The bayonet charging sergeant is recommended for aggression and warrior example but 
also for his choice of weapon: ‘McConnell’s decision to assault quickly rather than apply 
indirect fire had prevented collateral damage and saved many civilian lives.’438 His use 
of the bayonet over an alternative like artillery or mortar fire is applauded for its more 
clinical effect. Lance Corporal Coult was recognised for placing his vehicle alongside 
another during an ambush, for bringing ‘proportional, justified and accurate fire’ and for 
his judgement, bravery and restraint. 439  A private soldier demonstrated leadership 
beyond his rank and a ‘clear grasp of the key principle of counterinsurgency. By checking 
for civilian casualties he engendered a level of empathy with the local population that no 
amount of fighting could establish.’440 
 
The citations illustrate the nature of heroism that is recognised in the British Army. The 
hero is not only killing – though that is documented and admired – but is also helping 
 
430 Corporal Stevens CGC citation, Blackthorn 2009, 87. 
431 Corporal McClurg CGC citation, Blackthorn 2009, 86. 
432 Sergeant McConnell MC citation, Blackthorn 2009, 89.  
433 Captain Rainey MC citation, Blackthorn 2009, 88. 
434 Lance Corporal Toge CGC citation, Blackthorn 2009, 88. 
435 Captain Beattie MC citation, Blackthorn 2005-2007, 22 
436 Afghan National Army. 
437 Rainey citation, 88. 
438 McConnell citation, 89. 
439 Lance Corporal Coult MC citation, Blackthorn 2005-2007, 22. 
440 Ranger Owens MC citation, Blackthorn 2009, 90. 
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friends, allies and even the enemy. It is what the soldier does within the collective and in 
relation to his or her fellow human beings that matters as much as any individual action 
in despatching the enemy. This widens the concept of bravery. Soldiers are awarded for 
risk to themselves when providing protection as well as when they take action to defeat 
an adversary. This creates a fundamental question regarding the purpose of homo 
furens and promotes defensive posturing to equal status as offensive action – ‘we do a 
lot of things that aren’t warriorlike’.441 There are no mentions of warriorship in these 
citations, nor are any of the soldiers termed warriors. In war British soldiers are not 




Culture is validated by myth, narrative and legend; it comprises the stories grounded in 
events and the actions of people both actual and reported. These give meaning. It is 
explanatory and provides a guide (exaggeration and idealisation are permitted) with 
functional value, that inspires and transforms: it defines one’s immediate world and the 
afterlife. Myth matters for providing insight and explanation. For soldiers it can be a ‘cure 
for horror.’ Through learning, experience and imitation, cultural reference is built; social 
action, reputation and inspiration are had; and a foundation to collective consciousness 
both positive and negative is established, promoting emulation but also allowing 
deception, silencing and masking the truth. 
 
British strategic culture is an eclectic mix of influences: dependent on personalities, 
critical junctures, investment dilemmas and political judgements, subject to electoral 
cycles and public opinion. It is less non-existent and more oft changing and necessarily 
dynamic. Some themes can be identified. It is the consequence of a whole of government 
dynamic with political leaders the critical element (not history, tradition or stereotype). 
The army plays a part as a political tool for national interest and protection: it has no 
natural predators and is under minimal enduring threat less that which emanates from 
its own political masters. A vital part of the national fabric, the tendency toward ‘post-
martialism’ means the army must continually defend its position and prove utility beyond 
warfighting. Neither the concept of warriorship nor the term warrior appear in the myths 
advanced, stories told or ‘shared meaning’ that comprises Britain’s strategic culture. 
 
There is no singular British Army culture. The ‘sheer number of scenarios’ that the army 
might face precludes ‘any simple, narrow definition of purpose and aim’. 442  The 
 
441 FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 05:50. 
442 Fox, Learning to Fight, 31. 
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organisation is a ‘flexible, stimulating’ (and stimulated) social system,443 a collection of 
regiments444 rather than a true collective, and a tribal patchwork where tartan is at least 
as strong as regulations. 445  The regimental system, a source of both strength and 
weakness,446 is hugely important but the organisational wrap that the army provides 
cannot be dismissed as administrative only. It is more than this: it gives ‘structures of 
meaning’447 to the ‘named and classified world’448 of regiments. 
For an institution which has existed for nearly 340 years, there have been 
many different armies in fact and self-conception. In defining or describing 
the present-day characteristic spirit of the regular Army, it is necessary to 
draw out those characteristics that still persist from previous ages, even if 
only as trace elements.449 
The trace elements are of an army of regular forces and reserves; militia and 
professionals; ‘heavy’ armoured formations and light role units; line infantry and Special 
Forces. It is an army that is required to serve overseas and at home; in Europe in 
defensive positions and in Northern Ireland suppressing terrorism – manning machine 
guns or wielding batons. Comprising ‘enablers’ and ‘bayonets’450 it is charged with nation-
building and state defeat; it can be brutal and sensitive; it kills and protects. The British 
Army exists in multiple dimensions; it has layers and its many guises and component 
parts co-exist and are complementary but they can also be in opposition to each other. 
Of concern it lacks a philosophical basis and possibly even on occasion, purpose.  
 
The British Army’s most dearly-held qualities: 
tend to be those exhibited in its mythology (often represented as pictures 
hanging in regimental messes) and in its most dearly held triumphs, notably 
those against overwhelming odds, where the day was saved by a 
combination of physical courage, unquestioning discipline, sang-froid and 
firepower.451 
The army revels in ‘tough soldiering’ against an enemy that plays by similar rules. Fair 
competition is the yardstick but victory can be incidental, and a ‘draw’ even defeat is 
agreeable. The most popularly quoted events or actions by respondents reveal an army 
that fights against the odds with pluck, grit and tenacity. Performing a constabulary 
function is satisfactory and demonstrates the inherent flexibility of the British soldier and 
broad utility of the army. Chivalric pageantry is unfamiliar; wars of British unification and 
the milestones in the ‘establishment and running of the Empire’452 gain little mention.  
 
443 Kirke, Red Coat, Green Machine, 209. 
444 Mileham, “Ethos,” 228. 
445 Holmes, Tommy, 91. 
446 Carver, Seven Ages, xi. Holmes, Tommy, 91 
447 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, 12. 
448 Stets & Burke, "Identity Theory," 225. 
449 Mileham, “Ethos,” 228. 
450 This distinction was made by the senior non-commissioned rank in the Army. ‘Whether they are 
bayonet or an enabler, soldiers are trained to fight and win,’ @ArmySgtMajor, 05 Jul 2018. 




The regimental system, a ‘quasi-religious’ 453  construct is vitally important and the 
attraction of small scale Company level activity (though it constrains thinking to the 
tactical level)454 was evident in responses where soldiers detailed what matters. Stories 
‘help convey meaning to groups larger than 150’455 but it is stories about groups of less 
than 150 456  (the size of a company) that stick. The contemporary British soldier is 
prepared to tells stories about failure, poor behaviour and instances of excess as iconic, 
as well as the events that resulted in victory. Bravery is understood beyond the traditional 




453 Burke, Army of Tribes, 39. 
454 Kiszely, “Approaches,” 191. 
455 “Spinning a Dit.” 
456 This is ‘Dunbar’s Number’ that determines the number of relationships various species can maintain. 
Robin Dunbar, "Neocortex Size as a Constraint on Group Size in Primates," Journal of Human Evolution, 
22: 6 (1992): 469–493, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/004724849290081J  
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5. The British Warrior 
 
Are Soldiers Warriors? 
 
In this chapter army statements about warriorship are tested against the primary 
research that uncovers soldiers’ perceptions of the meaning of the term. The role of 
nature and nurture is considered, and respondents are asked if they think the British 
Army trains warriors or if there is something inherent in the individual. First, the words 
that soldiers associated most with warrior are examined. Question 7 asked: How do you 
understand the term ‘warrior’? What does it mean to you? Responses were grouped by 
theme and weighted: the top 10 are highlighted below and expanded at Appendix B. 
 
 
Fig. 5.1: Word Cloud - ‘Warrior’ Themes 
 
A difference in understanding of the words warrior and soldier was apparent. 10 
respondents defined warrior against soldier: ‘not a soldier’. Others thought ‘soldier’, 
offered on 25 occasions, explained warrior and when collated with similar words1 warrior 
as a synonym of soldier gained 64 thematic mentions. More diverse terminology was 
offered where warrior was not thought synonymous with soldier: alternatives, offered 61 
times, ranged from Berserker to ‘primitive creature’. These are captured and shown in 
Fig. 5.1 under the thematic heading of ‘Other’. 
 
1 By way of example: Professional (12); Trained/Training (12); Discipline (7); Soldiering (5); Schooled (1). 
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Soldier was a more desirable even essential term of reference. One soldier explained 
that he needed the identity of ‘soldier’ – a term he associated with professional. By 
omission he did not consider warrior similarly. ‘Soldier’ gave comfort: 
We need, as infantry, or anyone in close combat, you need your identity to 
help you morally with the absolute brutality of some of the things you end 
up doing. When you just red-misted [killed] ten guys in a corn field and you 
say I did that because I was a professional soldier – that’s how you deal 
with that.’2 
Soldier as a term of reference, not warrior, counteracts the spectre of moral injury such 
is its association. Soldier was attractive because soldiers ‘protect and secure and help 
out civilians. We don’t provoke people.’ 3  This resonates with the army’s reading of 
bravery and courage evidenced in the citations mentioned in Chapter 4, and stories 
where the soldier is defending. 
 
Soldier inferred a broader skills base and utility than warrior. It was recognised that the 
Army ‘isn’t always looking to fight’ – whereas warriors were presumed ready and 
focussed on combat. One soldier went so far as to explain that ‘the job [of soldiering] 
doesn’t actually require you to fight’.4 Warrior doesn’t resonate with those who believe 
soldiering involves a much wider skillset than fighting. Where the terms are synonymous 
it is thought so only to satisfy ‘the politics of inclusion’ that describes every soldier as a 
warrior without understanding the depth it entails5 so they feel they are part of the team. 
This is ill-considered: ‘If there were true synonyms, one word would vanish as being 
unnecessary. Each word that is retained represents a unique coordination of actions.’6 
 
Where warriorship was different to soldiering in the qualitative responses to question 7, 
respondents emphasised the dichotomy highlighted by Matthew Kosuta: the warrior is 
individual and personal; the soldier is based on the team, duty, discipline and the 
profession of arms. 7  Recent campaigns recommended examples of warrior culture 
vested in individuals honoured for bravery – not organisationally. 
The warrior culture is epitomised by the Falklands, actions in Helmand and 
Iraq (Budd VC and Beharry VC for example). In other words, the warrior 
icon needs a strong character to reference rather than large-scale actions 
such as Waterloo or Minden which are often a bit more ‘faceless’.8 
Warriorship though is not just a consequence of ‘going to war’. The ‘difference between 
 
2 FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 42:31. 
3 FG11: SNCOs 01 Nov 18, 43:10. 
4 FG12: Officers 02 Nov 18, 14:00. 
5 Riza, “Two-Dimensional Warfare,” 266. 
6 Jay Efran in conversation. Jay S. Efran, Sheila McNamee , Bill Warren & Jonathan D. Raskin, “Personal 
Construct Psychology, Radical Constructivism, and Social Constructionism: A Dialogue,” Journal of 
Constructivist Psychology, 27:1 (2014): 8, https://doi.org/10.1080/10720537.2014.850367. 
7 M. Kosuta, “Warrior and Soldier, What’s the Difference?” Discussion, 19 Jul 2018, at https://networks.h-




being a warrior and being a professional soldier’9 is that warriorship is a lifestyle and a 
whole of life endeavour;10 ‘warrior is hand to hand fighting, knives, riding in on horseback, 
we are just soldiers,’ according to one respondent.11 
 
Any definition of warrior centred solely on endeavour or hardship (Strozzi-Heckler’s 
‘marketable’ variants) that excluded killing and in particular the most intimate of killing, 
was unconvincing to the majority of those surveyed. The reality of war is more than this; 
it ‘is not just hand to hand combat like it was for the Vikings, we train for distance.’12 Here 
the soldier differs from the warrior: ‘someone who is firing from a long distance away who 
never sees the enemy, I wouldn’t say he’s a warrior…there’s a difference between a 
killer, someone who prepared to kill, and a warrior.’ 13  Respondents recognised the 
difference between the ‘emotional logic’ required for close combat and the ‘deliberative, 
rational cognition’ that allows killing at range.14 This view is interesting for the suggestion 
that the warrior has more noble standing and the soldier is more simply ‘a killer.’ The 
Special Forces officer cited in Chapter 3 had this opinion of his drone pilot colleague. It 
counters the view that the soldier is the more virtuous character. A more earthy, colloquial 
definition of what warrior meant came from a focus group: ‘it’s about having the stones 
[sic] to go out and pull that trigger, fix that bayonet and get into the enemy’s face and kill 
him’.15 The warrior though was not always considered external to the army and soldiers 
could still be warriors. Infantry soldiers reserved access: ‘just killing’ and ‘just’ suffering 
hardship did not qualify; not all soldiers qualify but some may be warriors. 
 
One of the COs offered a deliberate, short definition making the terms synonymous. A 
warrior is a soldier ‘who is trained and ready for his or her combat role and serves an 
ideal greater than him or herself’.16 The warrior within a community and as the servant of 
society was therefore thought feasible: the notion that there could be a code was agreed, 
albeit neither point was universally acknowledged, nor was any identifiable code evident. 
Comments on this theme were collated as ‘Service’ and respondents recognised 
sacrifice as an important tenet of warriorship.17 
A warrior is somebody who embraces the possibility of death and 
subordinates it to the unit and the mission. This preparedness to die is what 
confers the moral authority to take life. The sense of equality (and respect) 
with the opponent is a necessary, though not sufficient, pre-requisite to be 
 
9 FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 01:44. 
10 FG12: Officers 02 Nov 18, 02:00. 
11 FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 14:00. 
12 FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 27:58. 
13 Ibid., 29:40. 
14 Payne, Psychology of Modern Conflict, 128-9. 
15 FG5: JNCOs, 29 Nov 18, 09:45. 
16 CO23. 
17 Sacrifice was mentioned 3 times; self-sacrifice (4) and self-sacrifice (1) also figured. ‘Service’ includes 




The definition of a warrior was most apparent with war as a competition,19 with the right 
to engage ‘granted mutually’ and involving reciprocity.20 A singular focus on overcoming 
an adversary; 21  willingness to fight; 22  a determination to win, ruthlessness and the 
relentless pursuit of professional excellence were all mentioned. Warriors have an 
appetite to be tested and put their skills to use23 and so the notion of service performed 
stoically, or perfunctorily, on behalf of others fades. ‘A warrior is unrelenting in his (or 
her) pursuit of excellence. He strives to be the best fighter to ensure he never enters a 
battle that he cannot win’;24 she is ‘professional, dedicated, utterly committed, with a 
relentless pursuit of the goal to win…never give up, never surrender, work hard and do 
your best, in order to win in war.’25 Warriorship then is the pinnacle and exemplar of 
martial prowess: ‘a warrior should be excellent at everything – ceaseless pursuit of 
excellence’.26 Service, associated with warriorship, was a side benefit or afterthought. 
 
For all the mention of competition respondents didn’t actually relish the possibility for 
defeat and maybe even death that equal combat offered – nobility and honour is 
important, but negotiable, and certainly subordinate to winning. One officer thought 
‘warriorship as a net positive term’ and ‘aspirational’27 but didn’t place adherence to any 
warrior code above military success. ‘I’m not a believer in a fair fight’ he said, ‘I’m about 
being devious – within the rules of the game’.28 This is an alternative view to the recalled 
myth and the stories found iconic where valiant defeat was more inspirational than 
victory. The idea of ‘kicking a man when he’s down’ runs counter to the British Army’s 
ethos29 but there is also a point where stories and aspiration or how one would wish to 
see oneself, and reality meet. Stories are absorbed and enjoyed away from combat: 
fighting is more personal and in the combat arena instinct is pervasive. Where 
contemporary British soldiers appreciate the title warrior it is toward success: as fighters 
they wear it easily but don’t admire it for chivalric notions or as willing losers who see as 




19 This is defensible but is at odds with a reading of stipulated British doctrine: ‘there is little if anything in 
British military practice which suggests that combat is adversarial’ with preference given to low-level skills 
and drills (the very thing the professional soldier must master but that tends to miss the point; the drills are 
to improve performance when fighting). Storr, The Human Face of War, 37. 






26 FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 13:15. 
27 GS4, 18 Mar 19, 10:48. 
28 Ibid. 29:41. 
29 Kiszely, “Approaches,” 196. 
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Soldiering was also defined in direct opposition to warriorship: the warrior not the soldier 
is the automaton and it is the warrior who is defined as T1: 
…the Zulu who marches unthinkingly onto British guns at Rorke’s 
Drift…British soldiers at the Somme who were not allowed to be soldiers 
because their commanders didn’t think they could be soldiers…soldier to 
me is the man in the Falklands who in the dark of the night even without a 
commander cracks on and does what’s necessary but can also differentiate 
when to fight and when not’30 
The soldier is that individual who performs in war according to initiative, guile and with 
agility of thought. Knowing when to fight allowed another to privilege soldiering over 
warriorship: ‘I think switching on and off is outside the definition of warrior – that’s sounds 
more like soldier,’31 or the stoic soldier-warrior in my model in Chapter 3. Warriorship was 
queried for relevance by one respondent: ‘if I die it is an honour is the warrior’s 
mantra…warriors believe that organised violent combat makes us better people.’32 He 
was not in agreement with this guiding principle. Another emphasised the emotional and 
responsive, maybe unthinking and uneducated aspect of warriorship: ‘soldier has the 
professional element to it that warrior doesn’t necessarily have; the warrior doesn’t have 
to buy into the conceptual side of it’.33 One respondent was bemused at the thrust of the 
discussion: ‘I think people in the Corps will be looking at this’34 he said in solidarity with 
fellow soldiers. He inferred their uncompromised standing as soldiers provided them 
greater confidence and comfort in that identity. Later the same group of infantry 
discussed their affording themselves unnecessary and even unwarranted distinction: 
I spoke to guys in the RLC35 and in the Corps’ and they don’t get caught up 
in this like we do about being called Spartans,36 or warriors, or an operator 
or being ally,37 and the tie that goes with it…they just say they are drivers 
and don’t seem to need to stand on the pedestal. In the infantry we always 
want to be better than others.38 
 
That the Army had to be a broad church was highlighted. Recruiting only those of a 
warrior disposition compromised the ability of the Army to think and act more broadly. ‘If 
you emphasise the warrior ethos too much you limit the recruits you attract’ 39  and 
 
30 FG1: RHQ, 14 Nov 18, 20:50. 
31 FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 22:07. 
32 FG12: Officers 02 Nov 18, 04:00. 
33 Ibid., 20:40. 
34 FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 05:00. 
35 Royal Logistics Corps. 
36 The attraction of being known as Spartans is prevalent in the US as well but there too in keeping with 
the sentiments expressed here it is neither universally appreciated. Gabriel Russell, “The Spartans Were 
Morons.” 18 Jan 2018, accessed at https://www.lawenforcementtoday.com/spartans-morons/. The Senior 
Enlisted Advisor to the UK Chief of Defence Staff, quoting Euripides, invoked the image of the Spartans for 
inspiration after the first female officer passed ‘P Company’ in 2020. “The daughters of Sparta are never at 
home. They mingle with the young men in wrestling matches,” @SEAC_Defence, 19 Feb 2020. 
37 ‘Ally’ is a colloquialism for the wearing of non-issue clothing but more widely refers to anything desirable 
or stylish in appearance or behaviour. Dominic Adler, “A Punk History Of Military Cool, or the Pursuit of 
Ally-ness,” at http://www.craigrobertdouglas.co.uk/punk-history-military-ally-ness/ on 17 Nov 2018. 
38 FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 40:55. 
39 FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 30:17. 
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therefore the broader skills needed for utility across the spectrum of operations. 
Inattention to warriorship was even considered acceptable: ‘good soldiers’ didn’t need to 
be warriors. ‘Some of my soldiers are utterly professional and they hold that in high 
regard but they are not necessarily warriors.’40 Soldiering involves its own a code of 
conduct – ‘our values and standards’ and this provides ethical foundation, core purpose 
and esprit de corps.41 The danger of emulating warriors, in particular those of antiquity 
was highlighted: warriorship was ‘associated with aggression, fighting, killing and losing 
and pillaging and raping your way through your vanquished enemy…we don’t do that 
latter part anymore…’42 That the warrior could bound conduct and prevent animalistic 
behaviour was questioned.43 
 
Magee collates the traits of warriors (reproduced below) through history and suggests 
that ‘warrior codes’ are similar to the values and standards of modern day soldiers.44 
 
 Primitive Greek Roman Viking Knights US Army 
Service  X X X X X 
Skill at Arms X X X X X X 
Physically Fit X X X X X X 
Honesty   X X X X 
Moral Courage   X X X X 
Disciplined X X X X X X 
Loyalty X X X X X X 
Kill X X X X X X 
Physical Courage X X X X X X 
Protect the weak X   X X  
Fig. 5.2: Magee’s Warrior Traits 
 
Aligning Knights with Vikings would surprise the majority of those surveyed for this thesis. 
The knight would be familiar for chivalry and may resonate: they wouldn’t associate with 
the Viking. What Magee exposes is how difficult it is to ascertain what is actually meant 
by warrior where the title is applied to all homo furens: his examples actually have little 
in common beyond the basic endeavour of fighting. 
 
Soldiers Are Not Warriors 
 
Question 6 asked if all soldiers are warriors. Clear lines were drawn: ‘not all soldiers, 
foreign nations for example.’45 Only 4% of respondents thought that all soldiers qualified 
 
40 FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 09:20. 
41 FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 13:12. 
42 FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 14:40. 
43 FG5: JNCOs 29 Nov 18, 02:00. A veteran of the Falklands War used the same phrase but explained it 
as a predatory instinct: ‘if he did not kill, he would die.’ Parr, Our Boys, 168. FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 16:40. 
44 Magee, “The Way of the Warrior,” 36. 
45 FG11: SNCOs 01 Nov 18, 04:48. 
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(see Fig. 5.3 below). 
 
 
Fig. 5.3: ‘All Soldiers Are Warriors’ 
 
It was suggested that UK stated martial values were important: ‘I use words like self-
sacrifice, courageous…its more than just that rough fighting, deal with the enemy, type 
person, its more subtle, it goes back to the standards and values of the British Army – 
that has to be at the centre of it.’46 Explaining warrior as a term that can be taken only by 
those that adhere to British values dismisses ‘others’, peripheral out-groups. That this 
benchmark would deny it to the Berserker for example wasn’t thought odd. That warrior 
is accepted against UK cultural and organisational criteria is an attempt to make the term 
exclusive and maybe seize it rather than better define it. In this first glimpse of British 
infantry soldiers defining the term warrior, they covet it less it is allocated to others. 
 
British soldiers as a community fared little better. When asked specifically if they were 
warriors, agreement that soldier and warrior were interchangeable if V&S were adhered 
to, tended to dissipate: the importance of the British code as a qualifier reduced in 
importance. A considerable majority of COs (c87%), shown in Fig. 5.4, disagreed or 
strongly disagreed that all British soldiers are warriors; soldiers consulted at focus groups 
had a similar opinion with 86% against extending the title nationally. A senior officer 
interviewee stated his reservation. 
Warrior in my view has been a term that has been expanded in terms of its 
use, more broadly than the term requires; people comfortably substitute 
 






























































soldier and warrior but I don’t think the two terms are necessarily 
substitutable one for the other.47 
 
Fig. 5.4: ‘All British Soldiers Are Warriors’ 
 
The minority who agreed the terms were synonymous applied caveats: achieving the 
mission qualified those who did so as warriors;48 training for war but ‘maybe not fighting’ 
allowed the accolade.49 Meeting ‘standards’50 (though these were not determined) would 
qualify according to one soldier. That basic training, undertaken by all soldiers regardless 
of trade, was adequate for entry was defended on one occasion. ‘Our Army basic 
training, infantry training, makes us warriors – even the professionally technical.’51 For 
most respondents though the terms were not synonymous and warriorship was reserved. 
Almost everyone expressed an opinion demonstrating certainty of belief in answering 
this question but not consistency when the answers were cross checked against 
qualitative statements. Those disqualified as warriors were easily identified; determining 
those who should be called warrior was much more difficult. 
 
Warriorship was open to soldiers but qualifiers apply.  
Warrior and soldier are not synonymous. I think that warrior is an 
expression of a specific and discrete output within the Army – I think its 
narrowly defined by those that engage in close combat. Not exclusively, but 
I don’t think [soldiers of a named Corps] would define themselves as being 
 
47 GS3, 12 Feb 19, 03:52. 
48 FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 05:50. 
49 FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 12:27. 
50 FG5: JNCOs 29 Nov 18, 04:07. 






























































warriors, they would call themselves soldier, they enable. There’s 
something about the fact we call them Enablers. I don’t think the two terms 
are interchangeable. I think by dint of their output some soldiers 
demonstrate warrior characteristics and draw some strength from the idea 
of warrior.52 
Another thought that the term warrior could be read in a number different ways and he 
recommended a ‘sliding scale’ of warriorship be applied. ‘There are different types of 
warrior; you don’t have to be a warrior to be a soldier, but it helps’.53 In terming warriorship 
a ‘discrete output’ warriors are then a discrete element of the army  
 
For some soldiers, ‘it’s difficult to be a warrior; they have other jobs.’54 Furthermore, 
warriorship is not essential for victory: ‘not all armies were bred as warriors’.55 Good 
armies comprising good soldiers could be successful but warriorship offered the soldier 
an advantage, and ‘a vision of what one can be’:56 it should be ‘part of the soldiers toolbox 
and soldiers must have to capacity to know whether or not to use it’.57 Warriorship is an 
‘aspiration, the standard to achieve’ though ‘not every soldier can get on that journey’.58 
To do so the soldier needs a different philosophy.59 ‘There’s no gulf between soldier and 
warrior, one encapsulates the other’ 60  but the soldier must choose to ‘be warrior’ 
according to a major – the qualifier is a sense of choice, and state of mind is important: 
‘Not all soldiers are ready to go at the drop of a hat regardless of training’.61  
 
Warriorship involves ‘spiritual intellectual engagement with soldiering; and that is what 
affords substance to any definition of warrior.’62 This officer elaborated: ‘some people 
emotionally connect with soldiering – maybe that’s what it is.’ The idea that a combination 
of ‘physical, mental and spiritual work’ that together ‘make the warrior different from the 
professional soldier where physical and mental are the focus’ convinced others too. 
Which of these aspects of differentiates the warrior is unclear but the idea of separation 
resonates and may help in understanding different types: 
The warrior ethos for the 21st Century warrior comprises of two separate 
but related parts the physical and mental aspects. Physically, the warrior 
must possess the skill at arms to carry out his duties to protect society. He 
must be physically fit to operate for extended periods and overcome the 
stress and strain of the modern battle space. Mentally, the warrior must 
possess the ability to kill.63 
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Magee suggests by omission that the spiritual aspect is not necessary: those surveyed 
would argue that by ignoring that aspect he is debating soldier types and not discussing 
the warrior. That the British Army ‘doesn’t embrace the spiritual side’64 of soldiering is 
thought an impediment. The mentality of the application of ‘mind, body and soul into the 
application of violence’, that goes beyond soldiering is the victory of nature over nurture.65 
 
A sergeant said soldiers are warriors only if employed on infantry duties ‘You are either 
infantry, or you are infantry support, once trained if they are fit and ready then they 
[soldiers] are classed as warriors’.66 An officer admitted all airborne forces to the caste. 
‘There you require everybody to drive a bayonet and do the business’67 so warrior isn’t 
reserved only for airborne infantry and is available for all qualified for airborne duties.68 
Other soldiers were disregarded. Warrior was therefore reserved for a more reduced and 
‘discrete’ cohort. The ‘valuation of the in-group generally means being anti-social to 
relevant out-groups’.69 That the infantry (or those who are infantry like) are the standard 
bearer for, or inheritors of warriorship in the British Army would be divisive – regardless 
of the infantry’s self-perception or Battlecraft Syllabus declaration. General Staff officers 
with non-infantry backgrounds made a claim on warriorship for the wider martial 
community. ‘I would broaden it out to include others like the Army Air Corps who for most 
of their history and certainly since the arrival of Apache,70 have considered themselves 
combat aviators with very much a warrior ethos’.71 ‘I’d look at the RAC’72 suggested 
another who served his regimental duty there. He pointed to their recruiting adverts that 
were ‘all about blokes going on log runs, wearing cam cream, helmets, physical 
endeavour, Band of Brothers, alpha males, machine guns’73 as evidence that soldiers 
who crew tanks are warriors too. But the word was considered by infantry soldiers against 
a model of concentric circles with the infantry at its heart, fully deserving of the title, with 
other soldiers less so the further one moves away from the centre. 
 
The term could be made less exclusive for more pragmatic reasons: ‘we can’t exclude 
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68 That the infantry are tested to a more strenuous standard, and airborne soldiers more strenuous again, 
makes them distinct, and ‘better’. An army fitness test for infantry soldiers for example demands they 
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physical-employment-standards/. Whether physical fitness this is a valid test of warriorship was disputed. 
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anyone from the term because nobody knows what it really means – who are we [the 
infantry] to decide if you can use it or not?’74 This is insightful not least for its wider 
implications. Where armies wish to generate ‘novel combinations’ and instant formations 
of individuals previously unknown to each other 75  (the process of ‘battlegrouping’ 
explained on page 61) and ‘swift trust’76 is afforded a premium, then inclusion is the prize. 
Armies that introduce exclusivity run the risk that they will have ‘automatically killed 
cohesion.’ 77  This is worse where the exclusivity is introduced through uncertain 
qualification. Enablers, what Huntington called ‘auxiliary vocations,’ 78  were denied 
access to warriorship, and sometimes even fellow ‘bayonets’ were judged unqualified for 
the epithet of warrior by respondents. The notion that all ‘capbadges are soldiers, 
however not all are warriors’79 was oft-stated; ‘to be a warrior you should excel beyond 
‘normal’ soldiering standards’;80 and variations on the view that ‘not all soldiers are 
warriors or need to be warriors’ was frequently offered.81 The club is made more special 
by one officer: ‘I feel the term belongs to a more physical and less technology driven 
profession…I believe a warrior is someone who can use honed skills together with raw, 
controlled aggression to physically overcome their adversary’. 82  Pushing buttons to 
facilitate killing83 is not demonstrative of the skills of the warrior: those skills are ‘fighting 
spirit, fitness, unarmed combat, SAA [skill at arms], etc. etc’;84 the willingness to fight for 
‘self-preservation, protection of the young, and resource competition’85 is warriorship’s 
primordial basis. Warriorship should then depend on more than regimental enlistment. 
 
It is possible to ‘put any man in a uniform and give him an ID card and he’s a soldier, pay 
him as a soldier and he can do the bare minimum, dodge tours, if he wants and still be 
a soldier, won’t be a warrior.’86 Another differentiated warriors from what he termed 
‘salary soldiers’,87 modern day stipendiary troops who replaced the warrior. It was agreed 
that some soldiers, when their duties came close to warriorship, baulk at the prospect: ‘a 
lot of people like the idea of putting on a uniform’ and acting the part but when they are 
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called upon to perform ‘they transfer out of the infantry because they don’t expect the 
actual job role to be what it is’.88 The wearing of a uniform alone doesn’t permit entry to 
warriorhood. Some soldiers ‘want to be warriors until it’s time to do warrior things and 
then they aren’t interested anymore.’89 A colleague agreed: some ‘join the army to do the 
job, go overseas…some join to put it up on social media.’ Instagram soldiers90 he called 
them invoking an image of soldiers with motivation similar to civilians who are drawn to 
martial life and ‘adopt a persona and don the garb (costume) of the period, in all of its 
minute detail.’ They wish to ‘reconnect to a lost heritage or to find acceptance’. 91 
Participants engage with martial life for a period of time on the basis of ‘how they wish it 
to be, not necessarily as it actually is.’92 
 
Once SNCO explained his position anecdotally. He recalled a time when his infantry 
company was protecting resident soldiers, sailors and airmen in the Falkland Islands. 
They have this exercise where the infantry go away and then they turn out 
the garrison and they actually get a go outside; they are out for two days 
and they get withdrawal symptoms from Costa Coffee – two thousand of 
them…they are not warriors, that jumps right out at me.’93 
The OED definition extended the title warrior to soldier, sailor or airman: this respondent 
thinks that over generous. Misunderstanding and misrepresenting relationships in the 
way the OED allows between services and trades, between those who experience 
combat and those who don’t ‘causes friction’ and confuses identity. 94  Focus group 
attendees agreed. Even those who might be thought deserving of the title warrior given 
their proximity to the fight ‘on the frontline like medics don’t necessarily deserve to be 
called warriors…they don’t actually push into the positions [forward positions like enemy 
trenches]…the term shouldn’t be diluted just because you are in the Army.’95 
 
The singular focus of the warrior was commented upon: warriors get ‘in there’, they fight, 
where ‘anything gets in the way’ they charge through it in pursuit of their mission. 
However, their ability to fight a ‘more subtle battle’ under greater constraint’ and offer 
broader utility was questioned.96 ‘We’ve got guys who are warriors, great in combat but 
useless at everything else we need to do, including the preparation for combat’.97 Those 
who admired warriors thought them distinct in their mentality98 compared to soldiers. The 
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argument that ‘not all with combatant status [soldiers] could be fairly judged as 
warriors,’99 and in fact only the very few qualify, was extended one degree further when 
the term warrior was made inapplicable to British soldiers. Warriors, according to some 
of the COs who offered comment are different from soldiers. The warrior is a Berserker: 




Can anyone can be a warrior? This question was asked to draw opinion on the relevance 
of mind-set and free will in creating warriors. If the answer was yes then a conclusion 
might be that culture, training and environment dominates and provides for warriorship; 
if no, then individualistic tendency is paramount. Sir John Kiszely expressed his opinion:  
Certainly, training has a major role to play, but like the more technical 
attributes which qualified them in the first place for selection for their trade 
or speciality, so, I would argue, there must be in our recruits a sufficient, 
basic level of the other necessary attributes which allows them to be 
trainable in the time available.101 
The response was almost 50/50: 47% said anyone could be a warrior; the remainder 
declared not, some stridently.102 The lack of consensus is unsurprising. When we ask 
questions about will and decision, or reason or choice, says Noam Chomsky, human 
science is at a loss and the questions remain in obscurity.103 
 
Some people were thought natural warriors104 and warriorhood a closed community since 
not everyone has the same mind-set; others said the mind-set can be adopted and 
therefore anyone can attain warrior status, ‘if they make the decision’.105 There is a 
complex argument here summed up by CO20. ‘It’s a state of mind, as well as who you 
are and how you act.’106 To one degree the Blank Slate argument applies – the individual 
can be shaped toward warriorship – with environment influencing decision-making and 
action. Alternatively the decision is made sub-consciously beyond the individuals 
awareness or even in opposition to more obvious environmental factors, driven by the 
Ghost in the Machine. More likely this is a consequence of a complex algorithm; a mix 
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of biological and cultural factors, none of these though are barriers that cannot be 
overcome.107  All require attention. The human is equivalent to ‘an organ genetically 
determined then growing to a mature state’ through all interactions and not just learning 
or teaching.108 
 
‘Everyone is born innately different and raised differently.’109 Each of us is a combination 
of many variables: evolutionary roots, mind-set, environmental influence and culture and 
so the origin of warriorship ‘is not binary’.110 Recruiting from civil society and assuming 
as the only truth that those who choose to enlist can be trained as warriors was thought 
risky. ‘A conscript army can never be an army of warriors’111 and so the opportunity for 
anyone and certainly those inclined to be the servant homo furens to claim the title is 
dismissed. That ‘you can coach the instinct but it has to be innate’112 allows T2 greater 
purchase on the title warrior: ‘there is a personality aspect to being a warrior’ but those 
with the personality are the rarity.113 It is thought ‘plausible that a correlation between 
personality traits and military service could be caused by genetic predispositions.’114  
Those with the disposition exist within the tier designated as warrior-soldiers in the 
model. 
 
‘If you are combat arms you have made the warrior choice’115 Free will or some Ghost in 
the Machine, maybe genetic propensity, brought this CO to his regiment, and unit culture 
then took hold, developing further his warrior instinct and desire: 
It takes a particular type of person to want to become a member of the 
‘teeth arms’…However, joining such a unit is not enough to become ‘a 
warrior’…The ethos I felt in the Unit, at that time, was incredibly strong - like 
a religion, everyone worshiped The Regiment and celebrated past actions 
and actors from within its relative [sic] short but proud history. We were 
desperate to emulate our forefathers by having the chance to serve with 
distinction in the face of the enemy….it was regimental ethos and our 
intense comradeship (or ‘love’ in the soldiering sense) for each other and 
the desire to kill the enemy that underpinned our actions. Such a culture 
had to be controlled and took strong leadership.116 
Culture is a driving force here but so too is personality or the character of the individual: 
‘our very identity and sense of self is always defined relative to the norms of some group 
to which we belong or that we aspire to join.’117 The officer quoted above grasped the 
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opportunity to serve with a unit he felt comfortable with. He was drawn to it through 
subconscious desire or genetic tendency, and serendipitously he met his goal for he had 
no way of actually knowing if the regiment he chose would meet his desires and offer 
him what he expected. This is the ‘nature of nurture’ or where nurturing satisfies one’s 
nature. It is what some118 ‘psychologists call sociality, which requires people to construe 
the constructs of others with whom they wish to interact.’ 119  This officer hunted an 
environment where he could realise his self. Where he found it ‘unsatisfying,’ Raskin 
advises that he might then develop new dimensions of meaning, or look elsewhere for 
satisfaction. Such behaviours are evident when soldiers join a regiments then transfer to 
another, or seek challenge elsewhere for example with Special Forces, private security 
companies or as mercenaries – and then not just for financial gain but for self-
actualisation. 
 
Most frequently mentioned when describing the warrior was fighting spirit, warriors as 
fighters and the act of fighting.120 This fits with ‘ontologies of war that emphasise fighting 
as its central feature.’121 Fighting spirit is the ‘body chemistry of military units’ and where 
it changes for the worse it leads to defeat, and so it is critical for homo furens.122 The will 
to fight – ‘the disposition and decision to fight, to act, or to persevere when needed’123 
and fighting spirit, that ‘ringing term that broadly refers to a soldier’s readiness to move 
in on an enemy rather than flee or freeze; and essential for survival in combat’124 is vital 
where one claims to be a warrior. ‘How would I apply warrior? I’d say it’s about fighting 
spirit, it’s what makes men and women fight.’125 It could be argued that fighting and 
combat are the same and should be themed together but separating them better reflects 
the opinions expressed during research. Combat or some variation on that theme126 was 
mentioned 32 times. It was suggested as disciplined activity, ‘purposeful’ violence one 
respondent said. It read as a professional and inclusive pursuit where a cohort of soldiers 
would be involved. Fighting is more physical, and aggressive, a hand-to-hand endeavour 
and visceral activity: this is what respondents associated with warrior. 
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The warrior engages in physical combat or ‘hand-to-hand fighting’. Where this is denied, 
the definition of warfare is altered: 
Warfare by distancing itself totally from the model of hand-to-hand combat, 
becomes something quite different, a “state of violence” of a different kind. 
It degenerates into slaughter or hunting. One no longer fights the enemy; 
one eliminates him, as one shoots rabbits.127 
Here again is the idea that the warrior is the superior of the soldier who is less personally 
committed and more detached from the consequences of martial action. This challenges 
preconceptions and presents warriors in a more favourable light than that of Berserker. 
Looking the enemy in the eye and engaging in equal contest where either participant 
could win was admired by respondents – ‘the two key elements that characterize the 
warrior are his location on the battlefield and his tasks in combat’.128 This negates the 
application of the title to those who kill from distance or whose duties don’t involve 
warfighting.129 This sense appeared in around 50% of questionnaire responses: it was 
equally prevalent in the focus groups. 
 
Homo furens has to be ready and must possess the right attitude for immersion in 
combat: ‘it’s not just ability in hand to hand [fighting] but more so willingness’.130 Mindset 
differentiated those who had fighting spirit from those don’t. 
It’s just something you can tell. A guy has a bit of substance about him or 
he doesn’t; you can tell straight away. His demeanour, the way he walks, 
how he responds when you ask him a question, a self-confidence, pride, 
looking ally.131 
How the prototype is defined ‘is not simply a matter of what one says, it is a matter of 
what one does, how one looks, and even…what one wears.’ 132  The warrior has 
‘something more than everyone else’; 133  the ‘instinct that is initiated in difficult 
circumstances such as when losing’.134 Contrasted with soldier: warriorship demands ‘a 
stubborn, ruthless mindset. A soldier is a title, but that title doesn’t make you a warrior.’135 
This is about mentality, fighting mindset, and mindset more generally.136 A warrior may 
be ‘a soldier or someone engaged in warfare’ but some do not rise to the challenge.137 
As a recent Royal Marines recruiting advert had it: ‘It’s a state of mind. You may already 
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have it.’138 The way ‘in which you approach your mission’139 is pertinent. The weight here 
is on the word ‘may’, and the focus is on ‘you’ the individual not the Marines as an 
organisation. ‘What a Royal Marine does is change what he thinks is possible’. The US 
Army placed similar individual emphasis in 2018: ‘There are those who are compelled to 
act when others don't. Are you one of them?’140  Respondents agreed the personal 
emphasis and extended the notion. ‘It [warriorship] requires someone who has natural 
confidence, has natural leadership skills and has confidence.141 
 
Biochemistry, ‘drugs, bugs, toxins and tools’,142 can influence the fight or flight tendency. 
Without such intervention, warriors ‘if given the option of fight or flight – (s)he will fight’;143 
‘warriors fight, non-warriors take flight’.144 The conundrum is well recognised historically: 
‘between the physical fear of going forward and the moral fear of turning back there is a 
predicament of exceptional awkwardness’.145 Few soldiers have this particular ‘mindset 
and disposition’; few live for the chaos of war and actively look for a fight.146 
All those in the British Army by definition have the will to serve. Most, but 
certainly not all, of those serving are likely to also have the will to confront 
actively a violent opponent – although this does change depending on a 
variety of internal and external factors. Only a small percentage of this last 
group will actively relish this confrontation. To me, a warrior is someone 
who stands on this last motivational rung: they are someone who relishes 
combat. This type of person is probably very rare, and in many societies 
(e.g. British) this is not something a warrior might admit to so they are hard 
to find.147 
The soldiers who devote themselves to war and fight for a cause148 are beyond the Stoic 
who fights under constraint. These are T2 homo furens ‘for whom fight is an instinct, and 
for whom killing is very very straightforward, and easy and clinical, “dogs of war”…’149 
though they will only reluctantly admit it. ‘We’d all sound nuts [if we said we wanted to 
fight, go to war, to kill people]’150 but the type is recognisable and tentatively embraced. 
One officer preferred to focus on accelerant over ignition: ‘a warrior must fight for a cause 
not just for the passion for the fight – someone fighting just for the love of the fight is just 
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a barbarian.’151 Defining oneself in more favourable terms and especially against others 
is a recognised technique. ‘One of the universals of intergroup savagery is that it is 
attributed to the enemy group and denied in the host group.’152 Where the barbarian 
appears and the archetypal warrior disappears is impossible to determine objectively so 
cause is invoked as justification and separation: the Other then can only call upon 
illegitimate explanation. 
 
Major Winters’ differentiation of warriors as killers, a minority community compared to 
the average soldier was echoed in discussion: ‘I’ve probably met fewer than five.’153 This 
CO promotes the thoughts of the ancient Heraclitus154 where one in a hundred men is a 
warrior, and the views of Wigram,155 that influenced the famous Marshall study, that in 
any platoon only 6 ‘gutful’ men (one quarter) exist alongside twelve ‘sheep’ who follow 
and four to six others ‘who have not got what it takes’ to be effective.156 Grossman 
classifies the population as sheep and fighters as dogs, sheep dogs, wolves and wild 
dogs.157 These correspond roughly to the four variants outlined earlier in the model at 
Fig. 3.3. That warriors are ‘not as common as you might think’158 and stand separate from 
soldiers is a reasonable judgement. Swank and Marchand’s assessment of 2%159 is 
defensible as a measure for this rare breed, most noticeable where the highest standard 
of fighting effectiveness is required.160 What is uncertain from the research is whether 
these are the most noble of homo furens or the most dangerous. My sense is that 
respondents when discussing the most noble were considering the soldier-warrior or 




Homo furens as a naturally occurring phenomenon is more often rejected than agreed. 
‘Soldiers, like most professionals, are made more than born. To assume otherwise leads, 
at best, to wasted effort and unnecessary discrimination, and, at worst retarded combat 
performance and increased illegal violence.’ 161  Respondents would agree where 
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soldiering is concerned yet only a slim majority of COs (51%) thought the British Army 
trained or nurtured warriors. Those who attended the focus groups were more sceptical: 
just 42% agreed or strongly agreed.  
 
 
Fig. 5.5: ‘The British Army Trains Warriors’ 
 
What is striking is less the comparison across cohorts and more that those surveyed 
were so evenly split (see Fig. 5.5). About half think the British Army trains Warriors; about 
half think not. This matched almost exactly the proportions who either agreed or didn’t 
that anyone can be a warrior (asked at question 12). Where soldiers are so uncertain on 
both counts doubt must be cast on any claim that the Army produces warriors. It 
suggests, at least as far as this sample is concerned that the onus is then on those joining 
to ‘be’ warriors already where they are to achieve the warrior standard. The nurturing 
process begun in basic training that teaches soldiering relies on innate ability in the 
recruit to reach a ‘higher’ standard of warriorship. 
 
Eleven COs thought experience important where one is to wear the mantle of warrior. 
Soldiers who had been to war and partaken of the unifying experience that is combat 
were afforded qualification that couldn’t be had through training alone. ‘Anyone who 
actively takes part in conflict or war is a warrior by definition’.162 Others expressed similar 
sentiments. ‘A warrior to me is an experienced soldier, someone who has done his 
tours.163 From that comes entitlement to call oneself a warrior – and be seen as such by 
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others. ‘Battlefield experience conveys a certain weight to the voices of those who have 
fought there.’164 Experience of war,165 experience of fighting,166 and volunteering for the 
worst task167 in combat are ways the soldier can earn his warrior spurs – and build 
reputation.168 To be a warrior is to be combat-hardened and ‘tested’. When laid bare 
warriorship is ‘beating someone else through violence’169 and the award of the title then 
is a consequence of involvement in that act – not just ‘going to war’ or involvement in 
war as the OED would had it but ‘an issue of physical contact’.170 Through personal 
participation in close combat the soldier lays claim – ‘otherwise you dilute the term’.171 
Anyone can be trained as a soldier but ‘to be a warrior you need to be in a fixed bayonet 
situation, combat environment’.172 Operations are ‘disturbances’ to routine soldiering: 
‘when disturbances change the situation such that individuals perceive situated self-
meanings and expectations of themselves as different from their identity standard, they 
act to counteract the disturbance.’173 The soldiers surveyed instead suggest homo furens 
acts to embrace the opportunity to seize the new identity of warrior. 
 
An officer asked rhetorically ‘whether or not simply being trained makes you count as a 
warrior or having been tested in combat makes you a warrior’?174 Another stated that to 
be a warrior the individual must be operationally proven. The qualifying environment as 
well as skills is what counts: ‘the warrior needs an arena in which to be vulnerable.’175 
Those who haven’t had the experience of war are thought for this fact to have limited 
entitlement. No matter how they wish it or even if the title is conferred upon them ‘there’s 
going to be people sitting in the infantry not feeling like warriors because they haven’t 
been anywhere; no medals on your chest makes it difficult to feel like a warrior.’176  
Those who join hoping for ‘baptism by fire’ but who never experience war 
feel side-lined in their hero’s journey. Left to bear witness to glory but 
denied the opportunity to partake, is a population of veterans who served 
during a period of conflict but never in conflict…they are left with the 
fantasy, but not the reality, of war.177 
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168 The number of badges, medals and the possession of a combat patch ‘signifying deployment to a 
combat zone’ is significant in terms of the judgement of others. Monica Biernat et al, "All That You Can Be: 
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(1998): 305-6,https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.2.301 
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The inexperienced are not warriors ‘because they haven’t done a tour’178 and they won’t 
be warriors until they are ‘tested, blooded’.179 Any allusion otherwise is an empty award 
and even those who deployed on operations suffer self-doubt. One soldier explained that 
he wouldn’t class himself as a warrior as his recent deployment to Afghanistan wouldn’t 
qualify as ‘warfighting’.180 The nature of time and place are important and the warrior 
must have been situated appropriately to fully deserve the epithet. Warfare is a 
‘geographically defined object’ and it is only there that ‘the special laws of war apply’ so 
‘beyond that place one has no right to behave as a warrior.’181 Warriorship in this context 
then is something that is turned on and off as the warrior enters and exits the arena.  
The “hero’s journey” as a ‘departure, initiation, and return sequence is 
made manifest as an individual undertakes a journey or a rite of passage, 
experiences a defining moment rooted in crisis, emerges victorious, and 
then returns home positively transformed by the adventure.182 
That a warrior may claim to be so only where he has faced combat in that arena explains 
the ethicists concern regarding the return of homo furens from that place. 
 
Training has a role in warriorship. It doesn’t turn out finished ‘blooded’ warriors (‘it’s one 
thing doing a course, another executing the job’)183 and exposure to conflict retained its 
importance with close combat as the critical qualifier184 but ‘combatives’185 training or 
sport like boxing for example that involved laying hands upon another person were 
thought proxy activities. There was frustration that the avenues for exposing soldiers to 
close combat situations in training were not more readily available. ‘I was shocked by the 
lack of martial arts in the army – this is essential for fighting spirit’186 said one officer. ‘The 
reason we don’t do hand-to-hand, boxing, fighting’ – the main activities offered as warrior 
pursuits – said one sergeant, is that ‘as an Army we are too nice, you want someone 
who can handle themselves in a bar fight and as an Army we have lost that’.187 It was felt 
that policy constraint privileged risk over reward: organisationally the army was ‘not 
willing to take the G1 188  on the chin’. 189  A corporal appreciated and recommended 
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185 Matt Larsen, “Turning Soldiers into Warriors,” interview, The Modern War Institute, Sep 2018, 
http://modernwarinstitute.libsyn.com/ep-59-turning-soldiers-into-warriors-with-matt-larsen; ‘Chris’, “Why the 
British Army Needs a Combatives System,” The Wavell Room, 09 Feb 2018, at https://wavellroom.com/ 
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188 Code for administrative and personnel issues – G1 is used colloquially for disciplinary procedure which 
this contributor suggested might better be embraced as something of an occupational hazard. Soldiers will 
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189 FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 18:10. 
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‘milling’, a test that paratroopers undergo in basic training190 that brings out ‘the sort of 
aggression that one sees in animals fighting’:191 ‘milling is about going forward and that’s 
key to being a paratrooper, you can see the warrior.’192 This opinion, from a paratrooper 
is unsurprising but others similarly recommended Parachute Regiment training as a 
useful test for warriorship.193 
There’s a lot that’s wrong with the Parachute Regiment but one thing they 
do have is a really strong ethos; they know who they are and if you were to 
label them warriors due to their ethos and the individuals they have you 
wouldn’t be far wrong.194 
That comment, an uncommon admission of admiration from a soldier of another 
regiment, was made grudgingly: it is no less illuminating for that. 
 
‘Today’s generation of soldiers is different from that in the past but then there’s never 
been two generations that are the same’ is a truism:195 it is however also common for 
every generation to think they had it ‘harder’ than those who follow. So it is for serving 
soldiers – and in particular the more experienced – with regard to those now enlisting. In 
the view of some respondents a tougher syllabus of training required introduction and 
defending, where recruits were to be warriors. The ‘changed times’ narrative suggests 
less capable recruits;196 altered societal behaviour and demands, and less challenging 
training has led to reduced army potency and a sense that warriorship has been pushed 
beyond the reach of British soldiers. The view is heard in allied armies as well: 
What leaders have observed in general is they believe that there is too 
much of a sense of entitlement, questioning of lawful orders, not listening 
to instruction, too much of a buddy mentality with NCOs and officers and a 
lot of tardiness being late to formation and duties.197 
Combat operations is a gateway but ‘hard’ training and imposed discipline allows the 
development of ‘raw aggression’198 important for fighting spirit. Notwithstanding the fact 
 
190 See Parr, Our Boys, 69-70. 
191 Payne, Psychology of Modern Conflict, 124. 
192 FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 15:50. A recent twitter exchange about army boxing 
prompted a retired Parachute Regiment officer to express an alternative view. ‘Repeated blows to the head 
cause brain damage. Fact. Care for soldiers’ welfare is our greatest duty of care. In light of all recent 
medical studies on CTE [Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy – a neurodegenerative disease caused by 
repeated head injuries], etc, why do we continue to expose them to this risk?’ @majfox 12 Dec 2019. 
193 For a sense of what is involved in paratrooper training see You Tube video at youtu.be/P89X8tqtFNI. 
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196 The attitude of those already in a unit to those joining as newly trained recruits or as reinforcements is 
explored by Andrew Brown. His analysis – that new soldiers are never as poor as those receiving them 
would have it and in particular that ‘no commanding officer ever admits that the reinforcements his unit 
receives have been properly trained’ – appears broadly applicable to both circumstances. Andrew Brown, 
"New Men in the Line An Assessment of Reinforcements to the 48th Highlanders in Italy, January-October 
1944," Canadian Military History, 21:3 (Summer 2012): 35-47, https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss3/4/. 
197 Maj. Gen. Malcolm Frost, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Center of Initial Military Training 
quoted in Matthew Cox, “Low Recruit Discipline Prompts Army to Redesign Basic Training,” Military.Com, 
at https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/02/09/low-discipline-new-soldiers-prompts-army-redesign-
basic-training.html 
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that those who went before will charge that basic training is less challenging than ‘in their 
day’ there was a sense that the training undertaken now is less warriorlike or demanding 
than it might be: ‘Phase One [basic training] is not a test anymore, recruits aren’t back 
termed199 anymore…the idea is you are continuously training so there’s no fails…[it] is a 
standardless regime…only paras and marines fail people now.’200  
 
Those who attended the focus groups have intimate and immediate interaction with 
newly trained soldiers: they were unsatisfied that warriors were being produced. 
However, COs thought training adequate for warriorship. ‘Modern training methods’: 
will deliver the skills and enough of an attitude, an approach, to make 
anyone a warrior. It can be trained rather than born. Some are inherently 
better at being a warrior, but I believe everybody can get some of it with 
training, and approach, to a level that historically, would place them among 
‘elite’ warrior units.201 
The process undertaken by the British Army as far as this CO is concerned enables 
recruits to achieve the status of warrior – and even elite warrior status so convinced is 
he by the training regime. The difficulty is that we cannot be sure what he means when 
he thinks of the warrior or the standard he is thinking of. A more junior officer recently 
published his thoughts that the establishment of good ‘combat behaviours’ (that allow 
combatants to control themselves and excel in combat) relied on instructor competence, 
realistic training and a robust program.202 This seems applicable to most homo furens 
and all soldiers but not necessarily specific to those positioning against a warrior scale. 
 
According to one officer, edging toward the ‘twelve healthy infants’ theory and 
conditioning,203 it is possible to calibrate and even recondition toward warriorship:  
It all depends on whether you believe in nature or nurture! I believe in the 
latter hence, so long as an individual is born physically and mentally able, 
the [sic] theoretically could be nurtured into being a warrior…some can be 
trained/ re-nurtured accordingly.204 
Mixing nature and nurture respondents even came close to promoting martial race 
theory. Britons can all be warriors: ‘as a nation I would argue it is part of our DNA but it 
needs to be uncovered rather than installed’.205 Others thought it a word particular to 
 
199 A process where recruits who are failing some aspect of training recommence the course with the 
recruit course behind theirs and therefore qualify later. 
200 FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 20:57. 
201 CO24. 
202 His suggested formula is CB = (r + p)c where: ‘CB’ is Combat Behaviours, ‘r’ is realistic training, ‘p’ is a 
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of Experimental Psychology, 3:1 (1920): 1–14, http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Watson/emotion.htm. B. F. 
Skinner, “The Experimental Analysis of Operant Behaviour: A History,” in eds. R. W. Rieber & Kurt 





certain cultures, even within the British Army.206 Warrior ‘means something to me as an 
Irishman – it means fighting person and we’ve always been good fighters’.207 Later, at 
the same focus group: ‘I’d look at the Fijians if you are looking for warriors…if I were to 
pick out warriors in our battalion the top two or three would likely be Fijians’.208 Others 
dismissed cultural and ethnic qualifiers209 and argued that ‘there are no biological or 
cultural barriers that cannot be overcome if the need arises’210 preferring instead to make 
the soldier ‘highly schooled’211 through Blank Slate manipulation or ‘re-nurturing’. 
 
Military culture is the determining factor in the quest toward warriorship but societal 
influence is an equally powerful component and may hold the key. Culture was 
associated with warriorship by 11 respondents; 8 of those consulted thought that where 
society wishes to build a cohort of warriors then there is responsibility beyond the army. 
Not ‘anyone’ but the majority [can be warriors] if the socialisation process 
is favourable. This process can’t be owned only by the military – there must 
be an element of conscious or subconscious self-selection before the 
formal military socialisation process is started. If this self-selection is 
universal enough because of general socio-cultural norms (Sparta might be 
an example), then most people could probably be a warrior.212 
According to ex-US general and Defense Secretary James Mattis ‘most’ is an 
overestimate: only 30 percent of young Americans in his opinion would meet the 
physical, intellectual, and moral standards to even qualify for military service today.213 
The view that society matters most, possibly the most profound in some ways for its 
recognition that the army is not the definitive influence on martial identity, was agreed at 
a focus group of junior officers: ‘it’s a whole of culture thing, the whole society is aimed 
at the betterment of the warrior culture, support of the warrior’.214  
 
‘Warriors are born, soldiers are made – that’s a nice way to put it’215 thought one focus 
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group attendee. Warriors and soldiers are thus differentiated: T1 and T2, the stoic and 
the fighter. The warrior who ‘does what they think they should do or what they want to 
do, a soldier though is rules and regulations’216 acting under direction, not from free will. 
Warriors are ‘twice volunteers’ – once to enlist then to fight, doing and being. 
There is something here about volunteering: it’s the difference between 
doing something because you’ve been told to do it and doing something 
because you want to do it, a desire to put yourself in difficult situations, to 
have a combat experience as opposed to a reluctance to do it; the word 
soldier can sometimes evoke those feelings of reluctance, pressed men, 
conscription, all those kind of slightly negative terms...’217 
Where this is accepted it is obvious why the army is promoting warrior over soldier: it is 
less the superficial attraction or carnival suggestion of the word warrior and more 
rejection of the inferences associated with the word soldier toward something 
motivational or dynamic. Warrior is otherwise the personification of the fighting spirit 
thought necessary on future battlefields.  
Whilst lots of other things, technology, cyber, quantum computing…even 
the geo-political context in which we sit is changing, the nature of warfare 
will always take us back at some stage to the infantryman having to do the 
warrior thing. What they did in the Peloponnesian war was similar to what 
they did in the Falklands, its similar to what the bloke in the First World War 
and the Second World War did.218 
‘Technology and doctrine are just two elements of a set of interdependent factors 
composing a system whose sole purpose is to deploy and sustain a single weapon—the 
most effective infantryman possible.’219 With similar sentiments: ‘when all the cyber is 
done and the expensive bombs have been dropped and the smart weapons used you 
will still have a bloke with a bayonet who is at the sharp end and who is probably slightly 
out of control and he’s the guy you can rely on in the final analysis’.220 This ’bloke with a 
bayonet’, a near berserker in this analysis – the infantry soldier who engages ‘at the level 
of immediate close combat’ and as such is relatively timeless221 – is the most familiar and 




How British soldiers understand ‘warrior’ is indeterminate. They have no benchmark with 
individuals privileging different elements. Contradiction between colleagues was evident 
and no agreement was had on warriorship as a consequence of nature or nurture. A 
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sense of elitism was apparent in how soldiers thought the term should be applied whether 
through self-selection, training or experience but it was clear that warrior is not a 
universally recognised or acknowledged term for British soldiers. Attractive to some, 
others took more comfort from being known more simply as soldiers. Several soldiers 
made an attempt to simplify the difference: ‘soldier is transactional, warriors are 
transformational’;223 the soldier provides a basic service; the warrior sees and fills the 
cracks;224 ‘we want warriors in times of conflict but soldiers in other times’.225 The view 
that soldiers are automatons resonated: one officer used ‘neutral’ and ‘grey’ to describe 
soldiers.226 A separate phenomenon, warriors were ‘exclusive’ but also ‘excluded’.227 
 
The infantry soldiers surveyed didn’t think warrior a title that extends to all British soldiers. 
Only 1 in 10 applied soldier and warrior synonymously. The terms were separated by 
centring the latter on ‘fighting’, a specific act and ‘binary indicator’:228 soldiering was a 
much broader term involving duty beyond fighting. More generously but still divisively: ‘I 
don’t think soldier and warrior is synonymous – glory is a word I associate with warrior, 
honour and duty with soldier, some of us are warriors but you have to be a soldier’.229 
And so discrete elements are identified. Concerning in light of the view that the warrior 
is a fighter (a frequently quoted descriptor) is the statement that ‘not every soldier is a 
fighter.’230 Soldiers are then actively excluded from donning the mantle of the warrior.  
 
The desire to be a warrior though was palpable – if only to deny it to others. The first 
draw was thought internal; but performance as a warrior may then be refined through 
nurturing. Mindset and mentality were important but so too standards imposed in training. 
The individual must want to be a warrior then the organisation must train them. Research 
revealed that warriorship was considered primarily to be a personal endeavour, and not 
an organisational construct. Warriorship is about individual desire and drive. ‘Whilst you 
can be trained to be more resilient, more aggressive, the sort of passion and self-
determination/discipline cannot be manufactured’.231 Warriorship ‘is more of a personal 
issue’ and in the opinion of this officer ‘the Army as a corporation does little to foster 
this.’232 Having examined how soldiers understand, or rather didn’t fully comprehend the 
word warrior, next I discover how comfortable they are being known as warriors.
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6. British Warriors? 
 
‘A Person Who Makes War’ 
 
In 2003 the British Army fought in the US-led invasion of Iraq: since 2001 British soldiers 
have been deploying to Afghanistan. At the height of each campaign there were 45,000 
troops in Iraq and over 10,000 in Afghanistan. They deployed with the full range of 
equipment and weapons for ‘warfighting’ or Major Combat Operations. It was a time of 
intense activity, and arguably, given the national resource expended and the numbers 
involved, the most significant overseas commitment of national combat power since 
1945. Formations deployed and applied themselves to a range of scenarios for which 
they had been trained, prepared and anticipated, and some for which they had not. 
Battles were fought, casualties were incurred, and soldiers died: enemy forces too were 
killed. British soldiers were ‘making war’ and the army was operating at high tempo in 
the most demanding of circumstances. If warriorship was ever a thing, and warrior a term 
of reference for British soldiers it would be observable during this time. 
 
I examined over 450 interviews of soldiers who served in these wars. The lack of 
reference to the words ‘warrior’, warriorship or warrior ethos is startling. Of 150 
interviews 233  from Operation Herrick, the UK military codename for operations in 
Afghanistan, ‘warrior’ was mentioned just 64 times: 53 of those with reference to the 
British Army’s Infantry Fighting Vehicle 
(IFV) known as a ‘Warrior’ and shown in 
Fig. 6.1234 and once when referring to a US 
helicopter, the Kiowa-Warrior; 235  it was 
mentioned five times in relation to Afghan 
soldiers, occasionally known by rank as 
‘warrior’ instead of private. 236  An officer 
spoke about the Afghan warrior culture237 
but did not elaborate; another said British 
soldiers must present as ‘Honourable Warriors’238 by adhering to the Pashtunwali Code239 
 
233 Conducted from October 2005 to January 2010. 
234 This image is in the public domain. Accessed at https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8a/ 
Warrior_Infantry_Fighting_Vehicle.jpg on 29 Feb 20 under Creative Commons SA. 
235 Commanding Officer (CO), Operation Herrick (Op Herrick) 2009, Post Operations Interview (POI), Land 
Warfare Centre (LWC), 22 Jan 2010.  
236 CO, Op Herrick 2008/09, POI, LWC, 22 May 2009; CO, Op Herrick 2009, POI, LWC, 20 Nov 2009 (3 
times); CO, Op Herrick 2009, POI, LWC, 22 Jan 2010. 
237 CO, Op Herrick 2009, POI, LWC, 25 Feb 2010. 
238 CO, Op Herrick 2008/09, POI, LWC, 03 Sep 2009. 
239 Pashtunwali is a code and a non-written law for the Pashtun people which dates to pre-Islamic times. 
Fig. 6.1: Warrior IFV 
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and thus demonstrating cultural sensitivity. Warrior ethos was mentioned just once in 
relation to British soldiers;240 ‘warrior mentality’ once referring to the attitude of afghan 
troops.241 On only a single occasion did a (non-infantry) commander talk about a need to 
‘engender more of a warrior spirit’ in his unit.242 The references are all from one 12 month 
period in a 5 year timeframe. The term was not prevalent and appears more likely 
inculcated by local gatekeepers then. There is no evidence of warrior as an enduring 
organisational cultural reference point in the British Army in the Afghanistan archive. 
 
In over 300 interviews recorded between 2004 and 2008 from operations in Iraq (known 
as ‘Operation Telic’) with personnel ranked from Major to Major-General, the word 
warrior is mentioned 230 times: again (on 226 occasions) mostly with reference to the 
IFV.243 Of the remaining few instances a logistics officer refers to ‘G2/G3 warriors’244 (a 
disparaging comment on the lack of logistics expertise in combat officers); the remaining 
three comments relate to American soldiers. 
I was very envious of their ability to remain a purely military, rather than a 
political organisation: a true warrior class, with the full backing of their 
country, and with the resources they need to do whatever they see fit.245 
The implication is that the British Army is politically tainted, and not a warrior class. Then, 
building on this issue of military-political affiliation, the British ‘Comprehensive 
Approach’246 is compared to what is perceived as a more pure military approach by the 
Americans: ‘their attitude was very much “I’m a warrior and I don’t do sewage”.’247 Finally 
‘warrior’ was used to differentiate experiences and competencies, purpose and 
geographical deployments: ‘the Americans tend to have their “Iraq Warriors” in the same 
way that we had “Northern Ireland Warriors” in the past’.248 The interviews show that 
warrior was no more a common term of reference for British soldiers at war in Iraq than 
it was in Afghanistan. 
 
Discipline, cohesion, sacrifice, strength and authority according to Major Buckingham of 
the US Army249 are warrior traits: these are situated according to national preference and 
organisational cultural norm. Research respondents thought the word limited by such 
 
240 CO, Op Herrick 2009, POI, LWC, 24 Feb 2010. 
241 CO, Op Herrick 2009, POI, LWC, 16 Feb 2010. 
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245 SO, Op Telic 2006, POI, LWC, 07 Jul 2006. 
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frames and frequently declared the concept as ‘an Americanism’250 (‘the Americans are 
big into this stuff’).251 British officer cadets who contributed to Kayß research had a similar 
view. They explained that they did not like the word warrior: they perceived it as ‘too 
bragging, too antiquated or too American’252 – and not a ‘British’ term of reference. 
America and its military is the key reference point when discussing the phenomenon: 
‘warrior sounds really American’ was a common refrain.253 It was less well recognised 
and much less often embraced as a British term. 
 
One officer thought ancient reference points more useful. ‘There’s a Roman model of an 
army and a Greek model’: 
The Greek model of army is a citizen soldier army that fights for the idea of 
nation and tends to fight wars of national determination; the Americans 
have a Greek model of Army; they created the idea of nation by fighting for 
it…they have a view of warrior culture much like the Greeks had. The 
Roman idea of an army is a small professional army, distinct from the 
nation, used for wars of national interest and expansion as opposed to 
determination. The British is an army like that – a small professional army 
that has been abroad, with a very closed sense of its own identity…254 
Service, he continued, allows soldiers from outside the UK to become members of the 
nation – in the Roman style,255 whereas Americans are citizens ‘who defended liberty in 
time of emergency and returned home after the threat had passed’.256 There is much that 
could be debated here: two issues are selected. First, the American soldier is presented 
as the traditional warrior of the UK feudal system, homo furens who fights for the local 
community (the comitia curiata): the British soldier is expeditionary, a tool of government, 
within the comitia centuriata,257 an ‘instrument of limited war, designed to achieve limited 
goals at limited cost’.258 In reality the British Army is historically characterised as having 
the ‘quality of impermanence’259 and serves at home or abroad: it cannot be aligned with 
or disassociated from either model. 
 
Secondly, this respondent reinforces consideration of the warrior as a non-professional 
whereas the soldier, that Roman figure, is the professional. Alex Danchev made the 
same distinction but in reverse. For him the US are the Romans – an expeditionary 
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warrior force deployed globally in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks – whilst the British 
possess ‘the wisdom of latter day Greeks.’260 Such debate may seem moot but failure to 
investigate ‘the cultural context in which decisions are made’ whether in a Greek or 
Roman style for example, traditionalist or modernist,261 means ‘we are left with narrow 
and meaningless insights into strategic behaviour.’262 The point here is less which relates 
best and more that these commentators offer four armies different and distinct from each 
other, but also the same in some instances. A complicated matrix appears with many 
variations: the British, the British-Greek, the British-Roman army etc. We cannot assume 
that standards, behaviours or culture are consistent across armies – nor adopt terms of 
reference or models without extensive elaboration and explanation of what is meant. 
 
The manner in which organisations present themselves (and are perceived) is 
considered important.  
The American army is very public, demonstrative, overt: “we are warriors”. 
In the British Army it’s a much more reflective, pragmatic, sense of what we 
do. There is a visceral reality to the idea of warrior in the British Army – it’s 
not a public statement.’263 
Warrior then is a more obvious and deliberate term and not one to be adopted where a 
force wishes to present more subtly or less superficially. Another officer was more 
concerned about the British Army’s inability to match the US standard of warriorship, 
which to his mind is technologically and financially enabled, as well as culturally distinct. 
It relates also to numbers of soldiers and the freedom for greater specialisation.  
I don’t know if I like the warrior thing or not; I like the idea of it but my 
nervousness is about the fact that it is so inculcated in the American army, 
the American infantry, and I’m nervous about following in this culturally 
because we are different. We’re smaller, we’re poorer.264 
The research shows warrior is mostly understood in a US context265 and the recognisable 
contemporary example is the American combatant not the British soldier regardless that 
both have been to war in recent decades, and mostly the same wars. We can then 
separate war as an activity from the warrior as homo furens. ‘For one truly to be a warrior, 
it would seem, requires that there be a war’266 but going to war does not in itself make 
the soldier a warrior. 
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‘Not a Word For Us’ 
 
There was evidence of significant contemplation of the meaning of warrior and 
demonstrable caution in electing support amongst those surveyed. Respondents didn’t 
assume meaning in place of personal understanding. 
We live in language. We can never step outside of language. Language by 
its very nature is a differentiating device. Once I say good, it’s not bad. Once 
I say right, it can’t be wrong. We are carving up and categorizing the world 
in every moment...We don’t have shared meaning, we don’t have shared 
discourses, but we act as if we share them. They’re what we take for 
granted.267 
I expected the word and title warrior to be overwhelmingly popular. I thought soldiers 
would instinctively find it attractive. Responses, borne out in the disparate responses to 
the statement ‘I am a Warrior’, suggested otherwise. Less than 50% of those surveyed 
either agreed or strongly agreed that they were warriors, and significant numbers (26% 




Fig. 6.2: ‘I am a Warrior’ 
 
The OED definition has the warrior as ‘a person famous or skilled in war.’ 
By this definition, very few British officers and soldiers can legitimately 
describe themselves as warriors. Some – those who have proved 
themselves in combat – can, but the vast majority cannot. I have answered 
 






























































‘no opinion’ against question 3 [I Am A Warrior] because, although I have 
taken part in combat, I’m not sure I can honestly describe myself as ‘famous 
or skilled in war’.268 
Others were similarly uncertain – some based on their perception of the meaning of the 
word, others because they felt they neither met the dictionary definition. 
 
COs have careers that take them from command and regimental employment where they 
expect to be deployed on exercise or operations to staff or office-based duties more 
frequently than lower ranked soldiers. ‘Officers direct the killing but very seldom 
participate in it.’269 They find themselves managing the business of Defence as often as 
they see the opportunity as ‘warrior or heroic leader.’270 It is understandable then that 
they may feel unentitled to the legend of warrior that, according to this research, is bound 
to fighting. Huntington would explain that COs are managers not deliverers of violence: 
soldiers are ‘specialists in the application of violence’271 so they might be more positively 
disposed to the title. In fact they were even less sure than the COs of the personal 
applicability of the word (only 43% of soldiers as opposed to 61% of COs agreed or 
strongly agreed that they were warriors). 
 
The responses of the COs raised concern in focus groups. ‘I don’t see how an infantry 
CO can say he is not a warrior…our COs lead by example…maybe they think more 
clinically’272 opined a JNCO, contemplating the emotional inferences of the term. Junior 
officers’ were less prepared to allow their seniors to distance themselves from being 
warriors: ‘as officers the guiding principle is leading by example so how can we not be 
warriors but our soldiers are?’273 Where this was false humility, or a demonstration of 
British reserve and ‘stiff upper lip’ on the part of the COs, the junior officers suggested 
the author should ‘ask their men instead’274 for a more honest representation. Where this 
measurement is accepted, warriorship and the entitlement to the title is then awarded by 
external agents and not personally assumed. The research showed that officers think 
infantry soldiers are warriors, but they considered themselves and other soldiers less so: 
soldiers contrarily think officers are as warriorlike if not more so than they are. Neither 
group seems to feel particularly warriorlike in themselves but expect others, like them or 
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Warrior is an embryonic and relatively new term in British Army lexicon: it would be bold 
and illustrative of ‘early adopter’ or entrepreneurial attitudes rare in bureaucratic and 
conservative organisations to see the term seized upon quickly. This may explain some 
of the reluctance regarding its adoption. From the answers given though it seem to be a 
more profound problem: respondents simply do not recognise themselves as warriors. 
They don’t understand the word and are unclear on its meaning. The 36% of respondents 
who had no opinion on whether or not they were warriors, coupled with the 15% who 
rejected it suggests warriorship is an uneasy fit for over half of those consulted. It’s not 
a natural term for the British Army thought one officer; 275 its ‘not a word for us’ was the 
opinion of a company commander.276 The deployment of a special class of warrior by 
Australia at the height of the Afghanistan campaign was mentioned in the introduction to 
this thesis. By 2019 Australia had decided that warrior is not a word for them either and 
was distancing itself from the concept promoting instead ‘soldiering’ as their rallying 
call.277 Their recently published Creed begins: ‘I am an Australian soldier who is an expert 
in close combat…’ There is no mention of warriors. 
 
‘I am not a massive fan of the word warrior’.278 Like the company commander who 
thought the word inapplicable, this CO wouldn’t champion it as a term for the soldiers 
under his command. As a gatekeeper he has that authority. If he chose otherwise and 
promoted the term he might find his audience unreceptive. Warrior was declared by 
soldiers to be the opposite of ‘ally’ – British Army slang for anything desirable and 
covetable, or fashionable. Warriorhood was considered ‘chippie’279 meaning undesirable 
or common, and the opposite of ‘ally’. Soldiers were blunt in their dismissal. It was 
thought cringey, cringeworthy and ‘cheesy’.280 As a term of reference it was even treated 
with derision. The potential for the voluntary adoption of a term thought so unattractive 
by image conscious soldiers is low. Another admitted an initial attraction to the term 
warrior but then having considered its meaning thought it less so. ‘My initial thoughts 
were that I can relate to that [warrior as a term] but then when I began to really think 
about it I found it difficult to answer the questions – I relate to soldier more easily’.281 
When asked about the naming of a Company of soldiers as ‘Spartan Company’ – a 
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seemingly obvious reference to warriorship – it was explained it wasn’t what it seems. It 
was discovered that soldiers in training had similar regimental (or identifying serial) 
numbers. ‘The Company comprised new recruits whose regimental numbers started 
300- and 301- so they were called ‘The 300s’282 which then morphed into ‘the Spartans’ 
after the movie ‘300’.’283 An instructor explained that few people realised the origins of 
the name. In so explaining, he emphasises through minor anecdote how myth can grow, 
and how a word with meaning can be misappropriated. Those unaware of the 
provenance thought it a complimentary term for recruits who had or were expected to 
perform well, in warriorlike fashion. The reference was created by NCOs whose 
regimental numbers began 291- and 292- for amusement and neither for purposes of 
morale nor to instil a sense of identity. It certainly wasn’t adopted for its original value. 
 
The attraction of the term was completely lost on some respondents: its ‘old-fashioned’284; 
it meant something once285 – not now. The term is ‘time-expired.’ 
Some years ago I would have seen ‘warrior’ as referring to a soldier with 
high levels of professionalism and commitment to soldiering. Unfortunately, 
I now think that the term has become quite hackneyed and I tend to avoid 
using it personally, despite respecting its original meaning.286 
The word is ‘over-used’.287 Others thought it unrelatable: ‘when I hear of warriors I think 
of Romans, I think of Vikings, I think of blood thirsty savages’;288 a second respondent 
said it conjured similar images for him and he associated it with words like ‘mythical, 
Norse, Viking, rape and pillage.’289 Another: ‘spears…Amazons; that’s not me, different 
circumstances.’290 It might be made relevant but only where the word is reconstructed. 
‘The norms and what was acceptable for the warrior in history were very different from 
what is acceptable now; I’m saying the warrior ethos now is altered due to training and 
control.’291 This view was validated in a focus group: ‘warrior now means something 
different because we have rules of war, the standards now are different and culture is 
also a thing, definition is changing over time, constantly changing.’292 It might then ‘be a 
word for us’ but only after some considerable redefinition. A repackaging of ‘warrior’ is 
therefore necessary or a word already in use, like soldier, could be reinforced. 
 
‘Policy Gets In The Way’ 
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What is normatively right can be privileged over what is instrumentally right.293 Comments 
made suggested a separation between what soldiers think they should be doing, 
particularly where they agree with the pursuit of warriorship, what society wants and 
expects from them, and how the Army reads society’s signal. The warrior is the 
embodiment of the ‘tension between soldierly actions and the self-image’ of civilian 
society.294 Perceived constraints as well as practical obstacles laid in the path of the 
aspiring warrior through strategic culture, societal preference, the law, morals and 
military ethics were considered impediments to warriorship. 
The British Army is not simply being forced to mirror contemporary society. 
It increasingly runs the danger of being bogged down by attitudes which 
are utterly inimical to conventional military values. One might well argue 
that the day the British soldier becomes a model of caring citizenship is the 
day that he can no longer be counted upon to hold the pass against the 
thug and tyrant.295 
The separation is functional as well as cultural. ‘Society wants us to kill but they don’t 
want to know about it.’296 This causes concern and nervousness: the sponsor ‘wants us 
to be warriors when it suits them’297 leaving the soldier in a position of uncertainty over 
whether or not he or she will be supported in the aftermath. The recruiting adverts it is 
believed ‘are directed at the mums and dads to reassure them that ‘their children will be 
OK’ and not to inspire:298 it was thought where ‘the British Army released adverts showing 
warriors kicking in doors there would be a lot of upset people out there.’299  
 
The relationship between warriorship and society’s perception of soldiering is the crux of 
the issue here and these comments underline concern regarding the army’s place in 
society but also a ‘creeping aversion to risk’300 regarding the employment of the armed 
forces. Soldiers understand that they serve in an environment of ‘postmodern militarism’ 
where society admires the military but can reject ‘the discipline and sacrifice necessary 
to achieve it’.301 Societal values can be ‘inimical to the culture of the armed forces’302 and 
the ‘more libertarian values of modern Britain with their emphasis on the freedom of the 
individual rather than obligation or collective identity are sometimes at odds with the 
values and behaviour needed to create the spirit and cohesiveness required in battle’.303  
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The UK public are confused too about what they think of their soldiers and how they 
should be termed. A recent YouGov survey asked ‘which members of the armed forces, 
if any, should be considered heroes.’304 Of the Britons surveyed 32% (see Fig. 6.2) 
thought all armed forces personnel were heroes; 31% believed that only armed forces 
personnel who performed bravely should be described as heroes.305 Roughly one fifth 
thought serving in a combat role or having seen combat qualified the armed forces306 as 
heroes. These compare favourably to the sentiments of soldier respondents to the title 
warrior. Some personnel are more worthy of recognition as heroes just as some are 
thought more deserving of the term warrior. Neither is a universal identifier. 
 
 
Fig. 6.3: Civilian Attitudes to Martial Identity 
 
The YouGov survey shows the responses to the same question from samples in the USA 
and in Germany.307 ‘In Germany, the most common response was that no members of 
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the armed forces should be described as heroes. By contrast, only 5% of Americans and 
6% of Britons said the same.’308 Americans were most comfortable with their armed 
forces in the broadest sense being known as heroes, as with their naming as warriors, 
regardless of  function or experience. The US and German examples mark British military 
identity boundaries – and emphasise that strategic as well as military culture is relevant. 
 
From a strategic consideration to one more tactical: the lack of an approved British Army 
fighting knife. This was thought illustrative of the absent appetite for warriorship and what 
was termed the neglect of ‘precision combat’: 
We are in the infantry and we don’t have a knife, it’s on the badge but we 
don’t have one…at one stage [we] trialled 50 different knives but that faded 
away as they were advised against it, there’s just no hunger for it, I was told 
there was no need for it.309 
Knives are considered symbolic of warriorship: the bayonet, iconic image of the infantry, 
and centrepiece of corporate identity was cited for special attention. That the bayonet in 
recent times has been responsible for comparatively few deaths is irrelevant: it continues 
to be revered as the tool that instils aggression, unites individuals and is ‘the decisive 
element’ of the infantry attack.310 It occupies ‘a central position in the acculturation of the 
foot soldier’.311 ‘The infantry has just gone through a rebranding process’ advised the 
senior officer with responsibility for infantry ethos and the appropriateness of ‘the knife’ 
was discussed, not in terms of its symbolic power or its utility in combat but in the light 
of an increase in crime involving the use of knives in UK society: 
Our symbol is a big knife. How does that play?...That bayonet is historical, 
legacy, it’s part of who we are and what we do – close combat may require 
our soldiers to stick a bayonet in someone but in some ways we are going 
against the societal narrative. Promotion of the warrior ethos then can be a 
double-edged weapon.312 
Around the time of this interview it was even suggested that the army could be the 
antidote for societal knife crime, an awkward conflation of elements of this discussion.313 
 
Where society’s nervousness over the place of the bayonet is privileged, and policy 
clashes with military practice, behaviours and expectations become confused. 
The warrior is characterized by a strong attachment to professional values, 
a clearly defined distance from civilian society and a high measure of 
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professionalism. The virtues that the warrior represents do not reflect the 
values of his or her particular society or community.’314 
The warrior can be anachronistic and separate yet is embraced as a cure for society’s 
ills. It is why the term warrior must be cautiously engaged with. The idea that the military 
must fully match the broader societal narrative can also be overplayed, and the British 
Army should also exercise caution before compromising its values. It may have a strong 
case for occasional exemption. 315  Equally care is needed in not overemphasising 
something that may actually be irrelevant. One soldier suggested the knife is less iconic, 
or representative of warriorhood than corporately or academically presented: ‘the knife I 
carry on my belt is for cutting string.’316 
 
The perceived need of the army for a fighting knife and society’s rejection of the same 
could be viewed as metaphorical. The retention of the bayonet for its intended purpose 
may be an anachronism, but it remains ‘a useful all-purpose knife.’317 The army too is for 
killing, like a combat knife or bayonet with a single blade, but it is often also called upon 
to deliver more diverse, utilitarian functions, like a Swiss Army Knife. Some tasks might 
compromise combat purity but army culture expressed through the stories relayed 
previously promote broader force utility. The iconography of warriorship might then 
require ‘downplaying a bit’318 both to satisfy societal concern, or service a critical juncture 
and also so the army can present more honestly, and responsively. The extent to which 
the ‘profession of arms is an exclusive culture’ and requires recognition as ‘one that is 
much more separated from civilian society than postmodern militarism supposes’319 is 
the crux of the issue here but the tyranny of the issue of the day might also render the 
army helpless in any debate. One officer mulled ‘warrior’ as a term that would be 
permitted in the face of pressure regardless of army preference: ‘whether it sticks or not 
will be partly political and partly societal’320 and so he recognises that the army’s identity, 
the knife it wishes to be, is determined externally. The free hand von Moltke desired321 
for the military is restrained, a sense of identity bewilderment is introduced and fighting 
ethos can be undermined. 
The Army uses the phrase [warriorship] then they actively dilute it. The 
amount of procedure and things like that which we have to chin off 
[ignore]…we need to expose the men to violence regularly and they just 
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are not…Bayonet lesson – why is that so wrapped up in procedure?322 
The clash here is between civilian control of the military whilst recognising the civilians 
don’t always understand the nuances of marital activity, and the demands that the 
military self-polices but to acceptable societal standards. 
 
Warriorship demands ‘bursts of really strong physical activity: punching, kicking, 
stabbing, wrestling, the sense you can’t keep going any more – that’s not built in to our 
physical training’. This officer continues: ‘we train for other particular functions but none 
of those functions are proper close combat’323 and so there is a gap in competence. The 
skills associated with close combat requires courage – ‘a muscle that needs to be 
developed’ but policy prevents this for fear of ‘breaking’ people’.324 That the army had 
adjusted training too keenly to fit with societal constraint was a prominent opinion. ‘We 
have adjusted the terminology to the extant process of training, rather than adjusting the 
training to match what we think is the requirement for the warrior capability’.325 This 
tension between policy constraint and what is viewed as military necessity was tangible. 
‘Policy gets in the way’;326 ‘it’s no longer acceptable to do the more challenging things [in 
training]’327 and standards are compromised as a result. 
Men need to be hardened in peace if they are to be tough enough for war. 
But the very processes designed to achieve this cut across the integration 
of armed forces with civilian society. Training soldiers to kill, and getting 
them to realize that it is certainly proper and legitimate to do so, creates a 
division more complete in peace than is likely to be the case in war — when 
the perceived need for the soldier’s skills endorses his actions.328 
Caputo warns that shadowboxing won’t prepare soldiers for street-fighting.329  British 
soldiers had similar concerns. ‘The problem now is that it has become acceptable not to 
be at a standard, there is no basic standard anymore’.330 
 
Few soldiers defended the policy, legal or societal constraints that the Army operates 
under as enhancing warriorship. This is not new.  
The content of a military ethic (beyond such things as courage or loyalty 
which are obviously required for fighting well) can sometimes strike soldiers 
as a sort of window dressing or public relations undertaking at best, or as 
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an obstacle to mission accomplishment and force protection at worst.331 
‘War is supposed to serve policy, but it is not an easy or natural servant thereof’332 
particularly where the policy is perceived to be at odds with creating an efficient fighting 
machine. The Army (read society) was not thought ready for the ‘fall out’ from testing 
people333 to their limits, though constraints were contrarily recognised as integral to and 
a prerequisite of service: ‘we are there to protect and operate within the letter of the 
law’.334 The ‘key issue’ says Dandeker is ‘the extent to which the military way of life needs 
to be different from that of civilian society’335 and especially where it espouses standards 
akin to the warrior or T2 over the soldier and T1. 
 
The reason the Army is not doing more hand-to-hand combat training according to one 
soldier is that ‘it doesn’t want the training it is providing its people to spill out onto the 
streets on a Saturday night’.336 This is a fair comment and an even more fair reservation. 
The ethical and legal responsibility of improving or enhancing T2’s abilities to kill or injure 
without bounding the activity to a certain time and place (essentially allowing the Type to 
act without control) is an extremely complex consideration. A final comment is reserved 
for the soldier who thought the true warrior would be a fighting individual regardless of 
the training the Army provides, the law it operates under or the policy that it follows. 
Linking reduced inhibitions associated with the consumption of alcohol to an inclination 
for violence he suggested that any study into warriorship ‘look at the discipline 
records…that’ll show you the warriors…Pay Day Weekend produces warriors.’337 The 
constraints that soldiers think reduce warriorhood can be meaningless where the 
individual’s innate character leans toward warrior behaviour. 
 
‘In Ten Years It’ll Be A Different Word…’ 
 
For all the careful consideration, warrior was still thought meaningless by many of those 
consulted. ‘I only knew what it was from googling it.’338 Its widespread application flew in 
the face of what they thought should be an exclusive and earned term. In 9 of the 14 
focus groups soldiers expressed uncertainty regarding the purpose behind its 
introduction. It was a ‘struggle to link the British Army with warrior status.’339 The word 
was thought similar to other terms considered similarly hollow. ‘Warrior: it’s a made-up 
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thing; it sounds funny; you get called it by putting a uniform on; it’s like being called a 
legend.’340 Alternatives thought equally vacuous were suggested as equivalents: it is like 
saying that ‘he’s a ninja – but he’s not actually a ninja.’341 References of this sort – warrior, 
legend, ninja – were recognised as ‘tools to get people on side to do things you want 
them to do but really it doesn’t mean anything’.342 Such imposition of identity may lead to 
compliance but won’t result in conversion.343 One of the soldiers wasn’t impressed with 
any of these labels: ‘I couldn’t give two hoots what society calls me – I’ll just crack on 
with what I need to do’344 he stated, demonstrating self-belief, personal motivation and 
awareness and explaining that without his acquiescence it is unlikely to stick. ‘Just 
because someone says it doesn’t make it true. Someone articulates a comprehensive 
theory; it still doesn’t make it true. It has to be subjected to critical scrutiny, a la 
Socrates.’345 But such comment also betrays a sense of powerlessness: the identity of 
warrior is being forced upon soldiers. 
 
One SNCO said focus group attendees ‘had a conversation about it before we came in 
and it’s how you define it that is difficult – we all have a different definition’.346 These 
soldiers were from the same regiment: they work together on a daily basis and have a 
shared regimental identity but couldn’t agree what warrior meant. Soldiers analysed the 
Army’s motives: ‘The Army is trying to define the warrior through CDRILS’347 thought one, 
explaining warrior as the vehicle to give substance to standards and values – an 
argument that wins favour with ethicists. Whether warrior affords a rallying point for the 
code or the code defines the warrior, these two sides of a coin allow definition and 
importantly exclude other possibilities. Narrower bounding would introduce greater 
consistency – ‘across regiments they use the term warrior in a different way… we need 
to be a bit more straight on what warrior means’.348 This places responsibility on the army 
to be specific. One respondent accepted its ‘antiquated or historical connotations’ but 
was curious, indeed cynical, at the reasons it was being ‘deliberately invoked’ now.349 In 
another group similar suspicion was expressed that the term warrior is for organisational 
efficiency reasons and not much else: ‘I think because this is being used as an infantry 
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term I think it’s coming in line with the future which is going to be an Infantry Corps’.350 
Applying the term to the broadest collective brought soldiers to a conclusion that it is a 
device to undermine small group identity. 
 
What is meant by warrior is hard to specify351 according to the Regimental Recruiting 
Team focus group; its ‘one of those words that’s very hard to pinpoint exactly’ thought 
another group.352 Senior officers agreed that the word hadn’t been well defined though 
one urged caution against ‘metricising’:353 others contrarily felt there was a need ‘to 
measure ‘warrior’ somehow’.354  The values and standards of the British Army were 
assumed to be at the heart of what was meant and these might be the measure. That 
the term hadn’t been adequately defined was ‘a fair point; we should perhaps make more 
of the term as the epitome of a professional combat soldier who works to a code of 
conduct in the battlespace.’355 The case against metrics was that local interpretation is 
more useful and viable: ‘the term is ill-defined, but has strong historical resonance for 
certain communities’356 and accordingly should be left to those communities to determine 
meaning. Why ‘soldier’ or some regimental title won’t suffice is then unclear. 
When philosophers talk about words and things there comes talk about 
meanings. If the various meanings are incommensurate with one another 
and we hold to our respective positions, then we move into relativism.357  
That warrior might apply ‘relatively’ and subject to local interpretation allows exclusivity: 
‘warrior says dismounted close combat: it’s a bloke with a spear and now a bloke with a 
bayonet’.358 In this form, with the bayonet again as the critical element, the warrior is the 
individual with ‘the savage fury necessary to ram cold steel into another man’s guts’359 
and the responsibility to do so. As a term, ‘warrior’ won’t then apply across the British 
Army but might create identity within a global, martial cadre. Where it is metricised 
according to Values and Standards the word becomes relative and understood only in 
the context of the British Army. The need to ‘adapt the term to the culture360 was well 
recognised but so too was the fact that it is ‘hard to define British Army culture…it can 
be contradictory’.361 So it is difficult to establish a foundation or even entry point. 
 
Soldiers thought warrior a useful term beyond the regiment: ‘Works best at Army – if it is 
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to apply it has to apply to the whole Army. Not at regimental [level]’362. The preference to 
push it elsewhere allows local groupings to remain salient. Promoting it thus infers that 
the term is unwelcome or at least is made inapplicable locally. The lack of embrace 
makes it a fad, some new trend or temporal device. The sense in focus groups was of ‘a 
marketing image or label to promote the Army…it’s a buzzword’.363 It was acknowledged 
that ‘warrior has broader appeal’ 364  than some of the ‘niche’ terminology used at 
Regimental level yet regimental identity was aggressively protected: ‘does it work for us 
in terms of building an ethos within the Regiment, I don’t think so…’365 The ‘word now 
being bandied about, wasn’t even common during Herrick [operations in Afghanistan], it 
appeared afterwards, someone came up with it as a ‘good’ word’366; ‘it feels like a word 
that has appeared as a result of our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan’367; ‘during 
Herrick everything was ‘ally’, we were all ‘operators’, and now warriors, it’s the latest 
thing.’368 Most damning was the dismissal that ‘in ten years it’ll be a different word…’369 
 
‘There’s two sides to it: there’s those that are in the Army that maybe have a belief in it 
or maybe don’t, and there are those who are looking at it being advertised in the careers 
offices and recruiting centres’.370 Calling soldiers warriors was recognised as a recruiting 
strategy371 but ‘otherwise it doesn’t mean anything to me.’372 Recruiting is the fertile 
ground for its employment. This is the opposite of how Army intent is explained. With 
regard to sanctioned branding ‘the warrior word can be seen as pejorative in society’ but 
it is assumed ‘really useful as a brand for our soldiers’: 
In putting the Army across to the public we are better using words like 
protection and defence even though they don’t actually describe the nature 
of [the soldiers who] are going to have to attack and fight the wars, and are 
therefore de facto warriors’373 
This is more than semantics: words matter because ‘definitions are the foundations of 
action, knowledge, reality and Truth. If we think the military is made up of warriors, that 
is one set of ethical choices’ if we think otherwise, then a different set of choices apply.374 
Warrior is used by the Army in the expectation that it appeals to its soldiers; as far as 
soldiers are concerned it’s an appeal to civilian recruits. One soldier fully rejected it. 
‘There’s no credibility in the word, because of the way the British Army has branded it, it 
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has lost all meaning - I have no respect for it as a word at the minute, it’s a brand that 
people jump on’.375 
 
‘The role of language is critical in social constructionism’376 and soldiers didn’t appreciate 
the word warrior being applied to them without their agreement. ‘I would never have 
thought of myself as a warrior’; another in the same focus group thought the word 
‘completely stupid; it’s annoying that it’s been imposed upon us.’377 It was being done to 
soldiers by an unappreciated third party: ‘I don’t think you ever call yourself warrior, 
someone calls you a warrior…this hasn’t come from grass roots.’378 In another group they 
complained that ‘we are not getting let be what we want to be’ – and that was to be 
identified regimentally. There is recognition here that the soldier ‘unlike the civilian, 
possesses little to no legal or institutional recourse when it comes to psychologically 
insulating herself’ from strong character-shaping forces. 379  This is not to say that 
acceptable subculture did not loom large in soldiers’ consciousness, and was 
appreciated, when they considered identity. ‘If you want to call us warriors then fair dos, 
but we know we are Rangers and part of something bigger than that…’380 This is explored 
further when I consider ethos in Chapter 7. The smaller regimental group is ‘bigger’ than 
the Army to soldiers. Few who attended the focus groups self-referenced as warriors: 
they railed against imposed identity but rallied around their stronger regimental identities. 
 
‘This Leaves Us At Risk Of Great Damage’ 
 
Fighting was the descriptor most often used in relation to the meaning of warrior with 
‘Other’ warrior archetypes presented as points of reference: Maoris, Samurai, the Zulus, 
Crusaders, and Vikings gained mention as typical but were rarely relatable. Seldom was 
the term used in relation to the contemporary British soldier though the attraction of being 
referred to as warriors wasn’t lost on those consulted: ‘Give each Company a name; 
you’re Spartan Company, you’re the Immortals, and everyone’s buzzing off it’ said one 
young soldier. 381  Another read the word historically but was unimpressed with the 
concomitant ‘edge of the primitive’: it’s pejorative, he explained, ‘we ask our infantry 
soldiers to do…a damn sight more than warfighting; warrior suggests you do not much 
else. Warrior skills will only get you round the first corner’ presumably and to extend the 
metaphor, of any future three-bloc war.382 Contemporary soldiers, evidenced by the 
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iconic events that soldiers recalled, ‘are not employed solely to fight.’383 Used in a certain 
way, one officer mused, the term is ‘almost fanatical’.384 These are powerful points: used 
‘in a certain way’ the word is much more and perhaps ‘refers to all embodied activity’. 
It is not just words or text. This focus for me is very important as a 
communication scholar; recognizing that we create our world in what we do 
together is very powerful. It takes us out of pathologizing individuals. If I 
locate problems in someone’s conflicted processes or psyche, then that 
person has a problem. If I can look at patterns of relationship and the ways 
that people coordinate their activities, I am looking more at social and 
cultural discourses.’385 
Association with the full discourse implied by warrior is not within every soldier’s appetite. 
 
‘I strongly disagree with all of this – “warrior” leaves us at risk of great damage’386 was 
the forcefully expressed opinion of one officer. The risk is that ‘we glorify shocking acts 
by dressing it up as warriorship387 and excuse ‘those who just want to scrap’ by offering 
channels for ‘pathological behaviour’.388 Warrior here is understood in terms of the Killer, 
Psychopath and Berserker. The risk is in building a fascination with ‘mythic violence’389 
and the serviceperson becomes less interested in professional standards or any 
proffered code and more in the persona of the warrior and preferred code. The chance 
of ‘deviant cohesion’, the counter to the ‘reciprocal interplay of personal and social 
influences’ that creates moral action,390 increases where homo furens pursues the short-
term task, or performs according to some locally determined and alternative standard, 
detached from broader organisational goals. Donna Winslow terms it hyper-investment391 
where unit pride becomes so over-powering that out-groups are resented and rejected – 
with attendant undermining of wider discipline and institutional unity. Warrior units, where 
they self-define assume their own reference points and operate according to their own 
rules: this is a form of self-policing of course but not that which commentators welcome. 
‘Putting a high-end combat warrior battalion into a certain situation is not without risk’392 
admitted one British officer; another thought that he had ‘great soldiers who were right 
at the front on operations, who couldn’t control their warrior spirit when they weren’t 
fighting in the field.’393 This soldier type brings benefit and shows example but also 
concern. Positively this is homo furens ‘who stands out brilliantly on the battlefield’ but 
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goes unnoticed in garrison life’.394 More negatively, the army should ‘take care not to 
create Alpha males’.395 Battlefield brilliance can have both effects. 
 
Leadership might be assumed the remedy for aberrant behaviour. 
There’s a fine line. What you don’t want to do though is stifle potential. 
When you do over command you feel the machine straining against you, 
trying to break the shackles. The organisation needs shackles but if you 
pull them too tight, if they feel restricted then they will push back – and turn 
round and bite you.396 
This puts clear responsibility on the leader. ‘Once an army is involved in war, there is a 
beast in every fighting man which begins tugging at its chains, and a good officer must 
learn early on how to keep the beast under control, both in his men and himself.’397 The 
expectation is evident but there is no guarantee the officer will be able for it.398 Where 
momentum is created amongst a collective that sees themselves as a certain breed of 
warrior, separate as ‘men and lions, wolves and lambs’, as the Iliad had it, predatory 
instinct can overwhelm, particularly where it is encouraged, deliberately or not. The group 
preferred identity ‘begins to outweigh or silence competing moral, epistemic, or 
prudential reasons’ 399  that recommend compliance with organisational culture. The 
leader must then abdicate responsibility and conform to the will of the collective, or take 
control to rebalance and realign the guiding principles of his or her charges. That 
challenge is more difficult where a term like warrior has been promoted but left open to 
local interpretation. Delegating the responsibility for understanding without setting 
parameters is an incomplete approach. ‘We want warriors. But we need them to be 
controlled. They need to be able to turn it on and off. Is that too much to ask…? Don’t 
know, don’t think it is.’ 400  Others think soldiers deserve greater support: it is 
‘unreasonable and impractical to expect front-line soldiers, given their training and pre-
eminent warfighting role, to develop the levels of subtlety or master the wider range of 
skills’401 demanded by operations other than war, and maybe even peacetime routine. 
Warriorship where trained for, apparent and accepted, even lauded, has implications. 
 
Experience and history supports the view that high-end combat units struggle with the 
demands of low intensity operations: ‘at the day-to-day level the employment of self-
conscious elite units such as paratroops in urban policing has had disastrous results.’402 
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The British soldier may not be as ‘ambidextrous’ as it is assumed.403  But the risk of the 
edgy, unpredictable warrior may be worth taking. Some officers appreciated the 
opportunity that warriors offer and embraced the type. 
You need killers and you need people who are absolutely ruthless. There 
are times when nothing else matters but succeeding; sometimes the task 
is paramount. To have a cohort that will follow in pursuit of the mission 
regardless of the damage it does to the team, regardless of leaving 
individuals behind is a necessity.’404 
This task-oriented view suggests that even soldiers with demonstrable psychopathic 
tendencies might be useful war. At first sight the idea repels but soldiers see merit. 
‘Psychopath? Depends if you can stick to the rules of engagement’;405 and ‘you don’t 
want a battalion full of psychopaths but…’406 a small number, Winters’ killers maybe, 
Janowitz and Shils’ 1-2%, have appeal. ‘Officers promote the CDRILS but sometimes 
you might need to break them’407 was one expressed view and warriors possess that 
freedom. The most useful fighter is ‘stealthy, aggressive, and ruthless, a combination 
burglar, bank robber, and Mafia assassin.’408 That this is excusing deviant behaviour is a 
fair challenge but equally these are behaviours that are valuable when soldiers are 
thrown into battle: it is ‘difficult to turn warriorship off. Difficult to tell soldiers I want you 
to do this but sometimes you are not to do it particularly where victory is essential.409 
 
Some soldiers worried about having warrior expectation placed upon them. The warrior: 
…sacrifices emotion, familial relationships, relationships in any sense for 
the complete drive for self-betterment, or professional development and to 
fight – so the term isn’t particularly helpful. Those people are sad, quite 
sheltered and have sacrificed so much of a normal life that they put 
themselves in a position where they are less good at their job because they 
don’t have understanding of people…’410 
An officer in the same group thought ‘you can’t be a warrior if you have any distractions 
– like family. Those are weaknesses that impact performance. A warrior is like a warrior 
monk.’411 A third made clear that warriorship was not his aspiration. ‘I have seen people 
who I would describe as leading a warrior lifestyle. [They] can bring standards up but 
they can also be quite harmful as they tend to be very self-motivated, self-centred, 
sometimes quite arrogant and ignorant of the group they are in.’412  Promoting warrior 
elites invites the rebirth of an historic figure for ‘an environment in which violence was 
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much more common than today.’413 Military leaders might ‘protect against the dangers of 
soldier identity by making a more active effort to change what sorts of identities and 
behavior military culture regards as “high status”.’414 Where they decide to support the 
‘warrior’ as the archetype, leaders recommend elite status. This should give caution. 
…physically stronger men have been shown to feel more entitled to better 
outcomes, to set a lower threshold for the triggering of anger and physical 
aggression, to have more self-favoring attitudes about income 
redistribution, and to believe more in the utility of warfare.415 
 
There is a reluctance, for the reasons above and the many others discussed here, even 
where the term is thought attractive, to use it openly. The modern Army might actually 
prove intolerant of warriorship: it becomes a tenet of ‘the predicament of the modern 
western male.’416 ‘Saying to someone in training that they are a warrior is like telling them 
to ‘man up’. Its intrinsically linked to masculinity and that’s a golden taboo’.417 Where the 
mantle is adopted too quickly it may invite more leisurely circumspection when the reality 
of its interpretation is glimpsed – and then some necessary and hasty redefinition or 
clarification. One officer told a story where his battalion was deployed on operations and 
to introduce a stronger ethos, centred on warriorship, the company leadership looked for 
a more martial identity.  
‘A’ Company was the ‘Happy Apples’ – the least masculine punchy thing 
you can have and the Sergeant Major tried to change it to something more 
Nordic in keeping with the idea of the Vikings so he had the ‘Norse Knot’ 
even though that can be seen as a neo-Nazi symbol. It was soon outlawed. 
They tried to make a Viking Ethos, but that has connotations of rape and 
pillage and doing whatever you want, but not being an efficient fighting 
force; now we just have t-shirts we can’t wear.’418 
Other instances of similar appropriation were offered. The term implies ‘a Viking 
Berserker’ said one officer. He wasn’t supportive of warrior as an identifying terms but 
admitted that he used it as a device: ‘my JNCOs [Junior Non-Commissioned Officers] 
and Young Officers like it’ he thought; ‘it aids in getting a message across’.419 
 
The British Army, like its peers,420 is alert to anything that appears to go against its 
perceived or recognised culture. It tends, reasonably, given that it is an organisation 
based on mass, uniformity and stated standards, to look unfavourably on any obvious 
 
413 Sell, Hone & Pound, “Physical Strength,” 36. 
414 Robillard, "Dangers of Soldier Identity," 217. 
415 Sell, Hone & Pound, “Physical Strength,” 41. 
416 Robillard, "Dangers of Soldier Identity," 214. 
417 FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 04:00 
418 Ibid., 17:00 
419 CO24. Note though that more soldiers than COs had ‘no opinion’ on whether they were warriors. 
420 David Chen, “Chief of Army Bans Soldiers From Wearing 'Arrogant' Death Symbols,” ABC News, 
https://mobile.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-19/army-bans-troops-from-wearing-skulls-death-symbols/9673242 




development of unsanctioned ‘sub-services’.421 The allure of the term warrior must then 
be balanced against the possibility of unofficial secession by any part of the British Army 
and unwarranted ‘warrior-type’ behaviour, and ‘unsoldierly acts’, where the term is 
understood locally and differently than intended. 
Does soldier maybe imply more discipline, imply more professionalism, 
warrior maybe sounds a bit more ‘cowboy-esque’? Maybe that’s a good 
point… Soldier spirit? It’s a difficult one. My gut feel is I’m not a fan of 
warrior. I get where they are coming from, I get that its marketable but I just 
don’t think we need it. We’ve got enough.422 
Warriors have, in equal measure, the potential and ‘capacity to do bad’ as well as ‘to do 
great things.’423 Care must be taken where ‘overly aggressive groups of soldiers’ are 
mistaken for high-functioning units.424 It is not only great things that may be delivered. 
The language associated with warriorship and the definitions that are offered or preferred 
are all important. What is meant in the British context is critical. 
I think there is inherent danger in using the term warrior for the British Army. 
We want to develop a culture that is more unique – for us, not emulate US. 
There is a British Army culture, there’s an infantry culture, there’s a 
paratrooper culture, there’s a Parachute Regiment culture. There’s an NCO 
culture, corporals and sergeants mess culture…425 
 
The danger in the term warrior comes from its loose and imprecise definition. The word 
warrior ‘has layers’426 and the principles associated with it, maybe the ethical structure 
said one officer, ‘might be different for different warriors’.427 Another expressed a worry 
that the use of the word warrior ‘takes you to a place where its less about the ethical 
thing and more about defining you against your enemy’428 – the metric is how you perform 
against an adversary and not adherence to institutional norms. It was recognised that 
warriorship would not play well with the British public for this reason. ‘I think there is a 
risk that if you sell the British Army to the public as warriors then we might be assumed 
to have all the warrior attributes. That seems risky. We need to very carefully bound the 
definition.’429 By ‘all the warrior attributes’ we include the ferocity, the violence and the 
ruthlessness430 offered as fine line behaviours which can be admired but when exercised 
in an undisciplined manner make the warrior abhorred. Recognised as controversial and 
a word to be used ‘cautiously in society’ 431  not ‘thrown around loosely,’ 432  it is 
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acknowledged as value-laden. ‘Warrior unnerves’433 people. 
We are using warfighting quite specifically and we changed our lexicon 
recently to use the term infanteer. We need to be a bit careful about the 
word warrior in our ‘Attract’ phase; evidence shows that young people today 
outside the army would like to consider themselves part of an organisation 
that is doing the right thing, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, aggressively 
at times protecting the innocent and the combat end of the spectrum, the 
warrior end is attractive only to a minority in this country, and we therefore 
need not to put people off.’434 
The Army knows the word warrior could ‘put people off’; it recognises it should ‘be used 
quite carefully in the public domain’ though it is assumed ‘absolutely brilliant in the 
internal domain’.435 The analysis was not agreed by many of those surveyed who were 




The British Army speaks about warriors but has not formally characterised what it means 
– nor explained it to soldiers. The point was made by one of the COs that a definition of 
terms by this author ‘would have been helpful’.436 One interviewee mulled the issue: ‘I 
don’t know if we are formally adopting the title ‘warrior’ – not sure its army approved’ 
though he conceded that it did appear at least ‘semi-official’.437 He is correct in that 
warrior is not an official term of reference like some trade descriptors or ranks. Another 
senior officer also pointed this out: ‘I’m not sure we are using warrior as much as you 
suggest’438 though then self-contemplated the statement. ‘Do I agree with your thesis? 
Probably – recently it [the terminology] has re-merged. He continued: ‘if I go back to Op 
Granby,439 I think it was in common usage, there was an ethos of warriorship, not least 
as we had just taken delivery of the new armoured fighting vehicle. Did we lose it might 
be the question?’440 Mention of the IFV again and not homo furens is consistent with the 
archival research and the conclusion that warrior is recognised in the first instance as 
equipment not identity. Warrior is being employed as a term of reference but as an object 
of analysis is insufficiently attended to by the British Army. 
 
Where warrior is understood it is mostly in relation to American military doctrine and US 
soldiers. That it is a term not used when the British Army goes to war makes the point 
most forcefully that it is divorced from British military culture: the number who had ‘no 
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opinion’ on warriorship reinforces this deduction. It is seen as antiquated, from another 
time and not for today’s soldier. It is unattractive, ‘chippie’ and ‘not ally’. It was suggested 
though that warriors could be useful where the term is properly vested, explained and 
promoted, and this might be in a specific ‘British style’. As a term of reference for a select 
grouping of homo furens it might be acceptable. 
 
Where the introduction of the word is for branding purposes the exercise was thought 
tolerable by soldiers (it didn’t then impact them and could be ignored). Senior officers 
advanced the idea that warrior was most useful for its internal resonance: they expressed 
greater caution where it is used externally. The dissonance exhibited here adds to the 
ambiguity and abstract nature of the term. ‘Unless he is a fanatic, a man facing death in 
battle needs more than an abstract cause to defend.’441 
A social identity based on membership in an abstract category may not 
yield the support acceptance provided by a social identity based on 
membership on an actual group of interacting persons.442 
Warrior was considered to sit in this category by respondents; it leaves British soldiers 
at great risk; it separates the soldier from society, and could create toxic, caustic small 
team behaviours. Simply: ‘it’s not us.’ Where it might be, obstacles were anticipated. 
Warriorship is unachievable for ‘policy reasons’ such as the lack of appetite for warrior 
activity (like hand to hand fighting and bayonet practice for example). There was a sense 
that warriors at the ‘high end’ wouldn’t be authorised for action such is their potential for 
unacceptable, unfamiliar and unsanctioned behaviours. It was a term thought temporal 
– and therefore less worth investing in than any alternative identity, and certainly much 
less valuable than regimental and subculture identity. A ‘made-up’ term won’t quickly 
replace one of 400 years of standing and so warrior as a term of reference and 
descriptive noun, sat uneasily with infantry soldiers, officers and gatekeepers. It was 
deemed even more inappropriate for other soldiers. The concept of warrior ethos and 
the approach that British soldiers take to their duties is now examined. 
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One officer said that they were ‘good with warrior ethos, but not with Warrior; I’ve never 
heard anyone call themselves a Warrior.’443 Another agreed that ‘warrior ethos’ had 
greater resonance: 
This seems to be about whether we label individuals as warriors or if this is 
about warrior ethos, will to win, will to fight, that sort of thing. I think that’s 
where we should focus. You can have a warrior ethos, a unit can have a 
warrior spirit. If we label individuals as warriors it may prove a more 
tarnished title.444 
Ethos was considered a collective endeavour and warrior an individual title. ‘I’m very 
happy talking about warrior spirit and ethos. I’m less happy talking about individually 
calling somebody a warrior. I think that’s really difficult to define.’445 Brigadier-General 
McMaster of the US Army explains the greater attraction: ‘warrior ethos is important 
because it makes military units effective and because it makes war ‘less inhumane’.’446 
Ethos then is connected with norms of acceptable behaviour, the noble code and ‘good’ 
soldiers; warrior is less so. Magee too advances the spirit of the warrior over the persona: 
‘by focusing on the term “warrior ethos” rather than on the term “warrior" itself, the real 
value to present day militaries is seen’.447 Others took an opposite view. Declaring that 
he was ‘nervous’ about conflating warrior and warrior ethos, an officer explained that ‘it’s 
not that we shouldn’t have a warrior ethos, it’s not that we are not warriors, it’s the warrior 
ethos that makes me more nervous. Being a warrior is something we should aspire to.448 
His concern was that warrior ethos means a culture that is ‘martial and aggressive’ and 
this is not appropriate for all soldierly activity. He saw ‘less of a distinction between 
warrior and soldier’ than between warrior ethos and the culture of soldiering, that allows 
‘meaningful identity and sense of purpose by participating in actions short of war such 
as humanitarian aid or peacekeeping operations.’449 
 
Used in everyday speech, ethos appears when someone wants to say something serious 
about an organisation, says Patrick Mileham. ‘Special-sounding words, however, 
particularly those borrowed from the languages of classical times, are often used 
indiscriminately.’450 Ethos is ‘jargon’ lacking philosophical and empirical depth451 but as 
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Fig. 7.1 shows, it has become increasingly popular over the last century.452 
 
 
Fig. 7.1: ‘Ethos’: Occurrence in Literature Since 1800 
 
In simple form, ethos is ‘a generally accepted way of approaching matters’;453 it is a 
collective endeavour that determines ‘the tone, character, and quality of life, its moral 
and aesthetic style and mood’; it is the underlying attitude that people have toward 
themselves and their world, according to Geertz. He distinguishes ethos through a world 
view: a ‘picture of the way things in sheer actuality are, their concept of nature, of self, of 
society. It contains their most comprehensive ideas of order.’454 Ethos is therefore both 
collective and individual. It allows for society and self.455 This notion of ethos providing a 
picture is important in linguistic philosophy and fits Wittgenstein’s idea of a proposition 
as a picture of the facts.456 Warrior ethos presents a proposition and conjures a picture 
in our heads: so we should reflect on what is meant by that too. 
 
According to one think tank warrior ethos is the ‘code that expects individuals to 
aggressively engage and defeat an armed enemy in battle, promoting and valuing traits 
of moral and physical courage, tactical skills, emotional and physical stamina, loyalty to 
comrades and determination to accomplish the tactical mission regardless of personal 
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risk.’457 However it is also the ‘indifference to hardship, contempt for death, and genuine 
hatred’ of the enemy, as well as a demonstrable lust for killing. 458 This second view of 
ethos, or fighting spirit, would be unattractive to most people, and more alarming: but 
both views are equally valid. A broad term, ethos is the ‘spirit of a culture, era, or 
community as manifested in its attitudes and aspirations’459 – maybe the consequence of 
a critical juncture but often intangible and unlikely definitive. These different versions 
emphasise how warrior ethos, like warrior, can both attract and repel. 
 
Whether spirit or code, of community or the individual, broad or narrow, determining 
ethos, culture patterns and tracing relationships is a ‘staggering analytical task.’460 An 
approach to warfare and a taught phenomenon461 ethos is what the armed human group 
does and how it does it.462 It ‘provides a framework within which ’the army can interpret, 
develop, and modify its method of waging war’.463 Less prescriptive than doctrine or 
policy, ethos allows for ‘common character’464 and is related and subordinate to national 
and strategic cultures from which it is derived. The ‘distinctive experience of particular 
security communities finds social expression in more or less distinctive patterns of 
enduring assumptions about strategic matters, and those patterns warrant description as 
cultural.’ 465  Ethos exists organisationally, but also within smaller groups and even 
individuals. It is most potent – exciting and possibly disturbing – where these converge. 
Grant says ‘that the founding ethos of the German Army, stressing above all else the 
dominant role of the individual on the battlefield, was fundamentally well suited to 
producing tactically effective formations.’466 
 
Synonyms for ethos include character, tendency, motivating force, disposition, moral 
code, attitudes, beliefs, principles, and standards. Warrior ethos, through a classical lens, 
is the embodiment of virtue where qualities such as ‘honor, duty, courage, loyalty, and 
self-sacrifice’, 467  integrity, and selflessness are evident, inherent and inculcated by 
training or from birth.468 It originates in: 
…the Greek ethike arete, "ethical excellence", translated by the Romans 
as virtus morales, "moral virtue" or mores, which held society together. 
Although ethics tends towards "ideals" and morals towards actual 
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"behavior" in the real world, even philosophers routinely and unhelpfully use 
the two terms interchangeably.469 
In desecrating the body of Hector, Achilles was no less warrior for refusing normative 
constraint: rather he exercised a particular warrior ethos, his view of self in war. Ethos is 
not a measure of good or bad but rather a demonstration of approach. ‘There are plenty 
of instances of armies and units with magnificent morale and superb effectiveness which 
were based on a depraved ethos: the Waffen SS is an obvious example.’470 Where ethos 
is used in the British Army it is often in conjunction with ethical direction and constraint. 
 
Ethos and the relationships between society, the social person, and social behaviour,471 
like warrior, is examined through Identity Theory472 and Social Identity Theory (SIT).473 
The frameworks are similar enough to be treated as one474 – and so they are here, albeit 
Identity Theory centres on ‘roles’ and is personal and ‘microsociological’475 whereas SIT 
(a ‘social psychological theory’ according to Hogg et al) is focussed on the group. The 
theories allow hierarchies, and categorisation of identity. These match Hofstede’s model 
at Fig. 2.1 and my analytical framework: 
the superordinate category of the self as a human being (or human identity), 
the intermediate level of the self as a member of a social ingroup as defined 
against other groups of humans (social identity), and the subordinate level 
of personal self-categorization based on interpersonal comparisons 
(personal identity).476 
Human identity involves the norms of humanity which to some extent all people share. It 
is heavily influenced by sociological consideration, or culture but it should not be 
assumed that this translates directly into ethical consideration. Shoemaker reminds us 
that ‘the relation between personal identity and ethics is complex and by no means 
established.’ He offers five different versions of identity related, but not determined by 
ethics: psychological, biological, narrative, “anthropological” and a view that identity 
doesn't matter for ethics.477 Group identity is more local and particular; personal identity 
is psychological but can be role-based. The boundaries are not clear: personal identity 
‘is defined, at least in part, by group membership and social categories are infused with 
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Warrior ethos is the spirit of the military collective: it ‘binds teams together’;479 it makes 
people ‘feel part of something’480 and affords resilience ‘to withstand shock and bounce 
back stronger.’481 It was agreed that whilst the warrior is an individual, warrior ethos was 
a group endeavour and the two required aligning. ‘It’s no good being a warrior if you are 
an individual – collective culture is critical.’482 Another soldier was more precise and 
mindful either consciously or otherwise of the possibility of subculture deviance as 
discussed: ‘this is about collective warrior ethos – and the leader sets that.’483 As such, 
individualism dissipates. That ‘warrior ethos can be distinct from being a warrior…the 
two are tangibly different’484 was mentioned on several occasions with warrior ethos 
mostly privileged over warrior when a choice between the two was required. 
 
Ethos allows the formation of a ‘Band of Brothers485 and provides ‘shared culture’486 but 
it is not contractual: it is ‘inherently vocational’ and a ‘way of life’.487  It is therefore 
something vibrant and alive: ‘it is tempting to equate ethos with tradition. However, to do 
this implies that ethos is inflexible and intolerant of change.’488 ‘It’s a code of conduct that 
is embedded in your culture and character that drives and supports how you behave in 
training, on the battlefield and in life. It will differ within cultures.’489 Fundamentally, ethos 
enables and guides action; it is cause to the warrior’s effect, or input and process to 
martial output. Unfortunately not everyone found the concept comprehensible: one CO 
had ‘no idea’ what it meant and dismissed it, in keeping with the sentiment expressed in 
the epigraph to this thesis as ‘a made-up concept’.490 Another stated that he didn’t like it 
but didn’t explain why.491 Several found the term difficult to determine. 
The British Army does not have a universal warrior culture. It is not like the 
US Marines, for example, with ‘every man a rifleman’ mantra (or the Royal 
Marines as an equivalent). Basic training is more about discipline, 
conformity, cooperation etc. It does not encourage an ethos rooted in issue 
and receipt of violence.492 
This CO thought to rely on the nature of the recruit to actualise ethos: ‘British Infantrymen 
 
478 Deaux, “Reconstructing Social Identity,” 5. 
479 CO15. 
480 FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 16:00. 
481 CO15. 
482 GS1, 23 Jan 19, 12:24. 
483 GS1, 23 Jan 19, 12:45. 
484 FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 31:32. 
485 CO07. 
486 CO18. 
487 CO10; CO17. 







have always arrived with the propensity for violence hard-wired’. So warrior ethos, like 
warrior, can be inherent and doesn’t need taught: it is a personal code and something 
that could be reinforced. Just as warrior is a title for the few so too warrior ethos was not 
considered universally applicable. It was also thought a waning concept and something 
that the British Army wasn’t taking seriously enough. Associated with warrior, this ‘spirit 
of the culture’ was becoming ‘increasingly marginalised…[as other] intangibles are cut 
as we seek efficiencies. This has ramifications on developing a truly warrior spirit.’493 
 
British Army Ethos 
 
Instilling ‘combat ethos’ is ‘the British Army’s highest priority.’494 Variously presented this 
includes fighting spirit, 495  warrior ethos and combinations thereof (see Fig. 7.2 
recommending in this instance ‘warrior 
spirit’).496 The terms are supposed to be 
roughly synonymous: ‘warrior ethos and 
combat ethos are probably the same 
thing. I don’t know but my gut tells me 
they are broadly the same thing’. 497 
Fighting power, another variant, 
comprises three components: 
conceptual (or doctrinal); moral; and physical. 498  Ethics fits mostly within the moral 
component,499 a critical and equal part but not the dominant paradigm. 
An army, we find, is still a crowd, though a highly organized one. It is 
governed by the same laws which govern crowds, and under the stress of 
war is ever tending to revert to its crowd form. Our object in peace is so to 
train it that their reversion will become extremely slow; in other words, we 
add to each individual a quality known as ‘moral’, so that, when intellect 
and reason fail man is not ruled by his instincts and sentiments alone, but 
by the moral which has become part of his nature.500 
Ethical or moral focus comes from the ‘Values and Standards’ that are the foundations501 
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of the British Army and explain ‘what the British soldier is’.502 Most efforts by respondents 
to form a definition of British Army ethos made comment on behaviour, organisational 
ethics and specifically the Values and Standards of the Army.  
It’s not just about aggression…It’s about protecting the innocent; doing the 
right thing; it’s about controlled aggression and understanding what is right 
and wrong and applying the law – and you may not necessarily agree with 
those laws but its knowing what you can and can’t do – or its anarchy.503 
The 6 Values and 3 Standards define the Army’s attitude, and aspiration for its personnel: 
they were used as a guiding framework where soldiers hunted for meaning. Acceptable 
as the basis of the British soldier’s ethos, to assume they translate seamlessly to a more 
universal warrior ethos though would be careless. 
 
Of the Values, courage is an obvious warrior trait. Indeed, Keegan suggests courage is 
the only ‘currency of unchallengeable value’ in fighting regiments; other frameworks ‘do 
not flourish.’ 504  The other components might actually constrain warriorship. Integrity 
might limit subterfuge; selfless commitment (service before self) privileges self-sacrifice, 
and undermines self-satisfaction. There is no room for Berserker behaviour where 
discipline is critical. The dehumanisation of the enemy and what Aylwin-Foster called 
‘institutional racism’ in his survey of US Army ‘warfighting ethos’505 has no place where 
respect for others is directed. The realisation of this value brings ‘protection’ into focus 
more sharply than winning. The Standards also bound behaviour. Soldiers’ actions are 
to be lawful (within UK statutes, regardless of station) and they must exercise appropriate 
behaviour. Total professionalism is the mantra. These benchmarks are questionable for 
their general applicability: lawful is measurable but mostly nationally specific, appropriate 
behaviour is a subjective standard and professionalism an uncertain term. 
 
Military organisations are predominantly situated in considerations of group identity 
whether large or small, and create in-groups and out-groups, those like us and Others. 
Tensions then evolve dependent on the theory, doctrine or hierarchy that is being 
applied. For example the individual can move between categories and across 
hierarchies. There exists a ‘functional antagonism’ between categories of identity – 
where one becomes more salient the others become less so. 506  The V&S, and 
Leadership Code 507  are guides for soldiers in the British Army. The BCS was to 
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consolidate the experiences gained on operations that produced soldiers who were 
‘combat hardened’. It sought to ‘assure the combat ethos that we learned the hard way 
during fifteen years of counterinsurgency’508 and seized the opportunity to build on the 
experiences toward improved high-intensity warfighting capability (the acceptance of 
more austere conditions, tolerance of casualties and field burials over the repatriation of 
the dead,509 the taking of Prisoners of War, and isolation on the battlefield for instance). 
Each Army branch designed its own BCS to prepare for warfighting and to suit its own 
functional needs. Most branches emphasised the skills they thought critical in terms of 
trade contribution to the Army. The various sources that inform identity give as sense of 
what the British Army wants from its soldiers but collating them does not allow a clear 
picture of a warrior organisation, nor any single picture of ethos, or identity. Opinion was 
split accordingly on whether the British Army had a warrior ethos just as it was when 
soldiers were asked if the army trained warriors. As warrior was thought a meaningless 
term so too soldiers were unsure of the relevance of ethos. 
 
 
Fig. 7.3: ‘The British Army Has a Warrior Ethos’ 
 
One soldier stated that ‘ethos statements are written by officers’, then highlighted the 
futility of that: ‘you can’t write an ethos…’510 Of those who had an opinion 47% thought 
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the army had a warrior ethos; 45% disagreed. Those who disagreed did not always reject 
‘ethos’ but expressed a negative reaction to the prefix and descriptor warrior. 
 
For most respondents combat, fighting spirit and fighting figured as prominently in 
describing warrior ethos as they did in defining warrior.511 COs thought the ability to 
endure austere and arduous conditions, a ‘hardness of character, mental and physical 
conditioning and a willingness to meet extreme challenges important.512 Camaraderie 
also gained mention more often when considering warrior ethos than warrior – it was 
suggested that commitment ‘to protecting comrades’ and service to one’s soldiers 
mattered in its realisation.513 Fellow soldiers weren’t mentioned as often when defining 
warrior reinforcing the sense the warrior is more individually based. Many referred to the 
association of warrior ethos with a higher or ‘proud calling.’ That calling was usually to 
the infantry. Its ‘not that you join the infantry because you can’t get to other parts of the 
army [because you are not clever enough] but rather because you have the calling’.514 
 
The pursuit of mission success that ‘trumps personal needs’515 is integral to warrior ethos. 
Whether these needs are personal comforts or personal realisation is unclear: they 
extend to different conclusions. The former suggests service comes first and adherence 
to a warrior ethos is the ‘sense of being prepared to sacrifice oneself for the greater 
good, 516  for the sake of the cause. 517  Here homo furens performs stoically and the 
emphasis is on the transaction between the soldier and sponsor where soldiers are 
prepared to give their lives for others and the perceived greater good. ‘The preservation 
of the lives of the subjects of the nation-state is the supreme duty’518 of the government 
and its devices, of which the Army is one. This is T1 homo furens. The denial of personal 
realisation on the other hand may be the prohibition of one’s existential self and a 
constraint on T2. This leads to ‘psychological death, or ego death’ the complete loss of 
subjective self-identity that in the mythological framework of the hero’s journey ‘is a 
phase of total self-surrender and transition.’519 
 
Morality was a factor in defining ethos – more so than when warrior was discussed. ‘It is 
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Lethality Task Force ‘to improve the combat, lethality, survivability, resiliency and readiness of U.S. infantry 
squads’ and arrest the erosion in close combat capability. US DOD, “Directive-type Memorandum (DTM) – 
18-001” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018). Accessed at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/ 
54/Documents/DD/issuances/dtm/DTM-18-001.pdf on 14 Dec 2019. A degree of privilege is afforded to the 
US infantry: this is being built into the supposedly universal but now more constrained US Warrior Ethos. 
512 COs 29, 10, 30, 28. 
513 CO07; CO10. 
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about respect and restraint recognising that those that we are called to fight are equally 
valuable human beings…It is about doing only what is necessary to bring about peace.520 
Warrior ethos demands ‘high skill guided by strong morality’521 and is ‘an approximation 
to the martial codes of chivalry employed by the Knightly Classes during the middle-ages 
in Europe, namely a competitive interest in fighting underpinned by sound ethics.’522 One 
respondent offered Richard The Lionheart as the personification and to claim to have 
this ethos the fighter must be willing to die for his beliefs and those he fights along-side. 
Virtuous and of impeccable judgement homo furens knows when to fight and does not 
abuse the power that he has. 523  These opinions align with the army’s values and 
standards, and leadership code but not necessarily to how warrior was perceived. 
 
There were differences of opinion in what aspects might be included where ethos is 
considered, but it was widely agreed what should not be included. Breaking the law and 
breaching organisational guidelines were ‘red lines’ where the army’s perceived ethos 
was to be followed. ‘Wrong doers aren’t warriors – they don’t show the responsibility 
associated with being a warrior; those aren’t warriors in my sense of the word. You don’t 
have to break CDRILS or LOAC’.524 The critical phrase here is ‘in my sense of the word’ 
and that this sense aligns with the army’s organisational sense of the word: warrior ethos 
is conflated more easily with army ethos, and soldier ethos as evidenced through the 
V&S in a way that warrior was not with soldier. The point of convergence seems based 
on the shared suffix ‘ethos’ though than anything more considered. 
 
The emphasis on morality was complemented by a focus on ruthlessness, the ‘pursuit of 
excellence’ in every endeavour, and well executed warfighting skills. The concepts are 
not mutually exclusive525 but where this harder edged consideration becomes dominant, 
we might recognise signs of what Snydor calls ‘institutional solidity’: 
the presence of shared assumptions and beliefs, commonly accepted 
norms, and the unquestioned general values that enable large numbers of 
people, despite individual ambitions, dislikes, and disagreements, to work 
together in common purpose toward definite goals.526 
The subjugation of personal interest might suit martial requirements but how it relates to 
‘moral injury’ is then a challenge. Determining the veracity of national requirements is a 






524 The mnemonic for Values and Standards and Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 
18, 26:39. 
525 Stephen W. Richey “Military Professionalism and the Warrior Ethos: Both Are Needed to Win” 6 July 
2018, accessed online at https://networks.h-net.org/node/12840/discussions/2013508/military-
professionalism-and-warrior-ethos%C2%A0-both-are-needed-win on 01 Mar 2020 
526 Snydor, Soldiers of Destruction, 346. 
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determination to succeed’527 was broadly agreed but the practicality of the approach and 
its reach was uncertain. Challenging the term early, with a view to clarifying meaning, 
before local interpretation becomes ingrained, is important. Otherwise the dissonance 
that follows is ‘very strong – and painful to tolerate.’528 Attitudes become ossified and 
dogmatic, tied to a concept that is narrowly defined.529 ‘Changing doctrines takes time; it 
disorients a military organization.’ 530  Calling soldiers warriors creates an altered 




‘My understanding is that the term came from soldiers, from market research…there 
seems to be an appetite for it, I suspect the infantry will like it, it’s different, its special.’531 
The infantry, or some infantry at least, did like it (though I uncovered little to suggest it 
came from them): their attraction was though as heavily caveated as is organisational 
sanction. The ethos the British Army agrees to is not that of the Berserker – neither is 
the British soldier expected to be an automaton. This helps in bracketing what might be 
meant where the army uses warrior but doesn’t provided a honed definition. The head of 
the team that most recently introduced the term to the Army532 makes the admission that 
‘one of the things we didn’t do in BCS was define what the warrior ethos actually is – 
though maybe we didn’t need to…You could call it an infantry ethos maybe…’ He 
explained the expectation: 
self-reliance, moral compass, turning on but also turning off extreme 
violence; understanding of what is appropriate and what is not; the 
teamwork; never leaving a colleague behind; all of those things contribute 
to the warrior ethos.533 
By calling it an infantry ethos it is possible or at least easier to focus better on what is 
meant. It provides for the omission of what it is not and helps to better understand the 
sort of warrior the British Army desires. Where warrior ethos is infantry-centric it is 
restricted to those who indulge routinely or primarily in the application of violence. 
Warrior ethos is for soldiers involved in ugly, visceral, unpleasant work: only they, ‘those 
involved in hand-to-hand fighting,’ are warriors.534 Artillerymen, tank crews and attack 
helicopter pilots for example, though fellow combat arms, are denied the accolade. ‘I 
 
527 CO13. 
528 Festinger et al., Prophecy, 29. 
529 Kiszely, “Approaches,” 202. 
530 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World 
Wars, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1984), 30. 
531 GS6: 15 Mar 19, 30:10. 
532 It’s a new term? ‘Probably – recently it has re-merged…Did we lose it might be the question?’ GS2, 14 
Feb 19, 01:23. 




think sticking a 105 shell535 in the chamber is a technical act, it’s a process, whereas a 
panzer536 coming at you in the direct role is a totally different interface’.537 To qualify, 
according to the infantrymen surveyed, one must be ‘a trained combatant who is 
physically and mentally conditioned’’538 the soldier in question’s ‘primary role is to fight 
and to kill the enemy’.539 Warriors possess ‘the will to fight’ and are ready and willing to 
fight when called.540 Respondents conferred the title on the infantry through patronage, 
for distinction and as a recommendation of fighting prowess. ‘All soldiers are not warriors 
but infantry soldiers must be! I do not believe the British Army has a ‘corporate’ warrior 
ethos but the Infantry manages to keep the concept alive locally’.541 Logisticians for 
example, it was stated, don’t need a warrior ethos.542 Others placed it against ‘rank’ and 
reserved it further: ‘I suspect the closest any part of the British Army comes to generating 
a warrior ethos is the Infantry, but then only in its NCOs (and young officers to a lesser 
degree)’.543 This Company Commander agreed: ‘I’m thinking our warriors are our Section 
Commanders who are leading men, who are committing to the decisive act, the 
Corporals…so, its 18 men across the battalion…’544 (and so he also excludes revered 
platoon sergeants and non-infantry corporals who don’t command sections). Where this 
is true then the corporals and young officers divest themselves of the ethos as they 
promote and we establish yet another circle within the broader grouping. Warrior ethos 
according to this analysis is a generated capability that is time and place dependent. It 
requires initiation and realisation in groups that previously hadn’t exhibited it. 
 
When asked where the term originated, the officer who authorised the infantry battlecraft 
syllabus (BCS) gave an honest representation of his thought process. 
There’s some personal stuff in it; there’s some we learnt from the 
Americans; in many ways it came from thoughts on how you build a team, 
a band of brothers if you like, that was a driving force; my view which the 
team shared; otherwise I can’t tell you exactly where it came from.545 
He suggests it is intuitive and a shared infantry perspective. The infantry declared in the 
BCS that it had a unique and characteristic spirit, that marks the infantry as extraordinary 
in the profession of arms. It fits with army norms but ‘it is also more than this’. The 
infantryman will go that bit further, work that bit harder, and has a competitive nature 
such that losing is never an option. Infantrymen are urged to take risks, to do whatever 
 
535 The projectile the artillery load into their guns is a 105mm shell. 
536 British soldiers use ‘panzer’ as a slang term for tank regardless of its type or national affiliation. It is 
related to the long residence of UK forces in Germany after WW2. 
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it takes to kill the enemy and to accomplish the mission.546 They focus on the enemy and 
their ethos declares the infantry separate from other soldiers. ‘Do we have a Warrior 
Ethos in the Infantry? Put simply: Yes. It is the reason why people join the Infantry’.547 It 
demands from its members that they create and foster a fighting spirit.548  
 
Other branches of the armed forces declare themselves similarly distinct with their own 
ethos. 549  British soldiers of 16 Air Assault Brigade have the ‘Pegasus Ethos’, the 
hallmarks of which are: bravery founded upon determination, endurance and 
selflessness; discipline, that is primarily self-imposed; humility; and compassionate’. The 
airborne soldiers of that brigade are ‘a ferocious enemy’ who, in battle, in barracks, and 
at home, always do the right thing.’550 The Royal Marines ethos is defined as the ‘precise 
application of will’ and focuses on the individual commando over the organisation.551 The 
Rifles declare themselves ‘distinctive, forward looking, modern and professional’552 and 
offer that ‘Rifleman’ as an identity is a source of pride. The infantry, in seizing such 
recommendations, clearly wishes to be separate from non-infantry but there is also clear 
differentiation across infantry subcultures and distinct regimental approaches exist. 
 
‘A warrior must be selfless because he must subsume the purpose for which he is fighting 
to a higher purpose or else he is just someone who likes killing.’553 Where the title was 
confined to those who fight in close combat, (‘edgy, bloody activity’) then anything that 
afforded recognition of that 'most unpleasant work’ was thought a good thing: ‘ethos must 
be there to support the person who is being asked to do that. Training will only take the 
soldier so far.’554 It was suggested the infantry are also ‘crying out for something a little 
less politically correct, a little more edgy, something more visceral that makes them stand 
out as different.’555 It allows focus on core purpose and was considered useful in clarifying 
why the infantry exists: ‘let’s separate out the notion of attaching warrior as a hashtag 
which is about mobilising identity and providing a sense of belonging, from the sense of 
purpose that makes you go that last hundred yards.556 Identifying the infantry as warriors 
 
546 BCS, 3. 
547 Ibid. 
548 BCS, 1-2 
549 The Royal Armoured Corps stated at their Forum, 12 May 2017 that their ethos would be centred on 
three descriptors: Robust-Agile-Capable (or R-A-C). 
550 Pegasus Ethos accessed at http://abnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/16X_Pegasus_Ethos.pdf 
on 09 Oct 18. 
551 Anthony King, “The Ethos Of The Royal Marines: The Precise Application Of Will,” (Paper, University of 
Exeter, 2004), https://www.ex.ac.uk/~acking/Papers/RMethos4.doc. 
552 The Rifles website at https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/corps-regiments-and-units/infantry/rifles/ on 
20 May 2019. 
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554 GS6: 15 Mar 19, 17:40. 
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is more than branding: it’s a catalyst to facilitate warrior spirit.557 Question 4 asked if 
‘Infantry Soldiers Are Warriors’: 68% of COs agreed they were; a further one in five 
strongly agreed (87% overall). 
 
 
Fig. 7.4: ‘Infantry Soldiers Are Warriors’ 
 
These results are almost exactly the reverse of those where ‘all soldiers’ and all British 
soldiers were denied the title. Not a single CO strongly disagreed that infantry soldiers 
were warriors. This is an overwhelming vote from the gatekeepers of regimental culture: 
warriorship is relevant to British infantry soldiers in a way that it was refused to others. A 
smaller percentage (61%) of COs thought themselves warriors so we can deduce that 
COs think of their soldiers as warriors but are themselves unsure of their right to the title. 
In focus groups the sense of warriorship, or warrior ethos was slightly less vibrant though 
nearly two thirds (61%) thought infantry soldiers are warriors. That cohort were similarly 
reluctant to claim the title personally. When they considered the statement ‘I am a 
Warrior’ only 43% agreed or strongly agreed that they individually were warriors but in 
opposition to others, and as a collective they are comfortable that they deserve the title. 
It will be remembered that soldiers thought the term warrior was something that had been 
imposed upon them rather than something they themselves had sought; they considered 
it ‘cheesy’ and ‘cringeworthy’, a source of derision and ‘not a word for us’ yet they are 
 






























































reluctant to relinquish it, or strip their in-group of the title. It is a label then that is reserved 
(it’s not for all soldiers); it sits uncomfortably on the individual (‘not for me’); but is 
appropriate for those the respondent associates with (fellow infantrymen), regardless 
that is an indeterminate grouping since ‘infantry’ takes several forms.558 Soldiers may not 
believe they personally belong to the warrior caste but ‘ingroup bias is motivated by a 
desire to sees ones group’ as well as oneself positively.559 The results demonstrate a 
preference for the group over the self, and a degree of group worship or what the group 
is thought to be. Soldiers compare themselves to others thought ‘better’ and strive for 
warriorship but don’t necessarily feel they personally own the title. They are prepared to 
afford it to their infantry colleagues who they think ‘more warrior’ than themselves.560 
 
The BCS team sought formal recognition, through symbology, for infantry soldiers: ‘the 
infantry should consider an equivalent of the US Army’s Combat Infantryman Badge to 
recognise both active duty and/or proficiency in basic skills’. 561  They sought the 
establishment of an exclusive Club firstly to recognise infantry skills beyond the basic 
training that all soldiers undertake, and secondly from service on operations.  
We must reward those who embody the Warrior Ethos, and not be afraid to 
sanction those who fall below the standard. If we want our soldiers to 
behave like Warriors then we must treat them like Warriors.562 
A badge would qualify admission to the caste and highlight infantry distinction: ‘We might 
consider a ceremony to emphasise the fact that passing the Combat Infantryman’s 
Course is something special…we have forged your fighting spirit, your warrior ethos…’563 
The belief that warriorship is ‘forged’ is worth registering; the mention of a ceremony or 
a badge to mark the infantryman as a warrior implies more visible and public recognition 
of the infantry as a collective. The BCS recommended a badge; a company commander 
told me he had taken it upon himself to institute exactly this sort of recognition. In his 
Company ‘we have a Best Ranger award and the prize is a fighting axe, to try and instil 
fighting ethos’. 564  Outward demonstrations of qualification set against a corporate 
standard could assist in explaining what is meant when the word warrior is used to 
describe British soldiers but would also make the term more exclusive and illustrative of 
some of the more concerning aspects of historical and obligatory militarism. 
 
558 Paratroopers, Armoured, Mechanised and Light Infantry. The British Army even boasts Special Infantry. 
559 Rupert Brown, "Social Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems and Future Challenges," 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 30:6 (Nov 2000): 755, https://doi.org/10.1002/1099-0992(200011/ 
12)30:6%3C745::AID-EJSP24%3E3.0.CO;2-O 
560 Danish soldiers were asked their opinion on esprit de corps. One in 5 believed their answers would 
differ from fellow officers: ‘they showed neither Esprit de Corps nor corporateness.’ Henning Sørensen, 
“New Perspectives on the Military Profession: The I/O Model and Esprit de Corps Reevaluated,” Armed 
Forces & Society, 20:4 (1994): 606, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9402000407 
561 BCS, 4. 
562 Ibid., 5. 
563 GS7: 29 Mar 19, 15:49. 




It was suggested that ‘the infantry need these terms to make themselves feel better, and 
to give confidence’.565 This lack of confidence with the infantry presenting as neglected 
or adrift from the wider army and yearning for promotion and recognition was noted 
during the research. That the infantry is the bedrock of the army seemed a distant notion: 
respondents instead preferred the infantry was moving toward the margins of the army.  
Units on a flank, that see themselves as different to the rest of the Army, by 
training, or geography, or culture: there’s a bit about those organisations 
being different, working harder than others that are less different because 
they think they have something to prove…the concept of outsiders fuels the 
warrior approach’566 
Claiming ownership of warriorhood allows enhanced or re-energised identity. Warrior 
and warrior ethos permits the infantry to ‘define themselves separately from the rest of 
the army…it has a resonance because the British like a shorthand for something’567 and 
warrior is shorthand for hard soldiering. Others highlighted the specific nature of the 
infantry: ‘We are different. The infantry is different to the other Arms and Services. We 
are the tip of the spear. We are the bit that the rest support. We are combat.’568 That ‘the 
shaft of the spear deserves equal esteem as that of the tip of the spear’569 was lost on 
many of those consulted. Warrior as an identity ‘encapsulates that sense of identity and 
sense of belonging to a bunch of chosen men’.570 The recommendation and comments 
they made promote self, self-esteem, self-efficacy and self-interest.571 
 
Warrior is ‘not just a military term but the military needs it’572 and the infantry needs a 
more ‘developed sense’ of warriorship than others.573 It was pitched as an aspirational 
standard: ‘we do need to tell soldiers that they are warriors as it will make them better 
soldiers – self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts’ and a rallying point for the infantry – ‘a good 
thing…to coalesce around.’574 These sentiments are weakened by uncertainty regarding 
meaning: ‘we do need to control the definition’ said a focus group of officers. It was 
accepted that warrior is not the only term that could be used ‘We could have called it 
something else I suppose’, said the officer who led the writing of the BCS. The fact is 
that the infantry is struggling to define its identity: ‘warrior’ is seized in the absence of 
stronger or preferable distinction to afford a clear sense of purpose and improve morale. 
The identifier ‘warrior’ is a consequence of a lack of credible or suitable alternative. 
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The warrior ethos is at the heart of what we do in the infantry whereas 
arguably you can be a very good sapper, a good signaller, logistician and 
maybe not to the same degree have the same warrior ethos that you need 
in the infantry. It’s not irrelevant to others but its pertinent for the infantry.575 
It was welcomed as a vehicle through which the infantry could re-claim prominence, and 
argued that it would assist in filling a void that the infantry ‘owned’ and into which it should 
regenerate.576 This officer stated frankly: ‘in the absence of a war or a campaign which is 
often the greatest recruitment tool, we, in the infantry, seem to have ceded the centre 
ground on combat or warrior status.’577 Allowing all soldiers the term diminishes the 
infantry’s special place. The declaration of the infantry as warriors, the desired inculcation 
of warrior ethos and the warrior spirit was offered as ‘the anti-thesis to the Belonging578 
generation’; ‘the infantry is more warrior’ and needs to make this clear to itself, internally 
across the army and externally to society at large.579 Care is essential though in how a 
concept is presented: ‘as soon as you label a concept, you change how people perceive 
it.’580 As soon as you label soldiers you could change how they are perceived. 
 
By allocating the title warrior to their colleagues, those of the same trade, soldiers 
retained the title for the infantry (‘for us’) even where they think it’s not one that they 
personally deserve. Uneasy as they were with the label they wouldn’t give it up due to 
the ‘us and them’ considerations evident in the classic ‘in-groups’ and out-groups’ of 
Social Identity Theory.581 This phenomenon has been commented on in experiments 
where participants empathise with those they think support the same football team, or 
have similar coloured eyes. People tend to ‘give more points to members of their own 
group than to members of the outgroup.’582 Respondents were uncomfortable with the 
imposition of the title upon them as individuals but indulged in secondary imposition 
where they placed it on others rather than dismiss it completely. Soldiers seek the title 
warrior for those ‘like them’ and who they admired, in the infantry. 
Prepared to exclude fellow soldiers, several of those consulted went so far as to exclude 
infantry colleagues. ‘Some have it in spades from day one, others can become warriors 
through the right training and immersion and some will never get it. The Army, and to a 
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lesser extent the infantry, contain all three.’583 That ‘some will never get it’, even in the 
infantry, albeit to a ‘lesser extent’ reinforces that warriorship cannot be imparted to 
anyone – the raw material must qualify first by ‘type’. The idea of ‘different’ types within 
the infantry made sense to others too. ‘I think though that there are scales within scales. 
On the right real potential but also possible catastrophe. Other end, possible success 
there too and less chance of something going wrong’.584 It is better to tolerate the non-
warriors who might win success, but might lose, than to expose them as less than 
warriorlike. This is a risky strategy not least in light of the seriousness with which 
respondents regarded their trade. It compromises the concept of warriorship as an 
infantry standard where admission is based on a ‘tax’ on the toughest of soldiers. 
 
Confusion about meaning, frustration at apparent constraint and concerns that warrior is 
an historic construct, or meaningless term were mostly set aside where it came to the 
issue of who might claim the title. It was more often considered synonymous with 
infantryman than it was soldier: ‘It does define infantry as a whole; the Army maybe not, 
the infantry definitely, tag it to the infantry’.585 The infantry needed to more actively seize 
it: it might even be reserved completely for the infantry.  
I personally think it is more appropriate to the infantry because the nature 
of the warrior ethos is fighting spirit, its independence, it’s determination, 
controlled aggression, teamwork; all those things are important in our day 
job where we are contracted to close with the enemy. Everyone else in the 
army has to be able to do that but it’s not their day job.586 
This seizing of the title offers opportunity. ‘One of the reasons the infantry is suffering at 
the minute’ in recruiting opined one officer ‘is because of how the Army is being branded 
and advertised; the neutralisation of tone, the acceptance of all people; “Belonging”; the 
infantry alternately needs to be chasing a higher-level vision’.587  
‘Belonging’ went too far down the non-traditional route. It had to because 
the generation today are not as enthused by murder-death-kill as 
generations before. The core intenders who are enthused by that, that 
market is getting smaller all the time, and it gets smaller the farther away 
we get from Afghanistan and Iraq. If we went after just those we would have 
an Army of relatively few. But we went too far the other way. We turned off 
too much the core intenders and the internal market. The new adverts have 
dialled ‘Belonging’ back and we’re back to blokes bursting into rooms with 
rifles and lasers.588 
The infantry is now being squeezed on two fronts. Historically ‘any officer in the technical 
branches was ‘the bloke’ – implying that he was not a proper soldier…unbefitting to the 
conduct expected…In the other ranks, those who had a technical qualification were 
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officially designated ‘tradesmen’.’ 589  Today the technical arms are considered more 
favourably and the infantry cannot assume ‘horsey’ superiority as Liddell-Hart termed it. 
They hope instead to recover their standing through recognition as warriors. Secondly, 
there appear to be less T2 warriors, ‘core intenders’ and Coker’s dying class to recruit. 
 
An opinion has been offered that an indifferent approach to ‘rewarding effective conduct 
in combat’ may be a symptom of a lack of ‘true’ fighting culture, or warriorship, in the 
British Army.590 In his article, Grant contrasts the British Army of the 1990s unfavourably 
with the German Army of WWII, and explains that in the Wehrmacht: ‘Promotions, 
rewards and kudos were reserved for those at the point of most 
danger.’ 591  Respondents agreed that the British Army didn’t 
have this culture and rewards were relatively meaningless. it 
doesn’t matter ‘who gets called warrior and who doesn’t: it’s like 
who gets rosettes and who doesn’t’.592 Rosettes on medals (or 
clasps as shown in Fig. 7.5)593 are awarded to distinguish those 
who are in the area of conflict and are judged to have been in 
danger, or involved in the ‘warfighting phase’ from those who 
were not. The criteria is disputed just as the entitlement to 
identify as warrior was disputed. Interestingly those who might 
lay the easiest claim to the mantle were least concerned about it. The opinion above 
regarding medals and rosettes where it ‘doesn’t matter’ was offered by an infantry 
corporal whose job it is to lead troops against the enemy: he has an undisputed right to 
the medal with rosette and clasp. Those whose right to it might be disputed are often 
more keen to gain recognition. 
 
‘Warrior’ as a title, like rosettes, badges and ciphers allows the infantry to stand apart: ‘I 
would be completely happy if warrior became a term that was associated with the 
infantry’ 594  not least because infantry as a word was thought unattractive. Infantry, 
infantryman or ‘infanteer’ were judged inelegant terms, associated with inglorious 
endeavours: ‘infantry has negative connotations with the Great War, when I hear the 
word infantry, when the general public hear the word they think of masses walking 
forward in straight lines – that has to be broken away from’.595 Examination of this issue 
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gives substance to the deduction that the attraction of ‘warrior’ is a response and defence 
mechanism against a perceived demotion of infantry standing. 
Partly due to societal changes, partly due to generational changes and due 
for example to things out there about what the combat element does like 
Op Reflect, the remembrance campaign for the 100th anniversary of WW1 
that presents infantrymen being slaughtered in their thousands, and a 
mental health crisis in the nation which is reflected in the post-Falklands 
analogy that more people committed suicide after the Falklands than died 
in the War – this narrative has conspired against people wanting to do what 
we [the infantry] do.596 
The term warrior allows ‘social redress’ for a grievance where the infantry is a minority 
group in the army – and where they question their own social and even personal identity 
and standing. By ‘developing clearly visible identity markers and less permeable 
category boundaries’597 the infantry through its employment of the term warrior creates a 
secure system of reference. But it is acceptable only ‘as a secondary term’598 – the 




‘Warriors should be looked at through a regimental lens’ suggested an infantry instructor 
‘some regiments are, some are not.599 Where a unit exists on a ‘warrior scale’ and the 
sources of its culture won through ‘particular missions or geographical environments’600 
assist in determining identity. Units might then be employed according to their nature as 
an assault force, or a defensive force, or even outside of combat operations: 
…we should not fall into the trap of believing that the peacekeeping arena 
has much, if anything, in common with the battlefield, or that the attributes 
of the peacekeeper are, by themselves, of much relevance as qualifications 
to be a war-fighter.601 
The group most important to the soldiers consulted for this thesis was not the army or 
even the infantry: it was their regiment, a ‘metaphysical concept’602 maybe but a tangible 
social group603 as far as they were concerned and an organisation with real meaning. It 
is where ‘one’s idiosyncratic individualizing qualities are overwhelmed by the salience of 
one’s group memberships’. 604  Subculture also matters: ‘it’s when you get to your 
Company605 – that’s when you get your ethos, that’s when you get your calling’.606 It is 
 
596 GS6: 15 Mar 19, 06:55. 
597 Brown, "Social Identity Theory," 768. 
598 FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 14:50. 
599 Ibid., 44:15. Regiments in this context is used to differentiate infantry units. 
600 Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context,” 51-2. 
601 Kiszely, “What Should We Be Looking For?” 73. 
602 French, Military Identities, 339. 
603 A ‘set of individuals who hold a common social identification or view themselves as members of the 
same social category.’ Stets & Burke, "Identity Theory," 225. 
604 Hornsey, "Social Identity Theory,” 206. 
605 Within each battalion there are usually 4-6 companies of c100 soldiers each. 
606 FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 13:53. 
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where both T1 and T2 are subsumed by the collective. Aligning team and Company 
ethos to regimental organisation and beyond to the infantry and the army is the trick to 
giving meaning to identity that is coherent. 
 
Regimental identity is lucid.607 Uniformity provided by the named world of the regiment, 
the ‘non-rational methods of persuasion’608 and the symbols that designate a soldier’s 
position qualify role.609 These are comprehensible under Identity Theory. Like the chicken 
and egg dilemma, the recruit is drawn in, and the regiment offers opportunity for self-
realisation or vice versa. Personality, and identity, is ‘as much a product of a person’s 
world as it is a determinant of it.’610 A role is given or the group is joined and the soldier 
can exist either side of the Doing-Being division but the sense of belonging to that 
regiment circumvents all other considerations. One respondent couldn’t connect with 
British Army ethos or culture and even isolated his regiment from the wider infantry: ‘I'm 
not sure about British Army culture as I am a part of the Parachute Regiment’.611  
 
It is difficult to overemphasise the importance of this statement: regimental identity is 
deliberately privileged over all others forms of identity. At one of the first focus groups a 
coarse show of hands survey was conducted to ascertain how soldiers wished to be 
known. The choices I offered were: soldier, infantryman, or warrior. It quickly became 
apparent that these three options were insufficient – the ‘options aren’t relatable’.612 
Asking why revealed more specific terminology was preferred: ‘I’d go paratrooper’ said 
the soldier who raised the objection. Including this more functional and regimental term 
in the offer resulted in no hands shown for soldier, infantryman or warrior and 5 out of 5 
hands raised for paratrooper: they said an acceptable alternative would be ‘airborne’. 
This exercise was repeated at subsequent groups and results were consistent with 
soldiers overwhelmingly preferring to be known by their regimental identity.  
 
It is critical ‘to examine how a person categorizes herself or himself as a member of a 
group.’613 The soldiers of the Royal Irish were clear on how they categorised themselves: 
‘We should be promoting the rank of Ranger over Royal Irish Warrior’ was the opinion of 
the Royal Irish recruiting team where 10 out of 10 soldiers preferred Ranger over soldier, 
infantryman or warrior.614 Ranger is the rank that the Royal Irish Regiment gives to its 
 
607 Hogg et al., "A Tale of Two Theories," 260. 
608 The ‘use of rhetorical language, symbols, uniforms, chanting, control of bodily appearance, movement, 
and posture, ribbons, ceremonies, music, marching, etc.’ Robillard, "Dangers of Soldier Identity," 211. 
609 Stets & Burke, "Identity Theory," 225. 
610 Haslam et al, New Psychology, 14. 
611 Instr 21. 
612 FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 13:51. 
613 Stets & Burke, "Identity Theory," 228. 
614 FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 03:00. 
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private soldiers. Dating to an antecedent regiment, the Connaught Rangers (1793-1922), 
it matters to the regiment for its exclusivity and heritage as much anything else. A focus 
group of officers agreed: ‘I prefer Ranger over Warrior – it’s how we refer to our soldiers, 
and it’s what our soldiers are passionate about, its unique.’615 At a SNCO focus group 
only one preferred infantryman, 5 out of 6 opted for Ranger; 3 out of 5 corporals accepted 
warrior but when offered ‘Ranger’ 5 out of 5 self-nominated; and in a group of junior non-
commissioned officers the choice of ‘Ranger’ as identity was also unanimous.616 
 
In one discussion, small group affiliation came through even more strongly. Half the 
group were ex 1st Battalion soldiers, deployed and deployable globally, whose 
antecedent regiment was the Royal Irish Rangers: there soldiers were always referred 
to as Rangers. The other half comprised Home Service Royal Irish soldiers, who were 
deployed only in NI and who termed their soldiers Privates, a rank taken from their 
antecedent, the Ulster Defence Regiment. Here the body was split. Three opted for 
‘infantryman’ as a designation; four of the group preferred Ranger. 617  The opinions 
expressed were directly related to antecedent regimental affiliations. This is remarkable 
for the fact that those regimental references were at the time of the discussion 28 years 
expired, with the merger of both regiments occurring in 1992. Subculture and regimental 
affiliation, and even informal or historic cultures unsanctioned by the formal extant 
culture618 is a highly significant and determining factor for soldiers. 
 
The officer in charge of infantry ethos, keen on the title warrior for the infantry, was 
convinced that a broader term of reference was necessary, especially for recruiting: 
‘People only think about joining the Army, people understand ‘infantry’ – the regiments 
are less well understood now. Where’s Mercia? Who was the Princess of Wales to 
today’s youngsters? Only 7% of the population know someone in the Army’. 619  His 
deduction is that regimental identity is less tenable since affiliation and regimental 
association is strong only once the soldier is enlisted and begun the journey of induction 
– when he or she is hearing and digesting the stories. ‘To many outside the Army, the 
infantry (with its bewildering range of regiments) is more confusing than it is appealing.’620 
Prior to joining then, the assumption is that the recruit cannot have a sense of 
 
615 FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 27:40. 
616 FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 32:40; FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 30:10; FG5: JNCOs 29 Nov 18, 06:40. 
617 FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 29:00. 
618 Dandeker & Gow “Military Culture,” 59. 
619 He is referring to The Mercian Regiment and The Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment: GS6: 15 Mar 
19, 36:30. A reduced military-civilian interface exists elsewhere too. ‘There is a widening gulf in the United 
States today between the public and those who serve in the military and fight the nation’s wars. Though 
the populace expresses a great deal of trust in the military, the number of citizens with a direct connection 
to the military is shrinking, suggesting that respect for the military is inversely proportional to participation 
in it.’ Amy Schafer, ‘Generations of War: The Rise of the Warrior Caste and the All-Volunteer Force,’ 
CNAS, 08 May 2017, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/generations-of-war  
620 Dave, “The British Regimental System.” 
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association. More should therefore be made of ‘infantry’ and warrior, as collective 
references to draw people into the army. That this could prove a short-term arrangement 
since identity is not a fleeting phenomenon was not considered. Two further points of 
caution apply: first, groups perceived to have high status contribute to positive identity621 
and are attractive so the assumption that regiments are not recognised due to a lack of 
contact should be tested before it is accepted. Reputations attract even where the units 
are themselves unfamiliar. Second, whether ‘warrior’ builds on existing self-identity that 
is then reinforced or if it affords an identity in the absence of self-esteem (aligned to the 
uncertainty-identity model) 622  is unclear. Induction and training for either must be 
carefully tailored to suit all or it may fail in building collective identity. 
 
Collectivisation can also destroy local identity and affiliation. ‘Infantry branding – it’s very 
bland. It almost deletes the power of infantry recruiting through infantry regiments which 
is very powerful’.623 Insightfully: ‘the thing that makes the Infantry unique [regimental 
ethos and identity] is the thing that makes us harder to collectivise.’624 This officer argues 
that contrary to accepted philosophy, the sum of the parts is actually greater where they 
are kept apart. Concern that the term warrior, useful for recruiting purposes, would 
become corporate identity and diminish regimental identity, leading to the merging of 
regiments under a ‘warrior’ banner was articulated and opposition thought predictable. 
‘If you apply it to the Infantry, the [infantry] regiments will object, if you make it the Army, 
the infantry will object.’625 It was anticipated to fail too when placed upon the wider British 
Army. ‘If you define the British Warrior – the Scottish Warrior may not be happy, the Irish 
Warrior won’t be happy, they will both have alternative preferences for identity.’626 Culture 
eats strategy for breakfast627 and so local culture trumps organisational identity. The fear 
is that: ‘Once broken, the System will not readily recover, and the British Army will sever 
a key thread with history that has served the nation well for nearly four centuries.’628 
 
One of the corporals consulted was able to bridge the gap. He thought the various terms 
did not need to be exclusive. Like the Stoic he could exist in a multiphrenic condition, 
confident in who and what he was. He supported his regimental identify over any other 
but explained self-categorisation, firm in his primary affiliation and satisfied that harmony 
 
621 Naomi Ellemers et al., "Status Protection In High Status Minority Groups," European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 22:2 (1992): 123-140, https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420220203  
622 Michael A. Hogg et al., "Why Do People Join Groups? Three Motivational Accounts From Social 
Psychology," Social & Personality Psychology Compass 2:3 (2008): 1274, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-
9004.2008.00099.x. 
623 GS3: 12 Feb 19, 1:03:20. 
624 FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 43:58. 
625 FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 39:52. 
626 Ibid., 38:38.. 
627 Attributed to Management Consultant Peter Drucker. 
628 Dave, “The British Regimental System.” 
 
195 
could be had: ‘Ranger is the Royal Irish word for Warrior’.629 A senior officer agreed 
multiple identities were possible (and like the corporal reduces warrior to something more 
specific): ‘I think you can have many identities. This is not a watering down of the 
regimental system. You can be an infantryman first, then a Fusilier. Infantry is our trade’. 
However where warrior fits with these appreciated identities is uncertain and is more 
likely to conflict with one or all of them given its inexact connotation. 
 
The regimental system where units, and in particular infantry regiments are recruited on 
a regional and county basis, is the foundation of British martial identity: national and 
provincial associations are encouraged and the regiment is a supra-national entity.630 
The regiment also explains itself as it wishes. ‘In the Lancs [The Duke of Lancaster’s 
regiment] the soldiers will say they are Lions of England quicker than warrior; in the 
Anglians [The Royal Anglian Regiment] they will declare themselves Vikings’.631 This first 
example allows identity as preferred through Lancaster, the persona of the Duke and 
indeed the county of Lancashire: in the second the ‘land of the Angles’ (Anglia) is 
assumed an entity akin to the regimental county home base regardless of its lack of 
recognisable boundary. Both gatekeeper influence and myth are working hard here. The 
Royal Regiment of Scotland emphasises Scots heritage, both lowland and highland. A 
card provided to each Scots soldier has this as regimental direction.632 
I am a Scottish Infantryman 
I am responsible for the reputation of my Regiment and upholding its history 
I am PROUD to be part of this team 
I am FEARLESS in battle and compassionate in peacetime 
I am the living example of a PROFESSIONAL soldier 
The term warrior is absent. In other regiments it is equally so: in some where it is 
mentioned it is downplayed, or interpreted toward individual regimental preference. The 
strongest sense of identity comes from knowing which regiment is yours, and which small 
group you belong to – ‘the experience of the checkpoint [in Afghanistan] – doesn’t matter 
where you are from, all mucking in together…it was brilliant…we were like a family’.633 
 
 
629 FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 32:10. 
630 Denman observes that: ‘The regiment acted as a supra-national basis for the Irish soldier's loyalty; and 
perhaps service in Irish units focused rather than diffused a sense of Irishness. Denman, “The Red Livery 
of Shame,” 233. Provincial identity and influences external to the army can also create negative effect. 
Draper highlights the Connaught Rangers who were stationed in India at the height of the Anglo-Irish War 
where nationalist sentiment played some part in the ‘mutiny’ there. He points to institutional failings in the 
Army at that time as being equally important but it is the nationalist element that is mediatised and 
celebrated - and so mythologised. Mario Draper, “Mutiny Under the Sun: The Connaught Rangers, India, 
1920,” War In History, (2019): 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344518791208. Roy highlights that ‘caste 
consciousness’ can be replaced by racial pride. Kaushik Roy, “The Construction of Regiments in the Indian 
Army: 1859-1913,” War in History, 8:2 (2001): 147. So, identity and ethos can come from many sources 
and cannot be assumed. 
631 FG11: SNCOs 01 Nov 18, 52:20. 
632 Provided to the author by a SNCO of the Royal Regiment of Scotland. FG11: SNCOs 01 Nov 18. 
633 FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 31:50. 
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The marketing company that advised the Royal Irish on the #RIRISHWARRIOR 
campaign agreed to discuss the rationale behind their advertising strategy.634 National 
pride (“Irishness’) was important to their approach and they thought it important to 
promote symbols like the distinctive Royal 
Irish headdress known as a caubeen (Fig. 
7.6), 635  the unique green hackle, or plume, 
and Royal Irish cap badge – the harp and 
crown. They were correct in picking these 
things according to focus groups: ‘history 
spurs you  on, the power of the caubeen, 
being an Irishman…’636 That the regiment had 
collectively been awarded the Conspicuous 
Gallantry Cross (shown in top right hand 
corner of the Regimental Colour at Fig. 4.1) in recognition of bravery, sacrifice and 
service on operations in Northern Ireland was also thought powerful for creating a brand: 
the Royal Irish is unique in that it is the only regiment to have been organisationally 
honoured in this manner. Symbols such as these are convincing in the creation and 
maintenance of myth, heritage and history, and provide the stories soldiers tell. Less 
tangibly perhaps, though equally authoritatively, fighting spirit was something thought 
inextricably associated with the regiment that required highlighting. The convergence of 
symbology, national sentiment and regimental fighting spirit provided the idea that the 
regiment should be marketed with the caubeen, the shamrock, the regiment’s ‘Drop 
Zone’ flash from its days as an air assault unit (and associated with stories from World 
War Two and Arnhem) and even the regimental mascot, an Irish Wolfhound highlighted 
as icons. ‘Irish’ was the immutable part of the identity campaign; warrior was not. 
 
Three descriptors were shortlisted – Hero, Warrior and Ranger – to identify soldiers and 
‘build a positive reputation’637 for the Royal Irish. The desire was to create a memorable 
and engaging social media strapline and Twitter ‘hashtag’. Ranger failed as an identifier 
for several reasons. It was thought too close to one of the antecedent regiments from 
the most recent merger in 1992 and might alienate those otherwise affiliated. Of more 
concern, it can have sectarian overtones for its association with Glasgow Rangers 
Football Club – a team thought ‘Protestant’ in character. This could be inflammatory and 
 
634 Discussion: author, Regimental Secretary of the Royal Irish Regiment and marketing company 
employees, 14 Nov 2018. 
635 The regimental head-dress of the Royal Irish is called a caubeen. Image accessed at https://www.royal-
irish.com/stories/the-caubeen on 31 Dec 2019. © Copyright 2019. The Royal Irish. All Rights Reserved. 
The history of the caubeen can too be found at this link. 
636 FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 34:30. 
637 Marketing Company Regimental Communications Proposal 06 Apr 2016. 
Fig. 7.6: The Caubeen 
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would alienate communities in NI from which recruits are sought. ‘Hero’ was dropped 
early in discussions. The Regimental Headquarters made clear its opposition: ‘With 
respect to #RIRISHWARRIOR, the first proposal was #RIRISHHERO which certainly 
turned me off, even #RIRISHWARRIOR…we went with it with some discomfort’.638  
 
Warrior, chosen ‘with some discomfort’, from the outset provides an unstable and 
unconvincing foundation for identity. The marketing company wanted to highlight 
heroism but the regiment didn’t favour the title. The soldiers would prefer Ranger but the 
political context was not conducive. Warrior was the least worse option. A subtlety in the 
marketing company’s campaign was also missed. ‘RIRISH’, the shortened militarised 
version of the regimental title, was to be charged as a device. The marketing company 
intended it to be read phonetically as ‘Our Irish’, promoting the regiment as belonging to 
the people of Ireland and therefore heightening association – and increasing recruits. 
The suffix Warrior was a less important element of the ‘hashtag’ to the marketing experts. 
This was totally missed by soldiers who contributed to the research: ‘warrior’ was the 
sole focus demonstrating how easy it is to attribute incorrect emphasis and become 
confused by a new term of identity.  
 
The ethos of ‘the last Irish infantry Regiment of the line in the British Army’ is explained 
on the regiment’s official website.  
It is defined by its Irish character and the Irish traditions it observes. The 
Regiment recruits predominantly from the island of Ireland but also 
welcomes men of the right quality and character from all parts of the United 
Kingdom and further afield. The Regimental identity is Irish, reflected in the 
ethos, values and cultural orientation of all who have served or continue to 
serve the Regiment. Those who identify as Royal Irish or seek to be 
identified as Royal Irish will, above all, be professional in attitude and 
action, determined to lean in to any task, fiercely loyal to their Regiment 
and positively apolitical.639 
This is detailed and provides a sense of the attitude and aspiration that the regiment has 
for itself: soldiers also thought it familiar and felt they could then measure unit ethos. 
Ranger ethos 640  is the spirit of the Royal Irish and this goes beyond functional or 
formation influence: ‘we offer Ranger ethos in this Battalion, and what it is to be a 
 
638 FG1: RHQ, 14 Nov 18, 01:49. The RHQ sense of being ‘turned off’ by Hero reflects the mood at the 
regiment. Soldiers were not attracted to the plan. ‘#RIRISH HERO – now that’s American, what about 
being humble, showing humility, ain’t nobody going to turn around and can call themselves a hero’. FG6: 
Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 40:50. Interestingly in comment on the constructs one American soldier says that 
hero is used as a sarcastic sobriquet in the US forces. ‘If you’ve been in the Army longer than five minutes, 
you’ve probably been called “warrior” already. Or maybe “hero,” usually used sarcastically when referring 
to basic trainees. But “warrior” is not used sarcastically.’ Angry Staff Officer. “Stop Calling Us Warriors,” 14 
Dec 2016, at https://angrystaffofficer.com/2016/12/14/stop-calling-us-warriors/ on 17 Jun 2017. 
639 Accessed at https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/corps-regiments-and-units/infantry/royal-irish-
regiment/ on 30 Dec 18. 
640 FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 14:50. 
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Ranger.’641 Succinctly: ‘The soldiers all see themselves as Rangers. Different from all the 
rest.’642 The Irishness of the unit and the ability to ‘be Irish’ in the British Army through 
adherence to traditions established by soldiers from Ireland and the unique history of the 
regiment – with emphasis on unit loyalty and the apolitical nature of the regiment – is 
how the Regiment self-presents. Any alternative identity would require careful handling 
to complement and not displace what is already authoritative. As one soldier said: ‘I can 
explain Ranger in a pub; I can’t explain Warrior’.643 Where it can be explained it is more 
than a ‘shallow act’; it has ‘appreciable effect’ and is viable.644 
 
Ethos, locally enforced, is difficult to resist.  
Once people are in the Army though around the 6-8 week point of basic 
training we have inculcated, indoctrinated, whatever word you use, more of 
a combat ethos and they see the Army’s purpose as to protect the nation 
and to fight to protect the nation’645  
Certain regiments are thought to have an unassailable ethos – and with this comes a 
degree of envy and admiration. ‘The Paras ‘have it’ much as we might not like it. They 
have an ethos drummed into them that they are the best. [It] starts in basic training – 
they only train their own. Half of it is brainwashing but that’s OK’.646 The two strongest 
brands were thought to be Para and Rifles 647  – ‘paras brand as ‘hard men’ with 
uncompromising standards and present as ‘vaguely cultish’; 648  the Rifles offer the 
Rifleman Ethos, ‘lots of locations, lots of [infantry] trades, variation’ according to the 
senior officer in charge of infantry ethos. So strong are these brands in fact that ‘the first 
two females to commence infantry training have elected for Rifles’.649 The strength of the 
offer of this regiment is such that new recruits, including those previously prohibited from 
joining the infantry, have the Rifles as their first choice. They didn’t join the Army, nor the 
infantry or some band of warriors; they joined ‘The Rifles’. 
 
The introduction of ‘warrior ethos’ is an attempt to reduce division and strengthen the 
higher-level collective.  
 
641 FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 43:11. 
642 CO01. 
643 FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 32:40. 
644 Riza, “Two-Dimensional Warfare,” 266. 
645 GS2: 14 Feb 19, 05:40. 
646 FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 14:08. 
647 I am confident that others might equally have been mentioned: Gurkhas, Scots, the SAS come 
immediately to mind as strong army brands. 
648 Nick Betts, ‘Inside the Parachute Regiment, “The Last Outpost for Hard Men Willing to do Bad Things to 
Bad People”,’ The Telegraph, 9 Jan 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/men/the-filter/inside-parachute-
regiment-last-outpost-hard-men-willing-do-bad/. 
649 GS6: 15 Mar 19, 32:00. Since conducting this interview both are now qualified infantry soldiers. One 
joined the Rifles, the other reportedly enlisted in the Princess of Wales’ Royal Regiment. Mark Nicol “Two 
Women Pass the Army's Gruelling Six Month Infantry Training Course Making Them the First British 





My job is to please the infantry. We have 17 regiments that never speak as 
one – they are starting to now but only as a necessity because manning is 
not good. We need to regain and find the glue that binds us together; that’s 
essential. If warrior is a term that can be used well, brilliant. We don’t have 
a trade mark on it but we will use it.650 
The necessity to maximise recruitment compels the seizure of the term warrior but it may 
be a short term expedient: promising warriorship could prove an empty offer. Such 
strategies can fail when the ‘transferability of theory to the world of action’ is tested.651 
The moment of truth will be in the appearance of the trained product. ‘As a commander, 
I am concerned not so much with how to persuade people to join the Armed Services, 
as with what I am looking for in those who come under my command.’652 The label is one 
thing; the training regime another; the leadership effort required to realise warriorship 
and establish identity within the ranks a further consideration. 
 
The officer with responsibility for the BCS where warrior ethos was first articulated 
expects regimental and infantry ethos to co-exist. ‘I don’t think it should prevent units 
from referring to themselves on a more individual basis but warrior ethos allows us to 
bring the Corps of Infantry together.’653 A second officer with responsibility for branding 
and marketing, and more broadly the organisation’s corporate communications said that 
‘the need was to find a binding factor for the infantry as a whole – this was that.’654 The 
offer of an additional layer of identity it was anticipated would be welcome. ‘I’d like to 
think if you speak to most infantryman that they would agree and believe that the warrior 
ethos is a critical part of what we are about’.655 Discussed in the focus groups held for 
this thesis, and more recently still on social media,656 the constitution of a Corps of 
Infantry is an old and recurring idea.657 It generally fails to persuade. Even though ‘the 
autonomy and distinctiveness of individual regiments was appreciably eroded after 
1945’658 the British Army continues to resist the establishment of a single Corps of 
Infantry. The ‘need to unpick 350 years of structural and cultural evolution is not, 
 
650 GS6: 15 Mar 19, 42:50. 
651 Colin S Gray, “What Rand Hath Wrought,” Foreign Policy, 4 (Autumn 1971): 111, https://www.jstor.org/ 
stable/1147739 
652 Kiszely, “What Should We Be Looking For?” 70. 
653 GS1: 23 Jan 19, 17:20. 
654 GS2: 14 Feb 19, 11:23. 
655 GS1: 23 Jan 19, 03:50. 
656 @Average_S0Ldier, 14 Feb 2020, ran on on-line poll on Twitter asking ‘whether the Infantry could/ 
should move into a division based system. This system would have only 1 Infantry capbadge. We would be 
seperated [sic] by divisional flashes dependant on where we work.’ Of 563 votes, 37% supported the 1 
capbadge option; 59% desired to ‘stay as we are’. The results cannot be verified; the sample is uncertain 
but the sentiment is illustrative and in line with my research. do not Accessed at https://twitter.com/ 
Average_S0ldier/status/1228247450407854080 on 01 Mar 2020. 
657 The idea is often dismissed for its perceived negative impact on morale. Those who argue for a Corps 
of Infantry ‘mistake the gold of the infantry regimental system for brass, and want to replace it with cheap 
white metal.’ Major General H. E. N Bredin, “An Interpretation of the Infantry,” BAR 28 (Apr 1968): 39. 
Others suggest it is only ‘passionate, sentimental loyalties’ that prevent its formation. Barnett, Britain and 
Her Army, 489. For a pragmatic serving soldier’s opinion see B. M. Shaw. “The Demise of the Regimental 
System and the Reorganisation of the Infantry.” BAR 116 (Aug 1997): 39-43. 
658 French, Military Identities, 292. 
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currently, pressing.’659  
 
The results of this survey, focus groups and interviews, suggest for each of the three 
identities considered: warrior is thought least relevant, and largely incomprehensible; 
infantry is disliked; it is in regimental identity where a true sense of belonging and identity 
is felt. The inculcation of ethos, and indoctrination, persuades soldiers they are part of 
something bigger but this requires very careful management.660 Once accepted and 
absorbed it becomes a part of one’s identity and a dominant and powerful force. The 
collective effort of one unit considered a warrior battalion was likened to ‘a great stallion 
not quite always under control’ by an officer; you’ve got to harness it; it won’t always do 
what you want it to do but its powerful, and dangerous’ and as such a potent force.661 Not 
every ethos is well articulated, evident or ‘lived’: neither does ethos always appear in 
obvious form. ‘If that’s broadly what a warrior ethos, a warrior organisation is,’ this officer 
continued, ‘then you have to also consider others who aren’t like that.’ They have a 
different ethos, and the army as a broad church comprising soldiers who are not warriors 
was recognised. Where unit ethos isn’t powerful though it can be irrelevant or becomes 
subordinate to another, for example the ‘strong pull’ of a civilian primary group662 for 
soldiers based in the community. This may overwhelm and create divergence663 from the 




Ethos is the spirit or a sense of society. It is built across several levels of reference from 
the shared sense of that which unites humankind through nation to organisation and 
critically in the martial sense, regimentally. It is how one lives in each environment and 
importantly with reference to that environment that matters. Participation ‘may be highest’ 
when individuals are linked at three levels of abstraction (the group, the role, and the 
person). 664  Ethos can cement these three levels through consistent and coherent 
narrative. Neither warrior nor warrior ethos though is accepted as part of British Army 
narrative except where it can be read to existing articulated standards and values and 
then because these are the only reference. In the absence of clarity soldiers seize upon 
the framework they recognise. This retro-fits the term warrior to existing structure and 
allows warrior ethos at best to be simply synonymous with existing models or dismissed 
 
659 Dave, “The British Regimental System.” 
660 Kier applauds the honesty of the military for terming the assimilation of its members into its ethos in as 
indoctrination and not ‘orientation’ or ‘mentoring’. Kier, Imaging War, 28. 
661 GS3: 12 Feb 19, 11:23. 
662 Shils & Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration,” 290. 
663 Ibid., 296. 
664 Stets & Burke, "Identity Theory," 234. 
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as a ‘a made up concept.’ The spirit of the British Army is soldiering, and warriorship is 
an awkward addition to established ethos. 
 
If warrior ethos is ‘a thing’, something specific and new, not fabricated or an exercise in 
rebranding it was supported for its applicability to the infantry. But there were hints of 
unattainability about it: hero worship of those thought more deserving of the accolade;665 
and imposter syndrome where subjects were not prepared to self-award.666 Soldiers 
wanted the title but were uncertain over who qualified or how it is earned. An obvious 
and demonstrable lack of organisational esteem was evident as the infantry self-
contemplated. It was stated that ‘warriorship should be the infantry’s trade’667 and just as 
‘other cap badges promote their trade as the differentiator’668 so too the infantry should 
seize upon and promote warriorship. More than this – ‘we [the infantry] need it.’669 Warrior 
and warrior ethos is a means to regain lost status: 
We’ve tried to make an all-encompassing ‘Belonging’ campaign over the 
last 3 or 4 years which has been useful to certain elements of the Army but 
not been good for the combat arms. I’m trying to get us to regain that centre 
ground, that combat ethos – for example ‘soldier first, tradesmen second’ 
for other arms and services, they use that as a selling point because they 
can show that in Afghanistan etc they too must be able to fight, to ‘do 
combat’, but it means we have lost the ownership of ‘combat’.670 
Where the infantry attempts to monopolise the term warrior it will face a struggle: others 
think they too ‘do combat’ and doing ‘unpleasant stuff’671 isn’t restricted to the infantry. 
Trends suggest that ownership is likely to be further eroded before it is recaptured.672 
 
In their considerations of ethos regimental identity was privileged by soldiers over all else 
and it was this that soldiers could most easily and readily define. ‘The pride is in local 
identities – Fusilier, Ranger, Highlander…, that’s the ‘grippy’ piece, that’s where the 
 
665 Allison and Scott say the original phrase originates in Thomas Carlyle’s work of 1841, On Heroes, 
Hero-worship, and the Heroic in History. Their ‘Hero Leadership Dynamic’ is a useful frame of 
understanding here. It fulfils an ‘epistemic function’ relating to the ‘knowledge and wisdom that hero stories 
impart to us’ and an ‘energizing function’ by inspiring and promoting development. Scott T Allison & 
George R. Goethals, "Hero Worship: The Elevation of the Human Spirit," Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour, 46:2 (2016): 190, https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12094. 
666 ‘Imposter Phenomenon’ is where the individual internally experiences a sense of intellectual phoniness 
– but it is more widely understood now. Pauline Rose Clance & Suzanne Ament Imes, "The Imposter 
Phenomenon in High Achieving Women: Dynamics and Therapeutic Intervention," Psychotherapy: Theory, 
Research & Practice, 15:3 (1978): 241-7, https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/h0086006. 
667 FG12: Officers 02 Nov 18, 42:10. 
668 FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 08:00. 
669 FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 28:10. 
670 GS6: 15 Mar 19, 02:50. This idea that the infantry has lost ground is an historic refrain and recognised 
problem. ‘In 1943 a Director of Infantry was appointed at the War Office to give the infantry a voice on a 
par with other teeth arms.’ French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 71. 
671 GS1: 23 Jan 19, 21:29. 
672 Cyber is now ‘considered a combat arms branch along with infantry, armor, engineer, air defense, field 
artillery and aviation’ and accounted for almost the entirety of the increase in combat arms spots at a 
recent US officer graduation. Brandon O’Connor, “West Point Grads Get Assignments Through New 




meaning is.’673 These are not just titles retained due to some reverence or as ‘memorial 
to the obsolete weapons and techniques of the 18th and 19th centuries.’674 Rather they 
afford ‘combat value’ from a sense of solidarity.675 From that shared stories originate, 
familiarity grows and identity is strengthened. Regional, regimental and historical myth 
has meaning to serving soldiers and the regiment affords ‘a solid identity: that’s where 
the institutionalisation takes place.’676 Uniqueness is important and specific identity is 
powerful, in a way that warrior, soldier, or infantryman, is not and without some significant 
effort will never be. Anand Giridharadas says we need to dig our ‘fingers into the soil’ of 
our human identity predicament.677 The army must do similarly before it elects to impose 
the warrior ethos as a sense of society on the soldiers of the British Army. 
 
 
673 FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 32:40. 
674 French, Military Identities, 341. 
675 Kier, Imagining War, 29. 
676 FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 42:50. 









The British Army, contemplating recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
considering war in the future, has latched onto the term warrior as a reference for its 
soldiers. It promotes warriorship as an endeavour and warrior ethos or spirit as a guiding 
totem. Examined in this thesis for clarity – conceptually and in practice – these notions 
have been found wanting. The British Army has no history of warriorship; in current 
national or strategic culture, warrior ethos is largely alien; and British soldiers do not 
identify as warriors. Worse they regard the term as an imposition: ‘I can see why they 
use it.’1 Where it is attractive it is only as a superficial recommendation. Its insufficiency 
throughout the hierarchy (vertically) and between soldierly trades (horizontally) was 
apparent from my research; and the inherent confusion and contradictions in the terms 
were uncovered in discussion at focus groups, through questionnaire. and interview, and 
from my study of the academic literature. The importance of being deliberate in the 
language used has been demonstrated and the requirement for justification and 
amplification of what is meant by the army when it uses the term warrior has been 
established. Identity theorists and scholars of linguistic philosophy would have us know 
that there is much greater depth to how humans categorise themselves than the 
articulation and promotion of a relatively simple identifying term. 
 
In this concluding chapter, three empirical themes are highlighted. First, I suggest there 
are societal implications where the British Army recommends itself as an army of 
warriors: this must be accounted for. Second, I recommend four types of identifiable 
homo furens: each has specific relevance to soldiering and will influence any drive for 
warriorship. Some are more warrior like than others and the British Army should consider 
where its soldiers currently fit and where it might wish them to fit on the warrior scale. 
Lastly, and maybe most importantly for an institution of long-standing and one with 
considerable responsibilities, there are military implications where warriorship is 
promoted as an underpinning philosophy. 
 
The Army in Society 
 
The traumatic experience of the 1914-18 war brought the death of chivalry and with that 
the romance of warriorship. In its wake it left only residue, the brutality of war, as a 
 
1 FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 00:44 
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recognisable tenet. The Second World War through its impact on home communities 
reinforced the sense that war is hell and there is little to be admired about it, or the 
warrior. Action taken by Hore-Belisha in the 1930s brought British soldiers closer to 
society and by extension made them more compliant with and subject to societal 
pressure and opinion. Warriorship in extreme forms faded further; service was 
proletarianized;2 and society embraced soldiers as fellow citizens. Yet the contemporary 
British Army remains a small and curious separate institution, a ‘boutique’ enterprise 
when compared to mass or conscripted armies: its functions are delivered by select, 
discrete elements of society unknown and unseen by many there. Only 27% of the UK 
population declare themselves willing to fight a war for their country: that task is carried 
out by others.3 This sentiment also makes it difficult to recruit soldiers. The Army is then 
in a difficult position – it is necessarily because of its tasks, size and volunteer base a 
community within but separate from society yet society wishes it integrated and expects 
it to adhere to societal norms and behaviours. 
 
Where the army is ‘un-military’ in its behaviours civilian society queries it;4 where it 
presents in identifiably martial form, it is criticised and risks losing support. The army 
suggests itself as an organisation that is reflective of its domestic base but also demands 
that it be allowed to behave differently. It wishes to be exempt from ‘political correctness, 
incoherent relativism, and empty theorizing’,5 due to the demands it puts upon soldiers 
but it recognises that it must also comply with civilian direction. The civil-military balance 
therefore requires careful management. Warriorship represents a dangerous form of the 
soldiering totem that would unlikely be welcome by society at large and would push the 
army away from society: where it is promoted it would create a gap that would require 
remedial action. In this the army cannot be complacent: ‘public expressions of 
confidence in the military, however laudable and reassuring, should not be taken as 
conclusive evidence that the military is not alienated from civil society.’6 There is a fine 
 
2 Harries-Jenkins, “Military Professionalism,” 119. 
3 “Europe: Poll of People Willing to fight for country,” The Spectator Index, accessed at 
https://brilliantmaps.com/europe-fight-war/ on 02 Dec 19. The poll involved 60,000 persons and a sample 
of around 1000 men and women from each country. Accessible at https://www.gallup-international.bg/en/ 
33483/win-gallup-internationals-global-survey-shows-three-in-five-willing-to-fight-for-their-country/. 
Morocco and Fiji topped the pool at 94%. The country with the fewest people willing to go to war was 
Japan (just 11%). The least belligerent nation in Europe was the Netherlands on 15%. 
4 Robert Crampton, “The Squaddies Who Study Blank Verse,” The Times, 2 Apr 2018, 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-squaddies-who-study-blank-verse-85wzh6ffv. Mark Hookham & Tim 
Ripley, “Focus Groups Make Troops Feel More Valued, says Army’s Senior Sergeant-Major,” The Times, 
27 May 2018, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/80622aa6-611a-11e8-859e-536709dc09ad. 
5 David M. Jones & Mike L. Smith, “Review Article—Noise but No Signal: Strategy, Culture and the 
Poverty of Constructivism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 24:6 (2001): 492-3, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
105761001753210515. 
6 P. Gronke, & P. D. Feaver, “Uncertain Confidence: Civil Military Attitudes about Civil-Military Relations,” 
In P. D Feaver & R. H. Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), at 
http://people.reed.edu/~gronkep/docs/uncertain.pdf on 24 Nov 2019. A summary of evolving societal 
attitudes is at Bobby Duffy, “How British Moral Attitudes Have Changed in the Last 30 Years,” The Policy 
Institute, KCL, 24 Oct 2019 https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-institute/assets/British-moral-attitudes.pdf 
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line here and sudden pronouncements declaring soldiers as warriors where meaning is 
debatable and interpreted according to personal taste, outside of organisational or 
societal expectation could bring the army to an unanticipated position. It is important we 
‘take care not to violate what we know of ourselves’7 but the army must also ensure it 
neither breaches the societal foundations upon which it is built nor blindly adheres to 
external direction. ‘With its emphasis on ritual, tradition, and hierarchy’ the military: 
…is a culture already far removed from the society that it protects. Perhaps 
that is a necessity given the grim nature of its mission. Remove a belief in 
moral autonomy from that culture, replace it with simple obedience and that 
divide becomes unhealthy.8 
Maintaining harmony between the nation and its armed forces is a tricky balancing act 




Determining what is meant by ‘warrior’ is not as simple as defining war then extrapolating 
from there: the warrior is not simply one who makes war. War is a collective endeavour 
with the state or a political grouping at its heart as primary agent: warriors can be 
peripheral; soldiers predominant. Conversely the warrior can be central to fighting and 
war. ‘Aggression is a feeling in an individual, but it is a choice in a state.’9 The state 
conducts its wars through its soldiers; the warrior fights – in state-centric war or otherwise 
as the opportunity presents itself. The two concepts – war and the warrior – may align 
but equally they may not: the two terms are neither mutually dependent nor inclusive.  
 
Where the individual is concerned two main schools exist on the origins of warriorship: 
they are based on nature or nurture, or as I recommend, Being and Doing. The schools 
have homo furens at the extremes as automaton and protector, killer and psychopath. 
Dichotomies such as this prevail whenever warriorship is examined: the institutional over 
the occupational soldier; the fighter who acts in the interest of service against those who 
act for themselves; those who choose to fight and those who are compelled; the selfless 
and the selfish for instance. Clarity over what is meant is elusive. To create greater 
precision, I split the term homo furens and into 4 distinct variants: 
• The Servant-Warrior; 
• The Stoic-Warrior; 
• The Warrior-Soldier; 
• The Warrior-Berserker. 
 
7 Haslam et al, New Psychology, 149. 
8 Milburn, “When Not To Obey Orders.” 
9 Grayling, War, 231. 
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It is critical where warrior is used as an identifying term that the variant under discussion 
is declared. From that behaviours can be anticipated. The classifications are not absolute 
but the first two according to my analysis qualify as ‘Soldiers’: the second two are 
Warriors. The variants allow the observer to better categorise homo furens. 
 
Implications for the Army 
 
Where the army continues to pursue ‘warrior’ as a descriptor for its soldiers, and 
determines the variant it prefers, it might apply the title to all soldiers, some soldiers, a 
lesser few or to none. Of these options adopting it as the universal descriptor for every 
soldier in the army is the most ill-considered. Few of the infantry soldiers consulted, who 
I expected to identify as warriors did so, and many actively challenged the term. To apply 
it more widely outside of the infantry and across all branches would be even more 
questionable and ineffective. It competes poorly with trade identities, regimental 
association, functional affiliation, unit mythology and historical attachment and even 
some specified ranks and designations that are deemed more important.  
 
What binds the soldiers of the British Army together is their shared identity as soldiers: 
warrior competes with this association and could supplant it – but then likely only for 
some soldiers. It implies an approach separate, and not necessarily complementary, 
more likely overwhelming, to aspects of soldiering and reduces the scope of that 
endeavour. Where warrior becomes a universal identifier, synonymous with soldiering, 
there could be no differentiation in fitness standards for example, more ‘appropriate 
health mitigation strategies’ 10  would be required, there could be no separation of 
‘bayonets’ from ‘enablers’ with all treated as warriors. Its employment as a general 
descriptor would then inevitably lead to erosion or compromise of the skills for which the 
army employs its non-infantry and non-combat soldiers. Enhanced combat training to a 
credible warrior standard would require additional time, resourcing and energy – and 
likely demand a fundamental review of recruitment strategy for instance. Defining the 
term against its existing stipulated standards and values is a hollow offer: soldiering 
doesn’t translate seamlessly into warriorship. 
 
The army might confine the title to just some soldiers, an idea being discussed in the US 
where until recently the ‘warrior mindset’ was ingrained as an aspirational universal term 
across the army. There, consideration is now being given to ‘a grand reorganization of 
the military, whereby a small component of fighters is complemented by a larger corps 
 
10 Dominic Nicholls, “Shock and Awe: We've Been on Front Line For Years, Say Women, As Royal 




of military professionals.’11 The UK might separate similarly obvious communities like the 
infantry or those with stoic-warrior tendencies from others. Formally recognising the 
community that pursues excellence in combat as their profession just as law is the focus 
for the legal advisor and logistics for the supply expert would impress those in the combat 
arms. However, soldiers also demanded support where they are expected to flourish and 
succeed as warriors. They feel constrained and believe that policy doesn’t allow them to 
pursue warriorship; that society isn’t supportive; and the army won’t accept what they 
perceive as the risks involved in adopting a warrior posture and behaviour or the 
possibility of their breaching of assumed boundaries. The army ‘as a corporation does 
little to foster’12 the yearning for warriorship, and societal norms are not conducive. 
Where some soldiers are to be known as warriors there is a requirement to afford the 
earning of the status some greater substance and investment beyond basic training or 
doctrinal statement, or the title is an empty offer. 
 
Warriorship as an endeavour was often mentioned as something that goes beyond 
training: it is more personal, an issue of essence and ‘calling’, or nature over nurture and 
could be applied on a more limited basis to a much lesser few. The most obvious 
contemporary candidates are those in ‘high-end’ or elite infantry units – soldiers in the 
Parachute Regiment according to those who offered an opinion for this thesis or perhaps 
those of the nascent Specialist Infantry Battalions.13 Outside the army. the Royal Marines 
and Special Forces could be eligible for this more select and elite club.  
Whereas in previous eras an entire army could cast a compelling warrior 
archetype (e.g. the Spartans or the Apaches) now it seems the bar has 
been raised and that “warrior” is defined primarily by groups that consist of 
those hand-picked from larger formations.14 
This community already exists separate from the larger formation of ‘line infantry’ or 
county regiments that comprise the bulk of the infantry, and are trained to higher, and 
specialist, standards. By selecting these units, and declaring them warriors, the army 
maximises its chances of capturing those who likely already have a higher risk appetite, 
a desire to indulge in the act of combat and who have been tested previously to a 
standard beyond that of the soldier-servant or soldier-warrior: these are ‘twice volunteer’ 
soldiers, and the warrior-soldiers of the offered model at Fig. 3.3. They sit within the 
higher echelons of the martial community, the top 20% or less. 
Where a more select cohort is to be known as warriors there is a requirement to better 
 
11 Steven Metz, “Does Every U.S. Soldier Really Need to Know How to Fight the Enemy?” World Politics 
Review, dated 07 Oct 2016, at https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/20130/does-every-u-s-soldier-
really-need-to-know-how-to-fight-the-enemy. 
12 CO30. 
13 A ‘game-changing new capability for the army’ comprising expert soldiers and expert instructors’ that will 
be fully operational according to the British Army website by October 2019, at https://www.army.mod.uk/ 
who-we-are/formations-divisions-brigades/6th-united-kingdom-division/specialised-infantry-group/  
14 Connable, “Warrior-Maverick Culture,” 52. 
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understand the nature of homo furens. The research conducted for this thesis is 
necessarily curtailed in terms of psychological insight but there are swathes of secondary 
research, much detailed here, that point to the relevance of nature as well as nurture in 
the cultivation of warriorship. The possibility of unacceptable, unfamiliar and 
unsanctioned behaviours borne of individual motivation is recognised in clinical circles. 
Using this understanding, warriors can then be understood beyond their volunteer status 
and more so as a defined and definable Type. This is the top 1-2%,15 the soldiers that 
one CO said numbered ‘fewer than five’16 in his experience, who would be recruited and 
trained with conscious recognition of their potential and likely following the benefit and 
support of neurological and psychometric testing.17 We test for academic ability but not 
mental robustness or suitability of temperament. Yet they too are pertinent to warriorship. 
In the US, scores in a test for perseverance and passion ‘bore absolutely no relationship’ 
to the academic exam results, appraisals of leadership potential and assessment of 
physical fitness so painstakingly calculated during the admissions process. 18  
 
This would be controversial but greater danger exists where homo furens brimming with 
passion and ‘dark traits’ enlists but is unacknowledged. Their actuality could lead to the 
unrecognised ‘creation of a new combat arm.’19 Elite infantry units have high standards 
and are ‘tasked with the most dangerous and difficult missions’; they have a highly 
developed esprit de corps (that can encourage arrogance and even ‘contempt for 
others’).20 A ‘them and us’ paradigm can play out internal to the elite unit too.21 Other 
troops, both infantry or otherwise  neither claim the same history of soldiering nor do they 
have ‘fixed preconceptions about their own ‘toughness’: they are ‘less sneering’22 about 
activities outside of warfighting: more elite soldiers, here warriors, would incline to all of 
this. The danger in failing to recognise an existential elite is that a ‘microscopic 
condensation’ or concentration of only specific parts of the larger force they represent 
can grow within.23 Creating a framework within which the Type could be recognised and 
utilised to best effect would allow control but, critically, this would run contrary to the 
 
15 The current ‘Full Time Trade Trained Strength’ (having completed training is 73,470. This 1-2% is then 
less than 750 homo furens, or a single battalion of soldiers. UK MOD. UK Armed Forces Quarterly Service 
Personnel Statistics, dated 1 Oct 2019, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/847640/1_October_2019_SPS.pdf on 24 Nov 2019. 
16 CO22. 
17 This is gaining traction as an idea. Haley Britzky, “Army Officers Wanting to Become Battalion 
Commanders Will Now Undergo a Psychological Exam,” Task and Purpose, 13 Nov 2019, 
https://taskandpurpose.com/army-battalion-commander-assessment  
18 Angela Duckworth, Grit: The Power of Passion and  Perseverance, (London: Vermilion, 2016), 9 
19 Rosen Winning the Next War, 7. 
20 King, Combat Soldier, 393. 
21 Dan Lamothe, “Troops Charged in Green Beret’s Death in Mali Planned to Record Him Being Sexually 
Assaulted, Marine says” The Washington Post, 5 Jun 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-
security/2019/06/05/troops-charged-green-berets-death-mali-planned-record-him-being-sexually-
assaulted-marine-says/  
22 Burke, Army of Tribes, 73. 
23 Snydor, Soldiers of Destruction, 342, 345. 
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stated belief that ‘the British Army is the ultimate team’24 and so a clash of narratives 
occurs. Where obvious exception and privilege is afforded, the claim of a one team 
approach lacks credibility. 
 
The final option is to cease using the term warrior altogether when describing British 
soldiers. This is in line with Moskos’ basic hypothesis that western militaries are moving 
from an institutional format to one more and more resembling that of an occupation. The 
term warrior then has less relevance and soldiers match their standards and behaviours 
against a professional not historical, emotional or mythical charter. This option aligns 
with the observable shift in some western militaries away from the term warrior, popular 
again only in the last two decades or so, and back to the more familiar title of soldier. 
Soldier is a more inclusive term, it implies regimented, responsive and controlled activity. 
It encompasses all trades and functions, reserves and regulars, ethnicities and genders 
and is recognisable as applicable to and at every rank. It is less contestable than warrior, 
that at its extremes can mean psychopath or Berserker. These are not standards to 
which British soldiers aspire – but the type is inextricably linked to warriorship and warrior 
cannot be applied to their exclusion without considerable explanation of that fact. 
 
Alongside policy considerations, a number of areas for further research fell from my 
study. The implications of the formal enlistment and integration of women into British 
combat units will be exciting for its impact on warrior ethos; so too it will be interesting in 
years to come to examine how the recruits that were attracted to the army by the promise 
of warriorship as a recruiting strategy read the army’s ethos once trained and with 
experience serving with their units. The study concentrated on the infantry: it would be 
intriguing to carry out similar research with Royal Navy and Royal Air Force personnel 
who contemplate warriorship in those services. The Special Forces community both in 
UK and elsewhere, where access and ethical clearance can be gained, would present a 
fascinating case study particularly where clinical study can be made of motivations 
inherent in their choice to offer themselves for selection in what must be the most 
warriorlike undertaking. The suggestion that any study of warriorship should first consult 
a unit’s discipline record is also something I wish I had the time and opportunity to do. 
 
Mythology and Martial Identity in the British Army 
 
The critical junctures presented by the recent wars were significant but scarcely of the 
same momentous impact as, for example, the World Wars of the 20th Century. The 
rationale for the relaunch, unofficial or otherwise, of British soldier identity on the back of 
 
24 UK MOD, ‘A Soldier's Values and Standards.’ 
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these wars is therefore questionable. Other influences have bearing. The promotion of 
warrior ethos at a time of lowered military operations reminds soldiers of their purpose; 
it has the potential to boost morale and will guard against the army becoming ‘soft’ from 
anticipated, prolonged periods of time in barracks. The stipulation of a warrior code 
recalibrates soldiers’ thinking away from ‘the years of campaigning in Afghanistan and 
Iraq – back to warfighting’.25 Presenting soldiers as warriors when the touchpoint of 
combat operations is unavailable also allows the organisation and the veteran generation 
of the 2000s – a critical body of opinion formers – to embrace newly enlisted officers and 
soldiers through shared warrior identity. However, the use of the title warrior to describe 
British soldiers should not be underestimated for its potential impact. It provides a new 
model and repositions the army. ‘Models derived from developmental analysis bridge the 
empirical world of today with the social forms of the future. Put plainly, what is the likely 
shape of the military in the foreseeable future?’26  
 
Where deftly handled creating a bridge to a new identity would be effective. It will appeal 
to would-be soldiers, increase recruitment as well as retention, and importantly allow the 
infantry, the cornerstone of combat operations, where the term is so confined, improved 
and enhanced status. Building that bridge and persuading soldiers to cross it, to extend 
the metaphor, is no easy feat. The British Army’s most dearly-held memories can be 
viewed in its regimental messes. These memories hail from recent though still historical 
times (around 1800) though Britain’s martial history extends well before. Activity across 
the spectrum of operations is remembered from manning entrenched positions on the 
bridge at Arnhem, patrolling in Northern Ireland and more recently fighting insurgents in 
Iraq or Afghanistan. Those consulted for this thesis understood ‘post-martialism’ as a 
real consideration and recognised that as an institution the army must also defend its 
position as a warfighting organisation – but they are not exclusively focussed on 
warfighting. They appreciated the stories that give meaning, for their explanatory value 
and as a ‘cure for horror’ whether real or anticipated and recognised warrior spirit, mostly 
through demonstrations of defence over attack and always in actions considered ‘tough 
soldiering’ but the pageantry associated with warriorship was unfamiliar, or irrelevant. 
What was relevant was the wide and varied employments and deployments that British 
soldiers expect – ‘warrior’ duties are only one consideration among many.  
 
Senior officers think infantry soldiers associate primarily with the infantry and that this is 
their key identity: they then associate regimentally.  
There is an internal market that requires servicing to make obvious the elite 
club we are in as infantrymen. We have our regimental clubs but we are 
 
25 GS6: 15 Mar 19, 05:10. 
26 Moskos, “From Institution to Occupation,” 41. 
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trying to get back to the idea that you are first and foremost an infantryman 
then you have your regimental affiliation.27 
Many of the soldiers consulted reordered this hierarchy. Membership of the infantry or 
any other collective identity came a distant second to local small group identity: soldiers 
would even identify in opposition to those who shared their functional purpose, their 
fellow infantry soldiers. That the infantry is more important than the army is a fair 
conclusion; but regimental identity is more keenly felt than anything else. The army as a 
collection of regiments is preferred over some organisational collective. Within the 
hierarchy, however ordered, ‘warrior’ as a term of identification was absent. Soldiers 
don’t use it and they were confused by what it meant. Those consulted had no agreed 
definition and the term was simultaneously meaningful and inspiring but also banal or 
misleading. It lacks authenticity and was regarded as an imposition. Soldiers are drawn 
to the idea of being warriors but cautious about seizing the term: they are also acutely 
aware of likely societal objection to their being permitted to be warriors. Some expressed 
a personal aversion to the term, and it is highlighted again that almost half of soldiers 
consulted had ‘no opinion’ (40% overall) on whether they were warriors.  
 
The word warrior is not an organic reflection of British Army culture. It is not fully 
understood: there is no agreed definition and the term is imprecise to the point that it can 
be meaningless. Poorly prescribed, it lacks resonance and will therefore gain limited 
purchase in British society, British Army organisational culture and with British soldiers. 
This is concerning but represents the least bothersome outcome – its impact may be an 
irritation or irrelevance, an issue worthy only of debate and discussion. A more worrying 
and deleterious consequence is where its casual unattended introduction results in 
behaviour contrary to army intent and stated culture. It is ‘one thing to create a social 
force. It is another to wield it to maximum effect.’28 Warrior is a device seized upon to 
promote the Army and show it in a positive light but its potential instead to cause damage 
should be recognised.29 To define, train and present the army as one of warriors, or 
privilege one element as such (‘even the most minimal interventions’ can cause in-group 
favouritism),30 would create an organisation quite different to today’s British Army with 
implications for 21st Century soldiering. Where this is mishandled and promoted in an 
uncontrolled manner without conscious effort, and greater and more explicit qualification 
beyond the base level of the Army’s ‘Values and Standards’ it could lead, by extension, 
to a formal or acknowledged informal separation of part of the army from the rest, or the 
 
27 GS7: 29 Mar 19, 10:54. 
28 Haslam et al, New Psychology, 213. 
29 Commander 12 AI Brigade tweet: @Comd12AIBde 17 Aug 2019. The challenge is ‘to avoid narrow 
ideas of what a 21st C professional soldier does. 'Warrior' is only an (important) first step…care is also 
required; warrior ethos can distance us from the nuances of our role and the people we serve.’ 
30 George A. Akerlof, foreword to Haslam et al, New Psychology, xiii. 
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British Army from allies, or home society. It would therefore be prudent to counter any 
tendency toward wholesale adoption of the term warrior and consider it instead as an 
ongoing ‘developmental construct’31 that is not yet ready to be embraced and is neither 
ready as a bridge. It may apply in certain instances and to some individuals, but it is not 
convincing as currently employed; nor is it a fitting sobriquet for British soldiers 
 
Where the title is to gain meaning the most significant challenge will be in how society 
chooses to embrace and define the warrior. 
War is wholly unlike diplomacy or politics because it must be fought by men 
whose values and skills are not those of politicians or diplomats. They are 
those of a world apart, a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the 
everyday world but does not belong to it. Both worlds change over time, 
and the warrior world adapts in step to the civilian. It follows it, however, at 
a distance. The distance can never be closed, for the culture of the warrior 
can never be that of civilization itself.32 
The warrior exists; these are not mythical figures, though they are inspired by myth, and 
the warrior identity can be assumed to be real but it demands deep consideration and 
careful application. British army culture is also existential: it too is based on myth but not 
necessarily the mythology that promotes warriorship, and certainly not on that which 
recommends the warrior at the extremes of the model I have constructed.  
 
British soldiers serve a liberal society and operate within liberal norms. The research I 
conducted brings me to the conclusion that ‘the liberal warrior’ is an oxymoron33 and 
warrior is not a term appropriate for the contemporary British soldier. The terms soldier 
and warrior are distinct and should not be treated as synonyms. Soldier is a refined term 
with contemporary benchmark examples for comparison, and recognisable historical 
evolution to draw on. It is comprehensible. Open to much wider interpretation, warrior is 
less familiar to the martial landscape on which western forces like the British Army now 
find themselves. It is a curious and irrelevant term when applied to the many and varied 
circumstances that soldiers today find themselves in. Warriorship, individually found, is 
grounded in evolutionary psychology where our brains and therefore behaviour remain 
similar to our ancestors: for this reason alone it can be taboo and is therefore only 
selectively engaged with. Soldier, a collective endeavour, is a term centred on social 
psychology and learned behaviours. 
The dilemma for the army lies in its desire for greater recognition for its soldiers. It wants 
them, at least in part, to be known warriors but must be careful this does not lead to their 
 
31 Involving scrutiny or the past and identification of current trends this is ‘a statement of expectations 
concerning the future expressed in certain core concepts.’ Heinz Eulau, “H. D. Lasswell’s Developmental 
Analysis,” Western Political Quarterly, 11:2 (Jun 1958): 231, https://doi.org/10.1177/106591295801100205 
32 Keegan, A History of Warfare, xvi. 
33 Payne, Psychology of Modern Conflict, 172. 
 
213 
alienation. It needs to maintain a whole force focus to its endeavours and cannot promote 
elitism. It is also obliged and acknowledges the necessity of recruiting on a wide basis: 
to afford access to as many prospective recruits as possible necessitates compromise 
against warrior standards. Lastly society will unlikely let the army be warriors to the extent 
that some of its soldiers might wish and certainly will not accept soldiers at the extremes 
of the warrior scale explained in this thesis. Constraints on warriorship are real, 
opposition to warrior behaviours is predictable, and the army, representative of the nation 
and a lever of government, must recognise this. The quick adoption of the term warrior 
to describe British Army soldiers might now be challenged less it leads ‘to annihilation of 
identity rather than its actualization.’ 34  We are warned against leaving crucial 
considerations that affect understanding and assumptions unchallenged. 35  ‘What’s 
surprising, perhaps, is how profoundly a single word can shape material outcomes over 
time.’36 Considering how better to reinforce existing identity, through words recognisable 
to British soldiers and that they point to as providing them with meaning, before imposing 
something confusing, confounding and restrictive, would be prudent. The British Army 
must protect its heritage and the mythology that is embraced, and not some false 
promise or a word alien and unappreciated by those who fill its ranks. 
  
 
34 John T Kuehn, “The Cult of the Warrior - Helpful or...Silly, or...Dangerous?” Blog Post published 29 May 
2018, at https://networks.h-net.org/node/12840/blog/hand-grenade-week/1875375/cult-warrior-helpful-
orsilly-ordangerous on 08 Dec 2019. 
35 Ford, “Learning the Right Lessons,” 259. 
36 Alter, “The Power of Names.” 
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Appendix A: Data Collation and Themes – Q9 ‘Iconic Events’ 
 
Waterloo (43) 65 inc. 
Peninsular (9) 




Salamanca (1)  
Barossa (1) 
Hougomont Farm (1) 
Nelson (1) 
 
Rorke’s Drift (11) 15 inc. 
Isandlwana (3) 
Zulu Wars (1) 
 



















El Alamein (7) 
Kohima (7) 
North Africa (6)  
Burma (5) 











St Nazaire (1) 
Montgomery (1) 
Monte Cassino (1) 
Mandalay (1) 
 
Korea (9) 15 inc. 
Imjin (6) 
 
Northern Ireland (16) 18 inc. 
Bloody Sunday (2) 
 
Falklands (37) 40 inc. 
Mount Harriet (1 
Two Sisters (1) 
Goose Green (1) 
 
Iraq (20) 32 inc. 
Telic (4) 
Basra (3) 
Gulf War1 (2) 
Camp Bread Basket (1) 
Gulf War 2 (1) 
Kuwait (1) 
 
Afghanistan (33) 65 inc. 
Herrick (8) 
Musa Qala (7) 
Helmand (5) 
Sangin (3) 
Anglo Afghan Wars (1) 
Retreat from Kabul (1) 
Panther’s Claw (1) 
Panchai Palang (1) 
Al Amarrah (1) 
Abu Ghraib (1) 
Abu Moussa (1) 
Moshtarak (1) 
Sgt Blackman (1) 
 
Outlier mentions (Non-Thematic) 
 
Wars of Spanish Succession 8 
Blenheim 1704 (3) 
John Churchill (1) 
Malplaquet 1709 (1) 
Marlborough (1) 
Outenarde 1708 (1) 
Ramillies 1706 (1) 
 
Crimea (3) 9 inc. 
Alma 1854 (3) 
Balaclava 1854 (3) 
 
India 6 
Ferozeshah 1854 (1) 
Indian Mutiny 1857 (1) 
Plassey 1757 (2) 




Boyne 1690 (2) 
Dettingen 1743 (1) 
Minden 1759 (3) 
Quebec 1759 (1) 
First of June 1794 (1) 
Amritsar 1919 (1) 
Anglo-China Wars 1839-60 (1) 
Boer War 1899 (3) 
Palestine 1917 or 1948? (2) 
Malaya 1948-60 (1) 
Borneo 1964-66 (1) 
Mirbat 1972 (1) 
Iranian Embassy 1982 (2) 
Bosnia 1992 (1) 
Sierra Leone 2000 (1) 
Empire (1) 
Ceremonial/Presentation of Colours (2) 
Remembrance Day/Remembrance (2) 
 










Northern Ireland (16) 
Normandy (15) 




El Alamein (7) 
Kohima (7) 
Musa Qala (7) 
Agincourt (6) 
Imjin (6) 









Appendix B: Data Collation and Thematic Codes – Q7 ‘Describe Warrior’ 
 




Modern Soldier (3) 
Soldiering (2) 
Highly-schooled (1) 
Not gang member (1) 
Not executioner (1) 
 
Fighting (22) 64 inc. 
Fighter (15) 
Physical (12) 
Hand to Hand (3) 
Fighting Spirit (2) 
Relishes Combat (2) 
Combat Focussed (1) 
Combat ready (1) 
Close Armed Combat (1) 
Close Quarter (1) 
Unarmed Combat (1) 
Warrior spirit (1) 
Aggressive (2) 
 
Other 59 inc. 










Distinctly different (1) 









Roman Centurion (1) 
Primitive Creature (1) 
Historic origin (1) 
Old-fashioned term (1) 
Outdated view (1) 
Criminality (1) 
 







Not 9-5 mentality (1) 
Way of thinking (1) 
Ready and willing (1) 
Will to fight (1) 
Skin-in-the-game (1) 
 
Combat (16) 32 inc. 
Close Combat (4) 
Front-line (4) 
Violence (4) 
Purposeful violence (2) 
Violent (2) 
 




Greater Good (2) 
Values (2) 
Honour (2)  
Serve (2) 
Greater than oneself (1) 
Greater ideal (1) 
Responsibilities (1) 
Comrades above self (1) 
Preparedness to die (1) 
Self-sacrificing (1) 
Selflessness (1) 
Morally guided (1)  
Honourable (1) 
 









Combat Hardened (1) 
Tested In Combat (1) 
Operationally proven (1) 
 











Outlier significant mentions  
 
Different things to different people 




Serving own interest 
Uncomfortable things 
Does what most won't 








Defeat the enemy 
Original meaning 
Citizen soldiers 





Ready to fight 
Built to fight 
Self-confident 
Group identity 









Will to fight 
Mission first 









Hard to find/Rare 
Steely eyed 
Brotherhood 










Top Mentions: Base Themes 
‘Soldier’ (25) 
‘Fighting’ (22) 
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